

SECRETS *of the*
BALKANS

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

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SECRETS OF THE BALKANS



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SEVEN YEARS OF A DIPLOMATIST'S LIFE
IN THE STORM CENTRE OF EUROPE

By

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

UNITED STATES ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY
TO ROUMANIA, SERBIA AND BULGARIA, 1913-1920

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FOREWORD

A BLOW struck in the Balkans, as of steel upon flint; a spark, a flame—and then, the holocaust of the world!

But the blow came from without; the hand of tyranny was raised against a people whose freedom had been bought with their own blood.

The World War began in the Balkans, yet its origin was in the hearts of the unscrupulous autocrats whose ruthless ambition knew neither justice nor limit; who counted the subjection of a free people merely as the first move in the game to win commercial and political supremacy, and in the end, to dominate the world. Serbia was only a pawn, to be swept aside as the first obstacle in the path of world conquest.

This, then, is the story of the Balkanic Nations, from the earliest times, dealing briefly with the many centuries of invasion, oppression and continual fighting for liberty, and dwelling in detail on the heroic struggle in the great cataclysm, when their lands were again coveted as spoils of war.

In the narration is revealed intimate and positive knowledge of cause and effect, events and conditions, gained in seven years of constant and close association with rulers and subjects, in the full confidence that is born only of companionship in affliction.

The work is intended to shed light on the causes and results of the world's most monstrous crime, in the hope that the knowledge will help in the consummation of the great ideal of all civilization—a Peace on Earth which shall endure until the end of time.

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

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SECRETS OF THE BALKANS



KING PETER OF SERBIA

SECRETS OF THE BALKANS

CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY OF THE BALKAN NATIONS

TO understand fully the Balkan situation at the outset of the World War, it is necessary to know the history of the several states through their many centuries of almost continual bloody strife.

The Balkans have been termed "The Hotbed of European Politics." To one not conversant with the facts, this might seem to imply that the inhabitants of this area were natural trouble makers; that all the strife originated here, and kept the peaceful nations outside in a constant state of anxiety.

But the truth is that, owing to its natural resources and its geographical position, the Balkan Peninsula has ever been a tempting prize, to be won by conquest, and it has been the victim of more invasions, and consequent devastation, than any other civilized region on earth.

The peoples of the different states have at times quarrelled and fought with each other, and occasionally one took a slice of the other's territory, but in the main their wars have been waged with invaders who sought to enslave them, or with their conquerors, whose yoke of slavery they bravely threw off.

During very many of the last fifteen hundred years they were engaged in war, but almost always they were fighting for freedom.

To the vicissitudes of fortune through which they have passed, from peace and plenty to utter misery, the physical hardiness and indomitable spirit of the present day temperamental Balkanic peoples may be ascribed.

The Balkan Peninsula is situated in southeastern Europe, touching the Adriatic, Ægean and Black Seas. Balkan is a Turkish word, applied to a range of mountains. This range, terminating at the Black Sea, is really an extension of the Carpathians. Generally the country is hilly, with an abundance of water supplied to the fertile valleys by rivers and many small streams. In early times there were the provinces of Paunonia, Dalmatia, Thrace, Mœsia and Dacia, the latter comprising modern Walachia and Transylvania. These provinces were united by Emperor Trajan, and up to the end of the third century were benefited by the influences of Roman civilization.

During the reign of Constantine the Great, in the fourth century, the Huns came from Asia and settled on the European shores of the Black Sea. Later on, the empire was divided, the western portion being Latin and the eastern part Greek. By both, the Albanians were driven to their present territory. At times, the Christians on the peninsula waged war on each other. In the fifth century, the Huns occupied the present Hungarian territory, frequently raiding and devastating sections of the Balkan Peninsula. In the year 453 the Huns returned to Asia, but in the latter part of the century they again invaded the Balkans. As a result of the constant invasions and warfare, the Balkan inhabitants lapsed into a state of semi-barbarism.

In the sixth century, the Slavs first appeared, coming from what is now Galicia in Poland. They were a peaceful people, with little organization and no important leaders, but with them came hordes of the Avars, who were a type similar to the Huns, and equally dreaded. But early in the eighth century the Avars disappeared,

and the Slavs spread out all over the country. Those who entered Macedonia and Greece lost their identity, and the few who remained in Dacia transmitted to the present Roumanian language its words of Slavic origin. With the expulsion of the Avars, Greek settlers appeared and later these and the Slavs intermarried.

The exact date of the advent of the Serbians in the Balkan Peninsula is uncertain, but they were known to be in the Byzantine provinces in the year 637. The first Serbian state was established at the end of the eighth century under the leader Zupan of Zagorye, under whose grandson the limits of Serbia were considerably extended. After his death, Serbia lost her independence and became part of Bulgaria under Kings Boris First, Simeon, and Samuel. After the death of the latter, in 1018, Serbia became part of Byzantium, and remained under Greek control until the latter part of the twelfth century, when Stephan Nemanya united the Serbians in revolt. He founded the Nemanyich dynasty, which ruled until 1371. His son Stephan was proclaimed the first Serbian king, and a later descendant was King Stephan Dushan Nemanyich, who united in one kingdom Serbia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and part of Macedonia. He was called Emperor of the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians.

He made civil and criminal laws, and the empire generally prospered during his reign, but after his sudden death in 1355, dissension arose, and the great empire was divided under different rulers. King Lazar, of the Nemanyich dynasty, who ruled the northern portion, attempted to unite all the neighboring countries in a great drive against the Turks. But they were disastrously defeated by the Turks under Sultan Murad First, on the field of Kosovo, June 15, 1389, both leaders losing their lives.

Serbian independence continued only until 1459, when the Turks became masters of the entire Balkan Peninsula, and thereafter, for over three hundred years, the Serbians and other conquered nations were treated with great cruelty and oppression. They had no rights or privileges whatever and were forced to pay heavy tribute.

The Turkish oppression became unbearable, and the first steps to throw off the yoke were taken by a number of the young men of Serbia, who organized in bands and made their haven in the mountains. These were known as the Hajduks (Hydooks). Whenever instances of Turkish cruelty became known to them, they were swift and terrible in their vengeance, and they became so greatly feared that tyrannous actions ceased in many places. Through them, the Serbian church and the Violonists (Gooslars), the memory of former Serbian independence was kept alive.

Among the Turks, the real fighters were the Janissaries. These were young men who had been stolen in childhood from Christian parents, and had been reared as Turks and given only military education and training. Under Turkish guidance they were made cruel and merciless to the utmost. Only the diabolical Turkish mind could conceive of making fiends of men in order to turn them unwittingly against their own flesh and blood.

Under the orders of their Dahees, or Captains, the Janissaries set about the execution of the most prominent Serbians. In one week, the heads of one hundred and fifty leading men were sent to the Janissaries' headquarters in Belgrade, and very few in that section were able to escape. Among those who did escape at this time was Georges Petrovitch, called Kara Georges, or

Georges the Black, the leader of the Hajduks living in the village of Popola. All able-bodied men who could gain the mountain retreats were organized in 1804 under the leadership of Kara Georges, and descending on the Janissaries, they speedily put them to death. In 1805, the Serbians won a decisive battle with the Turks, and in 1807, Serbia was free, from Drina to Timok.

Kara Georges at times was as violent as he was brave. He declared to the Serbians who sought his leadership that he would kill anyone who disobeyed him, but the answer was that they wanted just that kind of a man.

To the unspeakable woe of Serbia, the English and French did not approve of her struggle for independence, and they inflicted great damage on the Serbian revolutionists in a great battle at Cuprije. In their desperate dilemma, the Serbians turned to Russia, and were there promised support, but the Russians being obliged to make peace in Bucharest in 1812, the unfortunate Serbians were again left friendless.

Then Georges the Black was stricken with typhus, and the Turks attacked Serbia on three sides and gained an easy victory. Later Kara Georges left his country in order to consult with the Russian Czar, but he was detained by the military commandant at Varazdin, and therefore failed to see the Czar. In October, 1813, complete defeat of the Serbians was accomplished, and from that time to the end of January, 1815, Belgrade was a shambles, with a multitude of Serbians the victims.

After the departure of Georges the Black and other prominent men, Serbia was bereft of all her capable leaders, save one. This was Miloch Obrenovitch, who declared to his people that he would not forsake them in any circumstances. But with the Turks, Miloch

dissembled. He came to Belgrade to offer the submission of the Serbians, and was accepted by the Turks as the Serbian representative. On the surface he kept everything peaceful for eighteen months, but at the same time he was secretly organizing the Serbians.

In 1815 he led the Serbians successfully against the Turks in several battles, and in 1816 Serbia was granted autonomy. Immediately after this, Kara Georges returned, which fact was reported by Veyvoda Miloch to the Turkish Vizier in Belgrade, who at once demanded Georges' head. Soon after, Kara Georges was killed while asleep, and some of the Serbians accused Miloch of the murder. This started a feud between the two families of Obrenovitch and Georgevitch, which resulted in the assassination of Prince Michael Obrenovitch in 1868, and of King Alexander, the last Obrenovitch, in 1903.

Veyvoda Miloch made an excellent leader. He was a good statesman, diplomat and business man. Under his rule the peasants were given land, and allowed to keep what they occupied. In 1817 he was given the title of Prince of Serbia, which rank was approved by the Russians and the Turks. He had a serious dispute with Russia regarding the form of government, Miloch claiming that the authority should be vested in him and in the Skuptstina, or Parliament, under the constitution which he granted the people, but as he had proclaimed this constitution without first obtaining the consent of Russia and the Sublime Porte, he was obliged to withdraw it, and Russia and Turkey substituted a new constitution under which the power was vested in a senate consisting of seventeen members, who were controlled by the Porte. His opposition to this made enemies, who,



CZAR FERDINAND OF BULGARIA

with the assistance of Russia, compelled him to abdicate in 1839. His son, Obrenovitch III, succeeded him, but in a short time he was also compelled to leave the country.

In 1847, Alexander Karageorgevitch, son of Georges the Black, was called to the throne. During his reign, Serbia was at peace with the Porte and with Austria. He incurred the enmity of Russia after the defeat of that country in the Crimean war. Russia expected Serbia to engage Turkey in war, but the Senate voted against it, and from that time, Austrian influence in Serbia was stronger than Russian. But Russian machinations succeeded in turning the Serbian people against Prince Alexander as an Austrophile, and he was deposed in 1858.

Miloch Obrenovitch was then called from exile to the throne, but he died in a short time, and his son, Michael Obrenovitch III, was again made ruler. He succeeded in having all the Turkish fortresses in Serbia turned over to the Serbians, having gained the approval of the European Powers, which removed the last vestige of Turkish control in Serbia. Less than a year later he was murdered near Belgrade, and while it was charged the deed was done by friends of the Karageorgevitch dynasty, no proof was secured.

As he left no heirs, Milan, the son of Prince Michael, took the throne as Obrenovitch. Being only fourteen years old, a vice-regent acted for him. During the vice-regency, two political parties were formed, the Progressionist and the Radical. In 1871, when Prince Milan became of age, he sided with the Radicals, but in 1880 he turned to the Progressionists. In 1876 he declared war against Turkey, but was defeated. This war caused Czar Alexander II to proclaim war against Turkey.

After the fall of Plevna, the Serbian army joined the

Russians, Bulgarians and Roumanians, and compelled the Turks to evacuate nearly all the occupied territory in Serbia. When peace was established, the Russians were unwilling to allow Serbia's claims, and at the Berlin congress advised Serbia to confer with Austria about them. It was therefore through Austria that Serbia obtained this desired territory.

Thereafter, Prince Milan ignored Russia and became a real Austrophile, spending more of his time in Vienna than in Belgrade. Against popular opinion he started war with Bulgaria, but was unsuccessful. This, coupled with his treatment of his wife, Natalie, led to his enforced abdication in 1889, in favor of his son, Alexander, then thirteen years old.

At seventeen, Alexander declared himself of age and began to reign. But he soon lost the good will of both Russia and Austria, and after he married the beautiful widow of an engineer, eight years older than himself, he had few friends left. June 11, 1903, he and his wife were brutally murdered in the palace at Belgrade by a body of officers. After his death, the National Assembly selected as king, Peter Karageorgevitch, grandson of the first leader against the Turks, who is the present ruler.*

The Bulgarians came from Eastern Asia in the fifth century, mingling with the Huns up to the seventh century, and later with the Avars and the Slavs. They first settled on the Volga River, but being progressive and desirous of expansion, they moved southwest and created a new settlement on the north of the Black Sea, which was known as Black Bulgaria.

Early in the seventh century, under Prince Kubrat,

* King Peter died in August, 1921.

their territory was extended from the Volga to the Danube, but after his death it was divided, his two sons each ruling a portion. One division was established in Paunonia until the arrival of the Magyars, toward the end of the ninth century, and the other for a time in Bessarabia, whence the majority later moved south, although some remained, and their descendants live there at the present time.

In 660, Asparukh, one of Kubrat's sons, captured Varna from the Greeks, and in 679 his territory extended from the Danube to the Balkan range. In the subsequent fusion with the Slavs, the original Bulgarian language was lost, being superseded by the present tongue, which is almost wholly Slavonic, with the inclusion of some Turkish words.

From the beginning of their occupation of this territory, there was enmity between them and the Greeks, and for two hundred years war was frequently waged between the two countries, but when the Arabs attempted seizure of Constantinople, they combined in successful resistance to the invaders. At the end of the eighth century, the Bulgarians, under Krum, overcame the Avars. Krum was then made king, and under his rule the Bulgars north and south of the Danube were united in one kingdom, law and order established, commerce and agriculture stimulated, and the country made prosperous. In 809 he wrested Sofia from the Greeks, and that city is the Bulgarian capital to-day.

Christianity was adopted by the Bulgars under King Boris, who endeavored to establish a church independent of the Greeks. For a while the country was under the sway of Rome, due to the efforts of two bishops sent to Bulgaria by Pope Nicolas I. Under

Adrian II, the next ruler, the church was directly under the Bishop of Constantinople.

King Boris united the different Slavic tribes so that his kingdom included parts of Macedonia, Serbia and Roumania. His son Simeon retained all this, and added to it Thrace and the remainder of Macedonia, and under his successor, King Samuel, the kingdom attained its greatest expanse. This is called the golden period of Bulgarian history.

Bulgaria was conquered during the reign of the Greek emperor Basil II, and for one hundred and fifty years the country was under Byzantine domination. In 1186, under Czars Assen and Kaloyan, Bulgaria revolted and regained her independence. Conditions steadily improved, and under Assen II, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Bulgaria was prosperous and happy. But after his death, she was conquered by Serbia and annexed to that country. With the disastrous defeat of Serbia on the field of Kosovo the Turks came into control, and in 1393 all the Balkanic states were under the tyrannous dominion of Turkey.

In common with the other Balkan peoples, the lot of the Bulgarians was misery beyond expression. Conditions of the infamous Turkish rule were known to the European nations, but for centuries no effort was made to halt or even mitigate the horrible cruelty. This apparent apathy was due to political reasons, each nation fearing possible advantage to another through territorial changes, and no such change could be made satisfactory to all the political powers concerned.

So the Turks were allowed to pursue their policy of annihilation of all who would not adopt the Turkish faith in place of their own, and unhappy Bulgaria suf-



KING CAROL OF ROUMANIA

ferred without hope until 1877, when Czar Ferdinand II of Russia made war on Turkey for the liberation of the Balkan nations. With the Russian army were those of Roumania and Bulgaria, and after the fall of Plevna, the Serbians also joined. Turkey was forced to capitulate, and Bulgaria was declared an independent state, with territory located between Constantinople, Adrianople, Chalcidice and Salonika.

But again there was dissatisfaction, through fear of the ascendancy of Russian influence in the Balkans; and other nations, England and Germany particularly, decreed that northern and southern Bulgaria should have autonomy under a Christian governor appointed by the Porte. Macedonia was left to Turkey, and Dobrudja given to Roumania.

After the liberation of Bulgaria, the first ruler, elected in 1879, was Prince Alexander of Battenberg, nephew of the Empress of Russia. In September, 1885, he proclaimed the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, an act of great popularity with the people but not approved by Russia and Austria. Influenced by these latter countries, King Milan of Serbia made war on Bulgaria, the pretext being that Serbia was entitled to share in Bulgaria's territorial aggrandizement. But even the Serbians were not in sympathy with the attitude of their ruler, and they were easily defeated. They could not understand why people of the same religion should fight.

On August 21, 1886, some officers who were Russophiles forced Prince Alexander to resign, and they conducted him to Reni, in Bessarabia, whence he proceeded to Lemberg. But many Bulgarians objected, and a revolution headed by Stambulov, a prominent diplomat, resulted in returning Prince Alexander to

Sofia on September 3, when he received a great ovation. However, Czar Alexander III of Russia forced him to abdicate, and September 7, 1886, he left Bulgaria for the last time, dying in 1893.

Stambulov, who was made president of the Sobranje in 1884, held the reins of government from 1886 to 1894. He was very capable but had great personal ambition, and his unscrupulous methods and tyranny made him very unpopular. He was succeeded by Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, the present Czar.

According to their traditions, the Roumanians, at the beginning of the second century, occupied the territory between the rivers Dniester, Tissa and Danube, then known as Dacia. At this time the Romans entered the country. In the third century, the country was overrun by the wild tribes, first the Goths, and then the Huns and Avars, and the Dacians retired to the mountains of Transylvania. In the sixth and seventh centuries, the Slavs entered the Balkan Peninsula by way of Dacia.

At the end of the eighth century, the Hungarians occupied the territory between the rivers Tissa and Danube, and for many years after there was warfare between them and the Roumanians, terminating in the partial subjugation of the latter. The Roumanians were, however, granted autonomy for about three hundred years, and the two nations were at peace until religious dissension caused a renewal of hostilities. In the early part of the fourteenth century the Hungarians were successively defeated by forces under leadership of Prince Basarab I, of Walachia, and Prince Bogdan of Moldavia, and the Roumanians gained independence.

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, Transylvania, Walachia and Moldavia were united under the rule of one of the best loved of the Roumanian kings, Michel the Brave, but Transylvania was retaken by the Hungarians and held by them under oppressive rule during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the time of the conquest of the Balkan states by Turkey, at the end of the fourteenth century, Walachia was also beset by the Hungarians and Germans, and for protection King Mirtcha entered into an alliance with the Poles, in which Moldavia joined later, and the combined forces of the three defeated the Germans in 1422.

Dear to all the Roumanians is the name of Stephen the Great, held to be the foremost of their kings. He successfully led his people against all their enemies, including Tartars, Poles and Hungarians, and achieved his greatest victory in the defeat of the Turkish army in 1475. Later the Turks sent an army of 200,000 under Mahomed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, but during the life of Stephen, this great force was unable to gain any lasting advantage. But after his death, the Turks overcame the Roumanians, and for two hundred years thereafter held them in a condition of miserable bondage.


At the end of the sixteenth century, the Roumanian prince, Michel the Brave, led his people to victory over the Turks and liberated his country. All the Roumanian people were then united, so Michel was ruler over the territory now known as Great Roumania. He adopted the title of Prince of Walachia, Transylvania and Moldavia. He was murdered in 1601, but is still regarded as one of the best loved princes of Roumania.

After his death, the Turks again gained control, and

treated the people with great cruelty up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, when Prince Constantine Brancovanu of Walachia and Prince Demetrius Cantemir made a treaty with Russia. But Peter the Great, of Russia, was defeated by the Turks, and while the Prince of Moldavia escaped to Russia, Prince Brancovanu was captured and taken to Constantinople, where he, his sons and son-in-law were beheaded. For several years thereafter, the Turks sent Greek emissaries to Roumania to collect the tribute imposed, and these treated the Roumanians with great injustice. They also established Greek as the court language in Roumania, and this continued in use up to 1857.

In 1775, Austria took from Roumania the northern part of Moldavia, which was afterwards known as Bucovina. In 1812, by the terms of a treaty between Turkey and Russia, the latter acquired the territory of Bessarabia, which was taken from the Roumanians. In 1821 a revolution broke out in Moldavia and Walachia, which resulted in compelling the Turks to withdraw the Turkish and Greek rulers, and in their place substitute members of the Roumanian nobility. Naturally these latter did all in their power to improve the condition of their countrymen. Another revolution took place in 1848, but nothing was gained by it.

After the Crimean war in 1856, Roumania was put under protection of the great powers, established at the Paris Congress, and Bessarabia was returned to her. In 1858 the Paris Congress permitted the union of Moldavia and Walachia, but required that they have separate rulers. Nevertheless, a year later, Alexander Jon Cuza was elected to rule over both countries. With the aid of France, this amalgamation eventually gained



ROUMANIAN RESIDENCE IN BUCHAREST



AMERICAN LEGATION IN BUCHAREST

recognition, and in 1861 the first Roumanian parliament met.

A new era for Roumania began with the reign of Prince Cuza. Sound laws were promulgated, agrarian reforms instituted, schools erected, education was made free and the welfare of the common people was given due consideration. After the abdication of this prince, Roumania elected, by plebiscite, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen.

He augmented the work begun by Prince Cuza and the country prospered. He organized the army which aided the Russians in the war with Turkey for the liberation of the Balkan states. For her participation Roumania again received Dobrudja, which had been taken from her by the Turks in the fifteenth century, but on the other hand, Russia deprived her of Bessarabia, claiming this as her just reward, it being the only territory bordering on her own.

However, Roumania gained her independence, and was recognized as a kingdom in 1880. The loss of Bessarabia rankled, and in 1887 Roumania made a treaty with the triple alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. This action was much criticized, but the Roumanian heads of state were certain it would result beneficially to their country. After the second Balkanic war, Roumania's territory was increased by the addition of Silistria, received from Bulgaria, and secured to her by the treaty of Bucharest. On the south this territory adjoined Dobrudja, already in her possession.

Since the year 1878, all the Balkan States had been free, with the exception of Macedonia. In 1912, newspapers throughout the civilized world were printing

frequent accounts of great atrocities committed by the Turks, and many were advocating the liberation of Macedonia, in which the conditions were most horrible.

But as similar conditions had existed and had been known to the European powers for centuries, with no attempt on their part to alleviate the misery, the four Balkan States, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, united in a war on Turkey to set the Macedonians free. Among themselves they made an agreement whereby Greece was to annex the southern portion of Macedonia and Albania, Serbia was to receive the northern portion of these two countries, with the port of Durazzo, and Bulgaria was to take over the central part of Macedonia.

The Turkish hold was broken, but before the division of territory could be effected, Austro-Hungary intervened with a note stating she would not consent to the partition of Albania. This was very disappointing to the conquerors, especially to Serbia, for that country stood in great need of a seaport to afford shipping outlet for her surplus grain and hogs, particularly the latter. As the other Balkan states raised enough for their own requirements, the only market the Serbians could supply was the Austro-Hungarian. The latter was therefore in position to dictate terms, and in consequence the poor Serbian farmers received very small returns. It was to remedy this condition and better themselves that they were always longing for an ocean port through which they could sell their products in the world's open market, and they felt that the objection to the division of Albania was wholly for the purpose of depriving them of such a port.

The action of Archduke Ferdinand, who interposed the objection to the division of Albania, embittered the

Serbians, and some of the students vowed vengeance. The Serbian government then proposed that the matter of division of territory should be left to the decision of the Czar of Russia, but just as the Bulgarian Prime Minister was about to take passage from Varna to Petrograd, he was notified by his government that it had been decided not to wait for the Czar's decision, but to proceed at once to take over the territory which had been assigned to them under the agreement.

Their contention was that there had been no opposition to their award, the objection having been only to the division of the country which Greece and Serbia intended to share, in which they had no interest. But the Greeks and Serbians were in possession of the territory, and as they refused to give it up, Bulgaria started a war to gain possession. She was opposed by Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Roumania, and was easily defeated. The last named country took part against Bulgaria, because of her disappointment in not receiving anything as a reward for her neutrality in the first Balkanic war.

Under the treaty of Bucharest, following this war, Bulgaria was obliged to cede Silistria to Roumania, receiving in exchange only a part of Thrace, a territory on the Ægean Sea, with the port of Dedagach. Because of this, the Bulgarians cherished animosity, and waited an opportunity for revenge. Their ruler thought this opportunity was at hand when the early successes of the Germans and Austrians tempted him to cast the lot of Bulgaria with theirs, into the maelstrom of the World War.

CHAPTER II

APPOINTED MINISTER TO THE BALKANS—ASSUMING CHARGE OF THE LEGATION—RECEPTIONS AND CEREMONIES

OCTOBER 16, 1913, I left Chicago for my post as “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Roumania, Serbia and Bulgaria,” with headquarters at Bucharest.

Heartened and stimulated by the good wishes and assurances of moral support of the thousands of friends who had feted me ere my departure, I nevertheless had a vague feeling of disquietude, perhaps a foreshadowing of the mighty events to come. Naturally, I was keenly appreciative of the high honor conferred upon me, but far above this was the realization of my responsibility to the government and to the American people, and of the trust reposed in me by the President and my many friends.

On shipboard I prepared my speeches for delivery when presenting my credentials to the respective sovereigns of the three monarchies. In these were expressed not only the customary assurances of esteem and the desire to maintain and augment the existing cordial relations, but also the intent to exert every possible effort to stimulate and extend commercial relations which would be beneficial to each country.

Owing to illness throughout the voyage of my private secretary, it was necessary for me to write the speeches in longhand. Perhaps this slower method afforded greater latitude for deliberation, but I was far less concerned with the wording of the speeches than I was in



ROYAL PALACE IN SOFIA



THE BLACK MOSQUE IN SOFIA

determining the policy and course to be pursued in representing my country and espousing the cause of justice at all times. Of course it was impossible to forecast conditions that might become existent, or emergencies that might arise, but it was my unalterable decision that in no circumstances would I be guilty of misrepresentation. This policy may seem at variance with popular conception of diplomatic tactics, but these memoirs will show the prudence of such a course.

It took a little time to become accustomed to the usual title of "Excellency," which from the first was freely used on shipboard, but after the receptions given me in Bremen-Hafen, Bremen and Berlin, it became evident that popular belief fully sanctioned its usage.

Extreme cordiality was manifested in each of these three cities, but my reception in Prague was glorious, and aroused in me most intense emotion. And this feeling was shared by all who welcomed me, for aside from their respect for my official position and the welcome to be accorded the representative of a country known to be the champion of liberty and justice, was the realization that one of their own blood had been sent to them. For, although I had been an American citizen thirty-three years, I was born in Bohemia and these people knew I could understand and sympathize with them.

A touring car and carriage were placed at my disposal, public buildings were bedecked with flags, and the most prominent societies of Bohemia cabled messages of thanks to the President of the United States. These demonstrations of satisfaction were evidently displeasing to the Austrian government, as on the ninth day of my stay in Prague, I received a cable from Washington requesting me to make no more speeches there, lest the

populace become over enthusiastic and race troubles incited. I therefore made my excuses and proceeded at once to Bucharest.

From the days of my youth, I had always been deeply interested in the history of the Balkan States, especially during the period of over four hundred years of Turkish misrule, when their burdens were at all times heavy, and the suffering often horrible. Now I was to see and understand the people and conditions.

On November 11, 1913, I arrived in Bucharest, finding the American Legation office under the temporary direction of the American Chargé d'Affaires. The offices occupied the first and second floors of a substantial building, which had been rented by our government during the preceding eleven years, and in that time had been tenanted by seven of our ministers to Roumania.

First, the conventional formalities had to be followed. According to custom, although the duly accredited United States Minister, I could not confer officially with my colleagues until I had been received and acknowledged by the king. The first step was to call on the dean of the diplomatic service, and request him to notify the Marshal of the Court of my arrival, and ascertain from him when the official reception could take place. The king being at his summer home in Sinaia, the information could not be given immediately, but later I was notified to present myself on the 27th of November.

On that day, two gilded carriages arrived at the Legation, and Colonel Baranga, aide of the king, entered my office and very ceremoniously invited me to accompany him to the royal palace. We rode in the first carriage, and the secretary and military attaché in the second. Arriving at the palace, the carriages

paraded slowly before a troop of cavalry that acted as guard of honor, the royal band playing a Roumanian march, which abruptly ceased as I stepped from the carriage, and in its stead I heard the strains of "The Star Spangled Banner."

Within the palace I was first presented to the members of the royal household, including a score of the highest military and naval officials, all in dress uniforms with rich gold brocade. Then Titus Maiorescu, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose official status corresponds with that of the American Secretary of State, conducted me to the king's private chambers, where King Carol, with the Crown Prince, the present King Ferdinand, and his son, Prince Carol, awaited me.

The king received me very cordially, and after my speech of about ten minutes' duration, he responded in about the same length of time, and expressed very deep friendship for America. He then led me into his private office, where we discussed American and Roumanian affairs for more than half an hour, after which he personally conducted me to the door.

In the antechamber I joined the secretary and military attaché, and we were then conducted to the presence of Queen Elisabeth, also known to the world as "Carmen Sylva." With her were the wife of the Crown Prince, the present Queen Marie, the Princess Elisabeth, Princess Mary, the little Princess Illiana and Prince Nicholai. The queen was very gracious and charming and she paid me a compliment by expressing pleasure that my country had selected not only a good diplomat, but also a good business man. Among other things we talked of music, for which the queen expressed great love, and she prom-

ised me an invitation to all of her special musical soirées.


After half an hour of conversation, I was permitted to present my secretary and military attaché, who had not been accorded presentation to the king. The audience being then terminated, we reëntered the carriages, while the band played the Roumanian national hymn, and were driven to the Legation. I was now full-fledged Minister to Roumania, competent to meet all other officials.

I remained in Roumania until the first of the following year, going thence through Hungary to Serbia. In Belgrade I was presented to King Peter by Prime Minister Pachich. The reception was similar to that in Roumania, though the conversation with King Peter was in the Serbian and German languages. The audience lasted over an hour, but at its conclusion it seemed to me to take even longer to remove myself from the presence of the king, as the distance to the exit from the great reception room was over two hundred feet, and court etiquette required that I cover the entire distance going backward and bowing. A great crowd witnessed the ceremony, there appearing here also much joy among the Serbians, being Slavs, that the United States had selected a born Slav as her representative.

In Sofia I was received by Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, being presented by Prime Minister Genadieff. The same formalities were observed as in the preceding receptions, with a still larger crowd in attendance. On the following day, the newspaper "Mir" printed an interview with me in which I expressed a favorable impression of the czar, stating truthfully my belief that he was a good monarch as he had labored twenty-seven years for the education of the Bulgarians. This evidently



JUNCTION OF THE SAVA AND DANUBE RIVERS IN BELGRADE



FORTRESS IN BELGRADE. VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE

pleased the czar, as thereafter he was very friendly, and always gave me prompt audience whenever I came to Sofia, an honor not granted to all my colleagues, some of whom, I understood, being unable to see him even once a year.

CHAPTER III

SOME INTIMATE GLIMPSES OF ROYALTY — THE FIRST WAR CLOUD

IN Roumania, on the first of January, their time, or January 14 according to our calendar, the great mass was read, which was attended by all the royal family, the local high officials and the foreign representatives. The head of the Roumanian church read the mass, and prayed that God preserve the king and his family, and keep the existing government in power. Mr. Take Jonescu, Minister of Interior, standing next to me, whispered in my ear, "This sermon will not do us much good because tomorrow we will be deposed and a new government will come in." And so it happened.

Shortly after my return to Bucharest, a commission arrived, which had been sent to extend invitations to European countries to participate in the San Francisco Exposition of 1915. The members informed me that thus far they had been unable to obtain audience with the monarchs of any countries, or the presidents of republics, and I promised them different treatment in the Balkans. First Queen Elisabeth received them, inviting also the wives of the three members of the commission. The queen, as usual, was seated in her large armchair, crocheting. She greeted them in a very kindly manner, inviting them to be seated, and immediately began asking questions about American conditions and customs, seeming to be very much interested in the answers.

Then she said she would give each one of the party one of the books she had written under the *nom de plume*

of "Carmen Sylva." When the books were brought, she discovered the number was insufficient and she requested one of the gentlemen of the commission to ask Mary, one of the ladies in waiting, to bring another. Instead of making this request of the lady in waiting in customary court phraseology, he parted the curtain dividing the rooms, and imitating the voice of the queen, he called, "Mary!" The queen did not seem shocked or offended, but laughed heartily. Naturally the visitors were delighted by the royal reception.

Next I presented the commissioners to King Carol. As he did not speak English and they did not speak German, I had to act as translator. The king informed us he could not furnish a special exhibit for the Exposition, but would send some things of interest and also send a representative. Then we went to Belgrade, but could not see King Peter because of his serious illness, although his ministers promised that Serbia would participate.

In Sofia, when we arrived at the royal palace by appointment, we found the whole royal family awaiting us, and each of them shook hands with us in real American fashion. The king and his ministers at once agreed to furnish a Bulgarian exhibit, and their Sobranje was asked to appropriate 300,000 to 600,000 leva to defray expenses. Then followed the usual questions about American affairs, and particularly about the Panama Canal. Commissioner Calvin B. Brown gave a comprehensive account of the canal, to which close attention was paid.

The king spoke with pride of a complete railroad train, a present from ex-president Cleveland, which was then in operation between the station and the summer

palace at Vrana, saying that he and his sons frequently ran it. Over three hours were spent with the royal family that evening, and by invitation the commission lunched with the king the next day, he obligingly having the Oriental Express held one hour until the luncheon was finished. Each member of the commission was given an autographed photograph of the king.

April 2, 1914, I was informed that the Queen of Bulgaria wished to visit America, and as it was immediately after the second Balkan war, our State Department deemed it advisable for me to ascertain her plans and consult with her. I remained in Sofia a month, during which time she made and remade plans. First, she intended to go as her royal self, then she decided to go incognito. Her passage had been engaged for May 21, and she had bought many valuable presents for the president, cabinet officers, prominent citizens and Bulgarian sympathizers. Her escort, consisting of a secretary, tutor and fourteen attendants, had also been engaged.

I informed her that all America would doubtless be glad to see her. She intended to appear in public gatherings, and to shake hands with everyone who wished to greet her, but I explained that this would be highly imprudent, as there were many enemies of Bulgaria in America, and some would be likely to offend her and possibly inflict bodily injury. Our State Department was somewhat fearful of unpleasant happenings during her visit. Also at that time there was some uneasiness in America over the Mexican situation.

After I had made these explanations, the queen asked if it would be better to defer her visit. I could not well advise her officially, but gave it as my indi-



CZARINA ELEONORA OF BULGARIA



vidual opinion that such would be the wiser course. She then decided to postpone the visit for six months, which was fortunate, as owing to the outbreak of the war she would have been obliged to remain in America for a considerable period.

I was present at the first meeting of the Sobranje after the second Balkanic war was lost by the Bulgarians. Out of two hundred members of the Sobranje, thirty-seven were socialists, and when the royal family appeared in the Parliament and the king began his address, these socialists and others hooted, called on him to stop, and reviled him with gross epithets. The king eventually finished the address, but the disturbance was so great that no one understood what he said.

I had audience with the queen that evening, who was very downhearted, but I succeeded in consoling her considerably by telling her that in America even the highest type of men, when candidates for election to public offices, are bitterly assailed and reviled in campaigns, both in speeches and in print, and I cited the case of one of our presidential candidates, who suffered most grievous attacks before election, but who, after taking office, was held in highest esteem. I said she could in no way be considered responsible for the war loss, and assured her of the love of her people because of her many good deeds. She seemed comforted, and ordered tea and cigarettes for us both. It was my first cigarette, but I could not well decline the honor and allow the queen to smoke alone.

Several days after my official presentation to the King of Bulgaria, the queen invited me to visit with her the hospitals and barracks where wounded soldiers and the poor were housed. At that time Bulgaria had

140,000 refugees. In Sofia, 8,700 were living on bread alone. All these were entirely dependent on charity. I saw one small room occupied by forty persons, including two women who had given birth to children there. The queen was then organizing a new society to aid the unfortunates and she asked me to accept the presidency of it. I suggested that she be president and let me be vice-president, and we would appeal to America for help. This appeal brought over \$75,000.

Returning to Bucharest, on June 28 I attended the races, which are held every Sunday during the summer. All members of the royal family were there, and that afternoon the king received a telegram announcing the murder of Archduke Ferdinand at Serajevo, Bosnia. The news was received with deep concern, and the king and all the diplomats immediately left the races. King Carol declared that the assassination would lead to a world war.

On July 12, 1914, I went to Belgrade to attend the Royal Ball, in honor of King Peter's namesday, but on arrival found the city draped in black instead of the national flags, because of the death the previous day of the Russian Minister Hartwig. The assistant secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office informed me that he had died suddenly while visiting the Austrian Minister, and that owing to his well known sympathies and regard for the Serbians, he was held in high esteem by them. He said that ugly rumors were then afloat that Hartwig met death at the hands of the Austrian Minister, but after examination and depositions, it was pronounced the result of an apoplectic stroke.

The next day the national flags replaced the black ones. The namesday celebration was conducted in a

subdued manner, excepting the horse racing in the afternoon, and the dances later in the public park. That morning, Crown Prince Alexander gave a reception for the diplomats and military attachés, at which the Austrian Minister was the only disgruntled person. He spoke disparagingly to me of the Crown Prince, and stated he was uneducated because he could not speak English or German. Next day the preliminary funeral service was held and on the following day the rites, with the city again draped in black, were completed. It was the largest funeral ever held in Serbia.

In the church, when Prime Minister Pachich began to speak, the Austrian Minister, standing at my side, greatly annoyed me and the rest of the assemblage by loudly talking to me, declaring that the speech was political agitation against Austria, and likewise assailing the French Minister. I was obliged to ask him to go to his seat so I could hear the speech. Next day, the Austrian Minister telegraphed Vienna that his life was in danger in Belgrade and he feared his house would be bombed, and that he had been obliged to send his son to Semlin, to save his life. It was general belief in Belgrade that the object of this was solely to arouse the enmity of the Austro-Hungarian people.

Before I left for Bucharest I had audience with the Serbian prime minister, immediately following a long conference he had had with the German and Austrian ministers. He told me he had just been informed that the Serbian students were to be expelled from the University of Serajevo, and notwithstanding his earnest protest to the Austrian Minister, he believed the threat would be carried out. He asked my advice, which I could not give officially, but as an individual I expressed

the opinion that his wisest course would be to do everything possible to avert war between Austria and his country, stating that their hospitals were then full of wounded men from the recent war, and that they were in no position to engage in fresh hostilities. He agreed with me, stating he would do everything he honorably could to avoid war.

I took the last steamer that left Belgrade before the World War began. Three days after my arrival in Bucharest, I received telegraphic advice that Austro-Hungary had sent an ultimatum to Serbia, threatening war unless all her demands were satisfied. As Serbia could not in honor comply with the demands, a proclamation of war was issued by Austro-Hungary. Being unable to defend Belgrade, the Serbians moved their capital to Nish, at the same time issuing mobilization orders which called out the last reserves. Similar orders were simultaneously issued in Montenegro, the interests there being identical with those of Serbia.

During my last visit to Belgrade, I conversed freely with nearly all the representatives of foreign countries. Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, the Austrian Minister, and Baron von Griesinger, the German Minister, especially talked to me about the Serajevo crime, and the Austrian Minister stated that Serbia must give full satisfaction to Austria for the murder of Archduke Ferdinand.

I am sure that none of the diplomats in Belgrade expected that within a week after the funeral of Mr. Hartwig, the late Russian Minister at Belgrade, war would be declared by Austria against Serbia. The Serbian people themselves were not without expectation of war as the Austrian newspapers had threatened them continually. Taking everything into consideration and



ON THE WAY TO SAMKOV, BULGARIA

without prejudice, it seems that Austria wanted war with Serbia, and that the death of Archduke Ferdinand was welcomed as a *casus belli*.

The Austrians have for years dominated the Serbian markets, but lost nearly all this trade in 1912, upon the inception of the war between Turkey and the Balkan allies. The Serbians charge that Austria, by the creation of the independent state of Albania, is responsible for the disruption of the Balkan Alliance. Of course, this action was taken by Austria to deprive Serbia of access to the Adriatic Sea. The late archduke was the advocate of this anti-Serbian policy, and therefore it was no wonder that the Serbians did not like him, as he had prevented the realization of the nation's dream to own a large port on the Adriatic. Austro-Hungary was very jealous of greater Serbia, as it had progressed and extended against her will.

The agreement between Austria and Bulgaria, which it is claimed was made after Bulgaria's defeat by Greece and Serbia, did not halt Serbia, and the friendship between this nation and Greece was very much disliked by Austria, but the greatest dissatisfaction came when it was announced that Greece had made an agreement with Serbia regarding the port of Salonika, which was also to be a Serbian port on the Ægean Sea, and thus give Serbia an outlet to the sea, which Austria had always tried to prevent. There was no more chance to stop this, and therefore Austria felt very unfriendly not only to Serbia but to Greece also.

On the other hand, the Austrians charge that Russia was trying to get a hold on the whole of the Balkan peninsula, including the city of Constantinople, and that Serbia was her tool to accomplish this purpose. It

seems, therefore, that the Balkan peninsula, which was like a volcano ready to erupt at any time, played a large role in the world's affairs, because, taking into consideration the quick action of Germany in joining Austria in the war, every intelligent man must realize that this new European war was brought about solely in the determined effort to attain the supremacy of the world's commerce, and thus, in time, absolute world domination.

The opinion of Lieutenant Miles, our military attaché, was that, "Austria was anxious to get a strip of land to the east of Herzegovina, which in 1912, at the close of the Turkish war, was divided by Serbia and Montenegro, thus joining the two nations of the same race. It is probable that it is this territory which Austria wants, both in order to sever Serbia from Montenegro and to open the Austrian road to Salonika. Austria also undoubtedly hopes that this war will strengthen her hold on the Slavonic people of her Empire." I personally believed she wanted a great deal more in addition.

The Bulgarian Minister told me that his government was sounding Serbia as to whether she would give up part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and in that way help the Triple Entente to get Bulgaria in line and relieve Serbia, but that his government had met with flat refusal. Serbia was not willing to lose any part of her territory, especially part of Macedonia, which is considered one of the richest sections of the Balkan peninsula.

At that time Serbia had between 80,000 and 90,000 men under the colors, and it was believed her total fighting strength could not exceed 220,000 men, while that of Austro-Hungary was estimated at 5,000,000. The Serbian officers generally realized the enormous task before the Serbian army, but felt that the war was forced on them

and that it would be a finish fight. They believed that the patriotic spirit would be aroused to even greater pitch than in the Turkish war of 1912, and they relied on the intense devotion of the Serbians, and some advantage to be gained by their intimate knowledge of the theatre of war. There was also an element of chance in the probable duration of hostilities, which might operate to wear out their enemies.

General Putnik, the Serbian chief of staff during the wars of 1912 and 1913, was absent when the crisis occurred and was held as a prisoner of war in Budapest. His absence deprived the Serbians of his intimate knowledge of detail, but on the other hand he was an old man, and necessarily lacking in the vigor which was essential at that time. Therefore his replacement by General Pavlovitch may have been advantageous for the Serbian cause.

Colonel Thompson of the British army was attached to the Serbian army in the wars of 1912 and 1913, and gained intimate knowledge of the service. Of this he says:

“The raw material of the Serbian army is excellent, but good generals are lacking. Putnik is elderly and prudent. Yankovitch and Stephanovitch are too old for active work. Boyavitch, though in the prime of life, does not exert himself as he might. Only once in the sixteen days did he visit the troops under his command. The nearest unit was three hours distance by motor, and six hours by horse. The division commanders, Sturm, Tershitch and Marinovitch, are highly thought of, and deservedly so, but they are too junior in rank. Colonel Pavlovitch is by universal consent the man to whom most of the credit for the victory of the Bregalnica is due. The Serbian infantry soldier is very careful with his aim.

The maximum number of rounds fired by any one man in 24 hours was only 80. During the Turkish campaign only 12,000,000 rounds were fired altogether by an army of 180,000 infantry soldiers.

“It is difficult to overpraise the Serbian infantry. They are brave, enduring, obedient, good-tempered, and can live on next to nothing under conditions which would appal the average Britisher. Attacks are sometimes made without officers, but though illiterate, the private soldier has a fund of common sense which enables him to do the right thing when acting independently. It may be said without exaggeration that there is no position which the better divisions of the Serbian army will not assault, provided they have good artillery support, but this is essential since the infantry have an almost superstitious reverence for artillery fire.

“The greatest deficiency in the Serbian army at present is in war material. Two weeks ago, the Austrian military attaché at Belgrade estimated that there were only 150,000 rifles in good condition in the country. The Serbians have received absolutely no war material since the war of last July, but they have the port of Salonika, in the hands of their friends the Greeks, behind them. An overwhelming success of Austro-Hungary would threaten the Greeks in Salonika, and for this reason the Serbians can probably count on getting supplies through Greek territory.”

Toward the conclusion of the 1913 war, Serbia was calling to arms all men from twenty to fifty-five years of age, which brought from 50,000 to 80,000 additional men. These were each given a franc, a cap and a rifle, and told to go to it. They looked like bands of tramps, coming to the front, but they made excellent soldiers.



QUEEN ELISABETH
"CARMEN SYLVA" OF ROUMANIA

CHAPTER IV

EARLY SERBIAN TRIUMPHS ON BATTLEFIELDS — RAVAGES OF SICKNESS

AT the beginning of the World War, Bucharest became the most important point in the Balkan peninsula, because Roumania was neutral and surrounded by belligerent countries. As our government had consented to take care of German and Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, I was instructed to take charge. All letters, telegrams and money had to be transmitted from the countries at war through Roumania. Consequently all belligerent countries had representatives there. From the outset, none of the countries were prepared to take care of the great number of prisoners taken. I was receiving telegrams from the Serbian government that the Austrians were making prisoners not only of soldiers, but also of every civilian Serbian they could take, women and children included. On the other hand, Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, complained to me that the Serbians were pursuing the same course with their people. Reports were furnished me of the result of battles, by the American military attaché, Colonel Sherman Miles, who was with the Serbian army, and also from Austro-Hungarian sources. These reports conflicted very much with the ones published in the newspapers.

For instance, in the first battle in Schabatz, the Austro-Hungarians announced that they took ten thousand prisoners, and the Serbians claimed four thousand, but the fact was that the Austrians retreated without any prisoners, leaving many guns and much ammunition behind them.

At the end of November, 1914, the situation in Serbia was very gloomy. For nearly four months the Serbian army was successful in fighting the Austro-Hungarian forces, but about mid-November it was short of ammunition, and some of it sent by the other Powers was not fit for their rifles, and I was told that this was one of the reasons for vacating Valjevo. The second reason, in my opinion, was a superior force of three army corps of Austrians and German soldiers which had just recently been sent on the Serbian front.

About the last of the month the Russians succeeded in forwarding over the Danube River to Serbia, enough ammunition for some time to come.

The American Consulate in Belgrade reported the transfer of Austrian prisoners from Belgrade to other points in Serbia, which action would indicate that there might be danger of Serbia losing Belgrade.

The main difficulty for the Serbians was that they could not use their whole army against the Austrians, as it was necessary for them to keep at least 50,000 soldiers on the Bulgarian frontier to protect the parts of Macedonia now called New Serbia.

Bucharest became a clearing house for the belligerent countries. The number of prisoners of war greatly increased the volume of correspondence, and as the Red Cross society was not yet in the field, all this work and the necessary relief measures had to be performed by our Legation. It was necessary for me to read all the correspondence to prevent any information being transmitted by spies. Always after a big battle, many telegrams in many languages were received by me, and these required investigations and answers. One message I received read as follows: "Please let me know

whether my son Charles is alive or dead. I have already lost four sons in the war. My wife became crazy in consequence of it and I shall take my life if my last son is dead."

I ascertained that his last son had died of wounds received in battle, but I did not have the heart to send any answer to the poor old man.

There were many cases of separation of families and particularly loss of children. The latter caused deepest distress. Every effort was made to reunite the separated although each case involved much labor and thought. In one instance, the wife of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian railways was in Paris when war was proclaimed, and she was interned there for several months. When she was released she came to Roumania. When she left home, her children were with the governess at her home in Galicia, but after the arrival of the Russians, all trace of the children was lost. After much investigation I learned that the governess had a sister in Kiev. I then evoked the aid of our consul in Odessa, requesting him to send a special messenger to Kiev. This was done, and the children were found there, living in great misery. I then obtained permission from the Russian authorities to have the children brought to Roumania, and it was my pleasure to restore them to their mother.

Naturally, in such exciting times, addresses would be inaccurate or incomplete, and in many cases the official records were in such poor condition as to afford very little assistance. Frequently money would be sent to me for certain prisoners without any advice as to where they were or even to what regiment they belonged.

All this required much patient effort, but in the end practically all tangles were straightened out. The money

destined to Serbian points had to be sent by messengers to Nish, the new capital of Serbia, where the distribution had to be made by the American consulate to the different military posts. Similar procedure was required for remittances to Hungary, where our consul-general represented the Serbian interests.

Another matter which required considerable time and attention was the plight of many people arriving from Russia. In every case these were halted on the border, and both men and women were disrobed, and any money or valuables found were taken from them by the Russian frontier authorities. A maximum of five hundred rubles was allowed to be retained. This small sum was wholly inadequate even for immediate needs. Nearly all these victims made protests to me when they arrived in Bucharest, but all I could do was to report to my government.

One of my first efforts after the outbreak of the war was to arrange for the exchange between the belligerents of the women, children and old men. This was finally agreed upon to include all the women and young girls, the men over fifty-seven years of age and the boys of sixteen and under. The Serbian government consented at once to this agreement, and the Germans accepted the terms and made the exchange within two months, but it required over five months to complete exchanges with Austria-Hungary.

In 1914, good fortune in the war seemed to attend the Serbians, but that was due largely to the devotion of the Serbian soldiers, who gave no thought to themselves individually but considered only the cause of their country. Their endurance of privation was marvelous. At night, hundreds of them could be seen sleeping around



MAIN STREET IN BELGRADE



STREET SCENE IN BELGRADE

the depot or on the hard stone pavements of the street, and yet in the morning their activity and fresh appearance would indicate perfect repose. Give the Serbian soldier bread and an onion, and he is satisfied. For days at a time, he requires no better food.

On December 20, I received a fresh complaint of ill treatment of Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Serbia. Therefore I went thither to investigate this matter as well as to attend to the distribution of gifts from the American children to the Serbian children, which arrived at Salonika on the "Chicago Herald's" Christmas ship.

My wife and daughters accompanied me on the trip to Nish. At night no heat or light was provided in the cars, to avoid revealing the train to the enemy, but nevertheless the sparks from the wood used in the engines furnished a very distinct target, which frequently drew a hail of Austro-Hungarian bullets. We escaped uninjured and arrived in Nish on the following day.

During this day, more than 20,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners arrived there, among whom were about ten thousand Slavs. The city was full of refugees who came from all parts of Serbia, and there was no place for the prisoners except in the gardens and in the parks. Some of the prisoners of war were allowed to walk the streets unguarded. I fully understood that the city had not adequate facilities to provide for so many prisoners, but nevertheless I required the Prime Minister to give them shelter. He at once agreed to empty all the warehouses and turn them into quarters for the war prisoners.

Some of the new prisoners informed me that they had had nothing but indigestible dried corn to eat for the last four days, and they were both hungry and

thirsty. I demanded from the Prime Minister a sufficiency of food for them, and it being two days before Christmas, asked him to give them a specially good dinner on that day. He promptly agreed, and immediately ordered over 700 kettles in which the food could be cooked and served. He also promised to provide sufficient hospital space for the sick prisoners. On Christmas day, the prisoners received soup, rice and mutton. This highly pleased all of them, and they united in giving credit to the American Minister for the unexpected good food.

Quarters for the soldiers were provided as agreed in the old barracks and warehouses, while the officers were placed in a building in the park. I spoke to a number of these officers of different nationalities, and not one of them voiced any complaint. Because of their success in the last battles, when they took 40,000 prisoners and many guns and other booty, the Serbians generally felt very kindly disposed toward their prisoners.

Before leaving Nish, I distributed all the gifts sent by the American children to the Serbian children, for which the latter sent their thanks to America. I also arranged with the American Consul for the prisoners to use the rear room of his consulate for writing. Advantage was taken of this arrangement to such an extent that when I left on the last day of the month, I carried with me ten thousand postal cards written by war prisoners. These were passed by Serbian censors.

Then I went to Sofia, and while there endeavored to ascertain the sympathies of the people with relation to the combatants. It was evident that in numbers they were about equally divided. Many people believed that if Serbia was defeated by the Austro-Hungarians,

Bulgaria might be the next victim. It was evident to me that the government and the people close to it were on the other side, and desired the triumph of Austria.

Our American consular agent, Mr. Kermektchieff, who was a Bulgarian physician, was one of those who believed that Bulgaria should side against Russia. He had written books on the subject, and when I discovered what these books contained, I asked him to hand in his resignation, because our country was strictly neutral, and we could not have an agent who was agitating for either side. He was a well known man, and an intimate friend of Czar Ferdinand. One of his brothers was a lawyer in Sofia, and another was secretary of the Bulgarian Legation in Rome. The latter married a German girl whose parents were part owners of the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin, and I thought it probable that this brother's influence affected our consular agent. After I had declared my views as to the proper attitude of our country's representatives, I was regarded in Bulgaria as a strictly neutral man, with Entente inclinations.

I returned to Bucharest on the first of January, and a few days later received a telegram from Nish that typhus exanthematicus had broken out, and that thousands of Serbians and a great many of the war prisoners were affected. It proved so severe that in less than three months over 50,000 people died, which included about two-thirds of the Serbian doctors and 15,000 war prisoners.

In the month of March, 1915, I received an unsigned telegram from Nish, notifying me that in front of one of the hospitals there three hundred bodies were lying, which were polluting the air, and that unless they were removed at once, many patients at the hospital, among

them many prisoners of war, would die from the poisonous effluvium.

I at once telegraphed to Prime Minister Pachich asking him to have the bodies removed. He answered that the reason why the bodies were not buried was because they did not have enough coffins. I telegraphed back to bury the bodies without coffins, which was done, and this plan was followed thereafter whenever necessary.

I asked the Department of State for help from the American Red Cross, and that organization responded nobly with doctors, nurses and medicines. The French and English also rendered great assistance, and at the same time Mr. Frothingham of New York organized a unit consisting of doctors and nurses, sending them with abundant supplies to Uskub, and other near-by places in Serbia.

The Austro-Hungarian government continued to complain that its prisoners in Serbia were being mistreated and deprived of food and medical help, and were left to die like cattle. As a matter of fact, the Serbian government made like complaints to me, almost every week, of conditions in Austria. The Austro-Hungarian government endeavored to have publicity given to their charges in the outer world, and asked that an international commission be appointed, consisting of citizens of neutral nations, which would immediately investigate the Serbian treatment of prisoners of war. They also asked that I be made chairman of this commission, with the sanction of my government.

Knowing the conditions existing in both countries, and the great lack of facilities for proper care of prisoners, I informed the State Department that I did not wish to serve on that commission, but the Serbian government



N. PACHICH, PRIME MINISTER OF SERBIA

protested it would accept no other chairman. Therefore when I received the second request from Washington to serve for the sake of humanity, I agreed, but with the understanding that I would not go to Serbia for several weeks. The other members of the commission were Colonel Sola, military attaché of the Spanish Legation at Bucharest, and Captain Billand of the Swiss army.

Immediately upon my acceptance, I telegraphed Prime Minister Pachich, advising him that the commission would arrive at Nish within a few weeks, and requesting that he promptly take all possible steps to improve the situation. In the meantime, the American Red Cross sent money, nurses and more doctors to Serbia, while the Rockefeller foundation sent Dr. Richard Strong, the eminent specialist, and seventy sanitary experts. Great credit is due Dr. Strong for the prompt application of measures which stayed this epidemic.

It is a pleasure to state that all the units from America, England and France worked in perfect harmony for the relief of the unfortunate. The value of their work cannot be overestimated, as these were terribly dark days for the Serbians. They were gaining victories on the battlefield, but at home the parents, wives and children were dying from typhus and other diseases.

Before I started on my trip to Serbia as the chairman of the International Committee, I received from the Austro-Hungarian government a silk uniform intended to protect me against lice, but I did not wear it. I simply wore silk underwear and silk stockings, with my hands in gloves tied to the underwear, which was sufficient protection. This precaution had to be taken because, during the epidemic of typhus exanthematicus, the lice carried infection, and they crawled from the foot

up to the breast, where they usually settled and poisoned a person. On the silk they could not crawl as well as on cotton underwear, and they would fall off. The best protection, according to expert physicians, was to wear silk underwear, and have the hair and neck rubbed with petroleum.

In the meantime the epidemic broke out in Poland, where the greatest misery prevailed, and representatives of the American Red Cross had to go there to investigate conditions. An International Society for Polish Relief was organized under the presidency of Mr. James W. Gerard, our Ambassador to Germany, and I was made one of the vice-presidents. Members of the American Red Cross in Bucharest informed me that all supplies would have to be bought in Roumania and forwarded to Poland from there, and requested me to arrange with the authorities for permission to make such shipments.

The king readily granted my request, stating that he was willing that two hundred carloads of grain be shipped to Poland every week or two, as long as the emergency existed there. He assured me of his sympathy with the Poles and of his desire to aid, but stipulated that I obtain the consent of my colleagues, the Russian, English and French Ministers. I insisted that the shipments and distribution should be in charge of the American Red Cross. I so advised the members of the Red Cross, and telegraphed these conditions to Mr. Gerard in order that he might obtain the approval of the German and Austro-Hungarian governments.

My colleagues readily agreed to the proposition, but the Austro-Hungarian government balked at the stipulation that the goods and their distribution should be in charge of the American Red Cross. They based their

objection on their claim that they were donating more liberally than anyone else to the fund, and therefore it should be distributed by their own men. I was obliged to notify the commission that my colleagues would not accept any other conditions than the ones first named, as they claimed that the Austrian government would use the supplies for the army and not for the civic population.

Because of the Austrian objection, no shipments could be made, and the unfortunate Poles could obtain no help except such as was procurable through the Scandinavian nations, which made it much more difficult to handle, and reduced the supplies to a pitiful amount.

At the beginning of the war in Serbia, the Austro-Hungarians sent airplanes to Nish, and they played havoc with the population there. One of the bombs exploded about twenty-five feet from the American Consulate, and the consul, Mr. Young, became very much excited and telegraphed me that I should notify the Austrian government to give instructions to the aviators not to injure the American Consulate or the baby hospital. I telegraphed him back:

“My dear Mr. Consul: Keep cool. Do not get cold feet. Everybody in Serbia is looking towards you. Give a good example of fearlessness. I notified the Austrian government to do as you desired.”

CHAPTER V

PROOF OF PLOT BETWEEN KAISER WILHELM AND WIFE OF ARCHDUKE FERDINAND

AT the end of March, 1915, I received by special messenger, from a reliable source in Bohemia, information that on Saturday, the 20th of March, at 10:30 P.M., three salon cars had arrived in the depot at Benesov, in Bohemia, from the middle one of which the late Emperor Karl of Austro-Hungary was taken and carried to the palace at Konopiste. He had been wounded in the right foot on the battlefield at Pilica by a bomb or grenade thrown at him and Count Lobkovic by a German soldier.

Emperor Karl was attended by a military physician until seven o'clock in the evening of March 22, when, following the receipt of a telegram, he was taken from Konopiste to the depot in Benesov and carried into a government train, which left immediately for an unknown destination. Guards were distributed from Konopiste to the depot, and a special detective service was organized, of twenty soldiers from the barracks in Benesov. It was rumored that Zita, wife of the emperor, was interned. She was not at that time in Konopiste, although the children and their teacher were there.

After the death of Archduke Ferdinand, the late Emperor Karl came to Konopiste and took away all the correspondence he found in the palace. In this he secured proof that Sophie, the wife of Archduke Ferdinand, had plotted with the Kaiser against Serbia, and had discussed plans about the war with Russia.



AMERICAN CONSULATE AT NISH



SERBIAN METROPOLITAN AND BISHOP ON THE DOORSTEPS OF THEIR HOUSE IN NISH, WITH MINISTER VOPICKA, HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER. AT THE TOP, THE SERBIAN GUIDE TO MR. VOPICKA

It had been agreed that after the defeat of Serbia, it was to be made an Austrian province, and following the removal of King Peter, that the throne would be given to the eldest son of Ferdinand and Sophie. After the defeat of Russia, Ukraina was to be made independent, with their second son as king.

Kaiser Wilhelm approved of these plans, and the action against Serbia was begun with the intention of carrying out the designs of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife.

From the beginning of hostilities between Serbia and Austro-Hungary, efforts were made to get a definite declaration of the attitude of Bulgaria, but little progress was made. When the Sobranje opened in September, 1915, there were many speeches by leaders of different parties, but the keynote of all seemed to be that although the Bulgarians were Slavs, they were Bulgarians above all else.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Radoslavoff, made a speech containing the following statement:

“Bulgaria adheres to her neutrality as proclaimed on July 21st. There are no complaints that we have broken our neutrality, and where questions have arisen, they have been satisfied with the explanation given. Although the present position is a very difficult one for us to maintain, I shall, supported by the majority of the Sobranje, carry out the same policy. We are on the best of terms with Roumania, Greece and even Serbia, and sustain most sincere relations with Turkey. I also proclaim that Bulgaria has her integrity assured, and whether we are obliged to come before the Sobranje for more authority depends entirely upon the attitude of the European Powers.”

I advised the Department of State of the situation, expressing the opinion that Bulgaria was trying to gain through diplomacy what she had lost on the battlefield during the last year. She was awaiting the developments of the war, and, as I was informed, was in daily conference with representatives of all the fighting powers. She was hoping to secure Macedonia from Serbia, Kavalla from Greece and Silistria from Roumania without war. Neither of the belligerent parties was willing to promise this territory to her, and the other Balkan states, Serbia, Greece and Roumania, were decidedly opposed to giving her anything.

It was my opinion, furthermore, that until the war situation became very dark for the Triple Entente, nothing would be done with Bulgaria. The Triple Entente would not bring pressure to bear upon the above named states, which were friendly to her, to make these concessions to Bulgaria unless they became absolutely obliged to have the support of the latter country. It was also possible that if the chances of war should favor Germany and Austria, the Bulgarian government, against the will of its people, who sympathized with Russia, would join them, the Bulgarian government believing that more could be obtained from Germany and Austria than from the Entente, as Bulgaria was convinced that Russia desired to expand Serbia, which would mean that a great part of Macedonia then held by Serbia would not go to Bulgaria. My prophecy was entirely fulfilled.

During the period of Russian victories, from October, 1914, to April, 1915, the Triple Entente was passive, and even the representatives of Russia and England, as was stated to me by Prime Minister Radoslavoff, declared they did not need Bulgaria. But later, with Russia being

continually defeated and driven back, and the fighting chances favoring the Germans and Austrians, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers as I had predicted. It is my belief that if prior to April, 1915, Bulgaria had been offered three counties south of Uskub in Macedonia, and had been loaned about 500,000,000 leva, she would have remained neutral, or would have joined the Triple Entente. Even in the month of May, 1915, Bulgaria endeavored to effect a loan from France and England but failed to do so.

Our ex-consular agent in Sofia advised me that the Bulgarian government was looking for a loan, and asked if it could be obtained in America. I sent a dispatch to the Department of State, but received no answer for a very long time. From published reports, I understood that some concerns in America were considering the loan, and I sent to the Department of State a detailed statement of Bulgaria's finances up to date, but no answer being received by June 15, I was notified that Bulgaria would wait no longer and that she would try to borrow the money in Germany.

General Marko, very deeply in the confidence of Czar Ferdinand, was sent to Germany in July to make arrangements for a loan, and it is more than probable that the military help of Bulgaria was an important part of the consideration. Therefore, from that time on I acted on the belief that Bulgaria would sooner or later line up with the Central Powers.

Even on July 1, English representatives showed interest in the matter, and on July 10, 1915, I suggested to the Serbian Prime Minister the possibility that if Serbia turned over to Bulgaria the territory south of Uskub, the Triple Entente might reimburse Serbia for it. The

Serbian Parliament discussed the matter, but it proved too late for any action.

At this time Turkey was very short of ammunition, and the Germans were trying to get some in through Roumania. One day an American, who had been doing business in Hungary and Austria for a number of years, came to me and said:

“Germany wants to send ammunition to Turkey. There is a good chance for you to make a million dollars without any trouble if you will obtain permission from the Roumanian government for Germany to send several trains of food and provisions to Turkey for the relief of the civic population in Constantinople. Of course, half of these trains will be loaded with ammunition secretly, but you do not need to have any personal knowledge of that. You can accept this offer, and it will appear that you are doing a great good by sending relief to Turkey. The reason why you are selected is because no other minister could obtain the permission from the Roumanian government but you.”

I told him that I thanked him for his interest in me, but not to think for a moment that I would be a party to any such arrangement. My country was neutral, and I could not under any circumstances aid any party at war. I requested him to make no more such offers, as it would compel me to sever my friendly relations with him.

He could not understand my refusal to avail myself of this opportunity for personal profit, and said I was the biggest fool he ever knew, but he clearly understood there was to be no further discussion of it.



SCENE NEAR VALJEVO, SERBIA, AFTER THE BATTLE
BETWEEN AUSTRO-HUNGARIANS AND SERBIANS



GRAVES OF SERBIAN SOLDIERS BETWEEN KRALJEVO AND
CACAK IN SERBIA

CHAPTER VI

CONDITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN SERBIA

ON the 15th of June I arrived at Nish, with Colonel Sola and Captain Billand, as members of the International Commission to investigate conditions affecting prisoners of war in Serbia. On the 17th, it was arranged by the Foreign Office that the commission should be placed in the charge of the war department, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Schapinac, who owing to illness was later succeeded by Commander Gaintch and Dr. Lebel Korovic from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At this time the Serbian government stated that there were 33,000 prisoners of war in Serbia, not including some thousands who were employed in private industrial works.

These prisoners were grouped in twelve camps or depots, including the one of the officers who were interned at Nish, and the Gramada depot, where were grouped a number of prisoners working on railroad construction. Rules and regulations had been formulated for the treatment of the prisoners, and the chief of each camp or depot was held responsible for the observance of these rules. With Lieutenant-Colonel Schapinac, who was in charge of all the camps, our commission visited all of Serbia and a part of Macedonia which was in Serbian possession. The commission finished its work on the 27th of July.

Many of the prisoners of war in Serbia were employed in private undertakings, as for instance, the sugar factory in Cuprija; or in public works, such as the construction, repair and maintenance of the railroads; in forestry and agricultural works, in state administrative work, in

military administration, in construction of barracks, in hospitals, in bakeries, and in private homes as domestics or employees.

I personally addressed 23,900 men, asking them regarding their treatment, and was convinced that the Serbian authorities were doing everything possible under existing conditions to accommodate and properly care for their prisoners of war. All this time typhus was epidemic, and there was much other sickness in the country.

There were about 740 officers held in Nish. These were interned in the old Turkish barracks, composed of two pavilions with an interior court of about 1,500 square meters. This was planted with trees, which afforded shade, and furnished with tables and benches. The officers of higher rank were grouped by twos and fours in private rooms. The others were in groups of from ten to fifty in large rooms, all of which were properly ventilated. Each officer had a bed with a mattress, a covering for it, a pillow and a blanket. The linen was changed every week.

For each small group there was an orderly, also a prisoner of war. They had four kitchens, one for the preparation of food for the Slavs, another for the Hungarians and Croats, a third for the Germans and a fourth for the Czecho-Slovaks. On the day of our visit, the Austro-Hungarian menu was, coffee and bread for breakfast, soup, roast beef and salad for lunch, and ham with vermicelli for dinner. Drinking water was supplied from the spring.

The officers selected and bought their own food, receiving an allowance of three dinars per day. They were furnished a private slaughter house, and there was

a canteen where they could procure at reasonable prices such things as preserves, cheese, alcoholic drinks, coffee and tobacco. Five per cent of the receipts of the canteen was turned over to the Serbian Red Cross. Each officer had his own linen and had it laundered in town at reasonable prices. The single bad feature the commission discovered was that some of the toilets were in unsanitary condition. There was an infirmary attended by Serbian doctors, and serious cases were sent to the Nish hospitals.

In the barracks there was a small chamber intended as a place of detention, in which there was a good clean bed. The rules permitted officers undergoing punishment three promenades of one hour each per day. The officers were privileged to write one postal card per week, but no objection was made if they wrote twenty, provided they were to different addresses. The officers looked very healthy, only they were suffering from lack of occupation. Some of them volunteered their services in the information office. Some gave their time to drawing, painting, or sculpture, and were permitted to take views in town. They were also furnished an organ, and occasionally gave theatrical performances.

Four officers had attempted to escape, and in consequence all the officers were denied the privileges of games, promenades, and baths in town, and were required to go to bed at seven o'clock, but at the request of these officers, I secured restoration of their previous liberty.

On my return to Bucharest, I endeavored through the Austrian Minister to effect an exchange of the invalid officers, even offering two colonels who were held in Nish in exchange for two Serbian officers of any rank. But unfortunately the Austrians did not value their colonels very highly, as they paid no attention to the

offer. There were six officers who had attempted to escape from Bardovac, who were kept incommunicado. Under guard they were permitted to exercise twice daily outside the building.

Considering the great misery and hardship prevailing throughout Serbia, it was apparent that the Austro-Hungarian officers were better off than even the better class of the Serbians themselves.

The treatment of private soldiers and sub-officers in every camp, except two, was all that was possible for their comfort under existing conditions. In one of these cases, we found that the chief of the camp fed the prisoners only once a day but charged for two meals, appropriating the money for the meal that was not served. In the other case, the colonel in charge had neglected to give proper medical attention to two hundred prisoners who were suffering from gangrene. The commission demanded court-martial and punishment for these two. In some places there were no beds, and the prisoners were obliged to lie on the bare floors, and in others on straw-filled mattresses, or on piles of straw which were provided. Usually the men changed their underclothing once a week, most of them doing their own washing, but frequently no soap was obtainable, which made the work more difficult.

In some of the larger camps there were infirmaries and hospitals where some of the prisoners acted as attendants and performed minor duties. There were tailors and shoemakers for repair work, and after work was finished all were permitted to employ their time as they chose up to nine o'clock, the hour of retirement.

The diet generally consisted of bread and soup, with meat about twice a week, but in the camps where they



DR. JICINSKY, COMMANDER GAINTECH, AMERICAN MINISTER VOPICKA, DR. RICHARD STRONG,
COLONEL SOLA, DR. LEBEL KOROVIC, CAPTAIN BILLAND

were working they were regularly furnished with meat, potatoes, rice, fat, cheese and bacon. The morning meal was usually served at six o'clock, consisting of soup, smoked meat or bacon, and between six and seven o'clock in the evening, soup and meat were served. In only two of the very large camps a mid-day meal was served, generally consisting of soup made from haricots, potatoes and meat. Examination of the first half of the camps revealed the fact that no vegetables were being served, and I urged that some be included, and if impossible to get anything else to put grass in their soup, to avoid the possibility of scurvy. It greatly surprised me to discover that wherever the superintendent of the prison was a man selected from among the prisoners, the treatment was far more harsh and severe than that of the Serbians.

Owing to the large number of prisoners, it was necessary to use almost anything available for lodgings. Those we saw included Turkish palaces, schools, gymnasiums, coffee houses, private residences, shops, stables, ordinary barracks, field tents, and even railway wagons, but being in the summer time, almost any place was suitable, as abundance of fresh air was highly desirable.

In Bardovatch, the prisoners were quartered in an old pacha's mansion, and we found that the halls, which were very large and airy, were unused, and the prisoners were packed like herrings in small rooms where all the windows were shut and the air was very offensive. The superintendent excused this on the ground that the odor from the toilets was so bad they could not allow it to enter the rooms. I told them at once to put the prisoners in the large halls, which allowed ample ventilation from the other side of the building. Dr. Richard Strong

of the Rockefeller mission was with our party, and he offered to supervise the sanitation of the toilets.

When the commission returned to Nish, I asked Prime Minister Pachich to arrange an occasional change of diet for the prisoners, as there was danger of illness resulting from continually eating the same kind of food. He agreed with me, and asked the commission to make specific recommendations, which was done, and the prisoners were thereafter given variation in their food, which was much more acceptable and healthful.

The greatest hardship for the Austrian soldier was the omission of coffee at the morning meal. The Austrians were accustomed to coffee from infancy, but as the Serbians could not obtain any for themselves, of course they could not supply it to the prisoners. We found that the prisoners' clothing was generally in very poor condition, whereupon the Austrian government expressed its willingness to send new uniforms and shoes, although the Serbians were then furnishing sandals or opincas to them without charge.

We found some men without any uniforms, but these had been sold to obtain money for gambling. In some places there was no work for the prisoners, and in other places they were given occupation, common laborers receiving from forty centimes to one dinar per day, and the mechanics being paid from one to four dinars per day. In only one place the prisoners complained that they had to dig trenches and repair guns.

The liberty allowed prisoners depended upon the locality and surroundings. In some places they were given perfect freedom, and in others restricted to certain territory for their exercise.

In the majority of cases, the commission found that

the prisoners were treated with great consideration. In fact, considering the privations of the Serbian people, the treatment might be recorded as actually benevolent.

The prisoners acting as attendants in the hospitals were first given training in the infirmary school in Kragujevac. These hospital attendants fared better than the ordinary prisoners of war. They had good rooms for themselves, with regular beds, blankets and pillows, and they also received milk or tea in the morning. The commission visited three-fourths of all the hospitals in Serbia, and found there were many cases of typhus exanthematicus. Numerous soldiers were also suffering from recurrent fever, dysentery and diphtheria. There were very few cases of smallpox, and no cholera. We found about 13,000 soldiers and prisoners in the different hospitals.

Naturally the danger of epidemics greatly decreased after the doctors of the American Red Cross and other sanitary missions had employed vaccination and other preventive methods. Effective and noble work was performed by the Rockefeller mission, covering mainly the district in New Serbia, the mission having at its command complete disinfecting equipment and necessary supplies; and by the French mission, engaged in Old Serbia with the exception of the Nish district, where the Russian mission was employed, and that of Belgrade, where the American Red Cross was active.

Much curiosity and surprise was caused at first when Dr. Ryan, who was director of all the hospitals in Belgrade, ordered the floors scrubbed and the walls cleaned every day. The people at first could not understand why, but after observing the benefits of cleanliness, they became earnest advocates of such methods.


From infectious diseases the mortality was greater among the prisoners of war than among the civilian or military Serbians. Out of 24,000 patients, the Serbian mortality was 5 per cent, while that of the prisoners was 24 per cent, and from typhus the Serbian mortality was $13\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and that of the prisoners 40 per cent. As Serbia had no large concentration camps, it was necessary to distribute the prisoners throughout the entire kingdom, which made it much more difficult to exercise uniform control, and the orders of the headquarters' staff were carried out with varying degrees of rigor.

The first relief party, which arrived in Serbia in January, 1915, was one organized and sustained by the American philanthropist, Mr. Frothingham, of New York. This unit, under the leadership of Dr. J. Rudis Jicinsky of Chicago, first organized a hospital at Dzevdzelija, and then went to Skoplje (Uskub), where it engaged in relief of Serbian soldiers and civilians suffering from typhus. Many cases of tetanus were relieved by use of the American serum.

Dr. Jicinsky informed me that the wounds of the Serbian soldiers were often frightful, due to the use by the Austrians of "dum-dum" bullets. He stated that he had extracted many of these from the Serbian soldiers' wounds.

The work of this unit was of great importance, and earned the heartfelt thanks of the Austrian prisoners as well as of the Serbian soldiers and civilians. Generally it was found that the camps under the command of military officers were better conducted than those under the direction of civilians.

The commission recommended new buildings for the winter, but Prime Minister Pachich informed us that such plans had already been prepared. Owing to the



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFICERS, PRISONERS OF WAR IN NISH

war's reverses, however, the Serbians were unable to carry out these plans.

Our experience taught us that while a few prisoners expressed the wish that they had been killed on the battlefield, rather than be obliged to endure imprisonment, life was still held dear by the many. For the future good of all, it is highly important that prisoners of war should receive humane treatment. It would seem the part of wisdom as well as justice, for international laws to penalize governments that do not take proper care of war prisoners.

While the commission was passing a creek, going from Cuprija to Dobricevo, although our automobile was going very fast and making a great noise, I heard a voice call, "Mr. Minister!" I ordered a stop and got out, and found a man holding two horses which were drinking from the creek. I asked him what he desired, and he told me that he was from Chicago, where he had a furniture store. He said he had a wife and children there, and that he was worth about \$15,000; that out of patriotic feeling he had joined the Serbian army, and now he was very tired of it and lonesome, and he thought he had already done his share of fighting. He asked me to have him discharged and sent home.

I asked Commander Gaintch, who was with us, to discharge the man and procure for him permission to return to Chicago, which was done at once. I advanced him two hundred dollars for traveling expenses to Chicago, where I hope he is now enjoying life, after his experiences in the great war.

In different places in Serbia our commission found some very old men, and boys of from twelve to fourteen years, among the interned soldiers, and we inquired why

they were there as prisoners of war. We were informed that they had been transporting ammunition in their wagons, but we learned that this was not their fault, as they had been seized by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians and compelled against their will to perform this service, those who refused to obey being shot. My colleagues and I asked the Serbian government to release these unfortunates, which request was promptly complied with.

At Uskub, we were received by the Governor of Macedonia and many Serbian officers. We were taken to the governor's mansion, where we discussed our mission and plans. The governor was much interested in ascertaining my views regarding certain Serbian affairs. I praised their country but said I could not offer any official opinion as the United States Minister.

As a matter of personal opinion I expressed regret that there was a dispute over Macedonia, and believed that an agreement should be reached with Bulgaria. He inquired what dispute I meant, and I answered that the Bulgarians wanted the three counties south of Uskub, and that if I were a factor in deciding Serbian policy I would consider it a wise move to cede these three counties to Bulgaria, provided they secured the remainder of the beautiful country for Serbia.

He and the other officers sprang to their feet, and said, "What do you mean, Mr. Minister? Those three counties are Serbian, not Bulgarian."

I answered: "I am basing my opinion on what I have heard from the American Sanitary Mission, which is living in Veles, and from others who have assured me that these three districts are more Bulgarian than Serbian, Greek or Turkish."

I said it could not be expected that they would give up this territory without recompense, as Serbia had sacrificed many lives to obtain it, but if the case were placed before the Entente Powers, they would probably hold that Serbia should receive Bosnia and Herzegovina to replace the lost territory. However, they would not agree to any proposition involving the loss of any part of Macedonia.

My suggestion was made at the time when the Russians were losing ground and retreating to their own country. I was not at all certain that there was yet time for any arrangements to be made between Bulgaria and the Triple Entente. But I knew that the Bulgarians would do anything to obtain the desired portion of Macedonia, even to the extent of breaking any agreement with Germany if necessary.

With money sent me by the Austro-Hungarian government, I had purchased supplies, clothing, etc., for the war prisoners in Serbia, and had sent the goods to Serbia, requesting their immediate distribution, but when the commission arrived in Nish we found everything I had sent stored in the warehouse, together with medicines and supplies furnished by the American Red Cross. The need of all this material was very great. The colonel in charge of the warehouse stated to me that lack of transportation had caused the delay. I doubted this, however, and asked the authorities to place the goods in charge of some other man who would ship them promptly to their destination.

Then the Serbians established a new system of having the money for war prisoners handled by branches of their Red Cross, and this appeared to work in a very satisfactory manner.

After this inspection trip, I realized the great need of food in Serbia, and after much persuasion I prevailed upon the Roumanian government to supply one hundred carloads of corn, and obtained from the American Red Cross one hundred carloads of other foodstuffs and different supplies. With the assistance of two members of the American Red Cross, Miss Shelly and Mr. Stewart, I was able to send these two hundred carloads of provisions and supplies into Serbia just before Bulgaria entered the war.

After I delivered my report as President of the International Commission for the inspection of the prisoners of war in Serbia, I received the following letter from the Austro-Hungarian government:

MONSIEUR L'ENVOYÉ:

It is with the greatest satisfaction that I have learned from the report of the Commission, which was charged to visit the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Serbia, that this commission has performed its difficult and responsible task with so great a zeal and in so excellent a manner.

The work of the Commission is of two-fold value to the I. and R. government: the report, which gives the results of this work, has at last put the I. and R. government in a position to form an opinion of definite and reliable character about the actual situation of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Serbia, and has moreover presented useful indications as to what means should be taken for the bettering of the situation of these prisoners.

I therefore consider it my duty to convey to you, Monsieur l'Envoyé, in the name of the I. and R. government, the very best and sincerest thanks for the energetic and careful direction of the work of the Commission and for the prominent activity which you have displayed in this certainly onerous and at the same time not undangerous mission.

I have the honor to express to you, Monsieur l'Envoyé, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) BURIAN.



HILLS AND FIELDS IN GRAMADA, SERBIA



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR PRISONERS AT NISH

CHAPTER VII

BULGARIA ENTERS THE WAR—SERBIAN RETREAT— KING PETER'S HEROISM

BULGARIA entered the war October 4, 1915, claiming that no agreement of any kind could be arrived at with the Entente Powers. As the Bulgarian people generally were not in favor of this step, the responsibility rested entirely on Czar Ferdinand and Prime Minister Radoslavoff. A brief review of events and conditions during Ferdinand's reign may shed some light on his attitude and on that of the Bulgarian people at this time.

On the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, Czar Ferdinand became ruler in the year 1887 at the age of twenty-six. He was the son of Prince August of Saxe-Coburg and Princess Clementine, daughter of Louis Philippe, King of France, and was therefore of Austrian-German parentage on his father's side and French-Orleanist on his mother's side. He was one of the best educated princes in Europe, and master of many languages; of distinguished appearance, highly ambitious and very wealthy.

In April, 1893, he married Princess Marie-Louise of Parma. The couple had four children, namely Princes Boris and Cyril, and Princesses Eudoxia and Nadeschda. They were staunch Catholics, but had their first son Boris re-baptized in the orthodox church. This action did not gain so much favor with the Bulgarian people as Ferdinand had expected, as it was generally considered an act of policy.

After six years of married life, Princess Marie-Louise died, but her character and actions left enduring love

in the hearts of the Bulgarians. Eight years after her death, Czar Ferdinand married Eleonora of Reuss. Before this princess became Czarina of Bulgaria, she was loved for her many acts for the good of the people, which were continued on even larger scale in Bulgaria. She supervised the direction of a modern hospital in Sofia, and was Red Cross directress during the war with the Turks. She was devoted to her people and tireless in her work to aid wounded soldiers, orphans and the destitute, and in devising means to better the condition of the unfortunate.

Czar Ferdinand, while desiring the admiration of the world, also spared no effort to advance the interests of Bulgaria and improve the condition of her people. After the revolution in 1848, the cause of education had been greatly advanced throughout Europe. Many schools and universities were built in different countries. Czar Ferdinand built many schools in Bulgaria, and he also greatly improved the roads throughout the kingdom and modernized Sofia. He was very popular until the Bulgarians met with defeat in the second Balkanic war, after which time there was a general revulsion of feeling.

His task as ruler was not an easy one. In connection with Bulgarian affairs, the relation of Macedonia required due consideration, as many of the Bulgarian diplomats and prominent men were natives of that country. Annexation of Macedonia had always been desired by the Bulgarians, not alone for territorial expansion, but to free the Bulgarians living there from the Turkish rule. The alliance made with other Balkan nations for the purpose of liberating Macedonia, greatly enhanced Ferdinand's popularity. It was his desire to enter Constantinople in the first Balkanic war, but Russia made

objection, which caused a feeling of enmity toward that country. On the other hand, Ferdinand was not popular with the Russians, although he had acknowledged that the Bulgarians were under obligation to that country for its aid in securing Bulgarian independence. This was due to his accession to the throne without the consent of Russia or other European powers.

Ferdinand always claimed that General Savoff precipitated the second Balkanic war, which resulted unfavorably for the Bulgarians, but the people felt that he, as commander in chief of the army, was responsible. In this war, and then in the World War, his plans and hopes failed miserably.

Many of my colleagues held that his sympathies were entirely with the Germans, and that in his desire to help them, he sacrificed his own country. It is my belief, based on my knowledge of conditions, that while Ferdinand's sympathies were to an extent with the Germans, he openly exposed their cause because of his firm belief at that time that Germany would be the victor, and that in the subsequent sharing of the spoils the aggrandizement of Bulgaria would be great.

It was a fatal error that the question of entering the war was not submitted to the will of the people, as I know that the great majority of the Bulgarians were opposed to the step taken. Czar Ferdinand and his ministers were therefore wholly responsible for the terrible losses sustained. It is to be hoped that his son, the present king, will profit by the mistakes of his father, and that under his rule the country will again become great and prosperous.

With Bulgaria in the fray, it was decided that she, with Austro-Hungary and Germany, would combine in

an attack which would annihilate Serbia. The doom of this country had been decreed before by the Germans, as a removal of the obstacle to their hopes for extension of power to the Turkish border. The German Minister in Bucharest told the Serbian Minister there, that if Serbia would permit the transportation of ammunition across her country to Turkey, no further attack would be made on her, but Serbia refused the offer.

Serbia expected that the Entente Powers would send at least 300,000 men to aid in her defense, but unfortunately assistance could not be furnished at that time and Serbia had to fight alone.

The Greeks were bound by a treaty to aid the Serbians in case of Bulgarian attack, but they sent no assistance, claiming that the treaty held good only in case of attack by Bulgaria alone, and that it was invalid in the existing case of combined attack of Bulgaria, Austro-Hungary and Germany.

The Serbians, with an army of a little more than 200,000 men, worn and wearied by the wars of the preceding months, were attacked on all sides by a force of about 600,000 of the enemy. Owing to the scarcity of men, the railroad running between Salonika and Uskub was not protected, and this was seized by the Bulgarians, thereby cutting off any chance for help which might be sent.

The Germans and Austro-Hungarians outnumbered the Serbians more than two to one, and their artillery strength was five times as great, which odds were well nigh insuperable. The Germans had reviled the Austrians, because in every previous effort to cross the rivers Save and Danube, they had been repulsed with losses of many thousands of men. But when the Germans



PARK FOR AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFICERS,
PRISONERS OF WAR, NISH



PALACE IN WHICH AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFICERS,
PRISONERS OF WAR, WERE INTERNED

attempted similar attacks at the same point, they met with the same fate, and were consequently jeered by the Austro-Hungarians.

After the armies of the Central Powers had effected these crossings by reason of vast superiority of numbers and equipment, their losses were greatly lessened and those of the Serbians greatly increased. Man against man, the Serbian officers and soldiers clearly demonstrated their superiority. In two months of bloody warfare there was no decisive battle, but the Serbians continually retreated toward what remained of New Serbia, and to Albania, with the enemy constantly closing in from all directions.

Many Serbians, especially those living close to the border, for their protection took refuge in Roumania. In Turnu-Severin and vicinity there were at one time nearly 15,000 refugees. The Austrian authorities at Kladova were trying to induce them to return home, and it was also claimed that the Austrians were giving money to those who did return. At this time the German Minister came to our Legation and asked me to notify the Serbian government that all the refugees should return to their homes at once, promising that they would not be molested. The same afternoon the Bulgarian Minister came for tea at the Legation and made the same request, and the Austrian Minister also asked the same thing over the telephone.

I first wanted to know why all three ministers were so much interested. I telegraphed to my government regarding it, and received an answer that if the three ministers would sign a written guarantee for the safety of the refugees, I should communicate their request to the Serbian government. This answer came in about

five days, and when I received it and asked the German Minister and his colleagues for a written guarantee, they failed to respond.

At that time the newspapers in the Allied countries were full of articles regarding the cruelty and bad treatment by the Germans to their subjects in the occupied territory, and therefore had I sent this communication to the Serbian government as originally requested, it would have indicated that the Germans had been maligned in the press. My interest was solely in the safety of the refugees, which could not be assured without the guarantee requested.

During the month of October, the Serbian government was obliged to remove its headquarters from Nish to Kragouyevatz, Stalatch, Kruchevatz, Trestenik, Cralievo, Cacak and Uzice. My last communication from American Consul Young came from Cacak. With the retiring army, retreating to inhospitable Albania, were taken the war prisoners and their own wounded soldiers, and they were accompanied by a great mass of the civil population, who preferred to face any hardship, even death itself, rather than submit to the treatment their women and helpless people would probably receive at the hands of the conquerors.

They had heard of the horrors of Belgium, and they dreaded the invading forces, even more than their ancestors had feared the merciless Turks. Therefore they traveled over mountains covered with snow, and through treacherous swamps, partly filled with the bodies of human beings, horses and cattle. Thousands of men, women and children died on the march, from hunger, exposure and sickness. It was but another chapter in the history of Serbia's fight and struggle for liberty.

With his people on the march, and fully sharing all their hardships, was King Peter. I first met King Peter in 1914, and found him a man of very distinguished appearance and agreeable manners, although his health was poor and he was then quite seventy years old. As a young prince he had followed his father in exile to France, where he enlisted in the French army in 1870. In one battle he was taken prisoner, but escaped and swam across the river to join his army again, and shortly after he was severely wounded.

After nearly forty years of exile, he returned to his country in 1903, and immediately advocated alliance with Russia and France as opposed to the pro-Austrian inclinations of his predecessor. During his reign, Serbian territory was extended, and the population increased from 2,500,000 to 15,000,000 people, which is the population of the present country of Jugo-Slavia. In later years, owing to his age and continued illness, he entrusted the affairs of state to his son, Crown Prince Alexander.

From September to November, 1914, the fortunes of the Serbian army waned. The Austrians had by far the greater forces and constantly received reinforcements. After the loss of Krupania, General Putnik ordered the retreat of the Serbian army, meanwhile inflicting great losses on the enemy.

December 2, Belgrade was occupied by the Austrian army, but owing to heavy rain for two days, the retreating Serbians were not immediately pursued. At this time King Peter was receiving treatment in Vrania, but notwithstanding his physical condition, and disregarding all remonstrances, he at once joined his army. In this desperate situation, with the enemies victorious

everywhere and the Austrian airplanes dropping bombs on the helpless Serbians, King Peter appeared and summoned his officers, to whom he said:

"I know that you are all weary, and long for your homes. You have fought bravely, and even if you abandon the fight now, you will always be regarded as Serbian heroes. You have sworn to defend your king and your country. I do not longer hold you to my personal defense, but we are all bound to our country. I shall remain here, and those who wish may stay with me, and either be victorious or die for the cause."

This rallied the soldiers, who declared that they were weary only of retreating, but they would be eager to stand by the king in an offensive action. King Peter then went to the trenches, seized a rifle from the first dead man he found, and began picking off the enemy. Soldiers were killed on both sides of him but he continued undismayed.

The news that the king was in the trenches circulated quickly, and officers and men were filled with new life and hope. The retreat continued for a month, when the Serbians halted and began an offensive which resulted in a great Serbian victory. The Austrian army was absolutely overwhelmed, and 40,000 prisoners and 120 guns were captured by the Serbians. In a few days, Belgrade and the whole of Serbia had been deserted by the enemy.

After this battle, the king went immediately to Belgrade with an escort of a few soldiers, arriving while the city was being bombarded. He went first to the cathedral, where he fell on his knees and prayed. The news of his arrival spread, and in a short time the cathedral was packed with the people of Belgrade. The



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFICERS, PRISONERS OF WAR,
TAKING PROMENADE IN THEIR PARK



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR PRISONERS IN NISH

king's sons and many officers were also present, and then and there, while the bombardment continued, the *Te Deum* was celebrated as never before.

Afterwards, for some nine months, there was a lull in the fighting. The Germans agreed to make no further attack if Serbia would permit ammunition to be shipped across her country to Turkey, but this was refused. Then followed the combined attacks of Bulgaria and the Central Powers. King Peter immediately headed his army again, but soon realized that even the greatest heroism cannot resist overwhelming numbers. He again entered the trenches without arms and suffered from illness, cold and hunger, but he stayed with his soldiers. When the futility of further resistance was apparent, he joined his people in the great retreat.

CHAPTER VIII

LAST DAYS OF QUEEN ELISABETH—CAUSE OF BULGARIAN ATTITUDE

ON February 18, 1916, I had an audience with Queen Elisabeth of Roumania, the last audience she was ever able to grant to anyone. I wished to thank her for the present of her book of poems entitled "Sweet Hours," written under the name of "Carmen Sylva." At this meeting, her majesty discussed politics to a considerable extent. She expressed her pro-German feelings in very strong terms, and stated that the existing dislike of the Germans had been inspired by the Queen Dowager of Russia, and that this hatred was most unjust.

She hoped for peace, and asked when it might be expected. I stated that if the Quadruple Entente should gain a decisive victory and some territory from the Central Powers, it might afford an opening for negotiations. For instance, if the Russians took Bukowina, that would be sufficient to start. The queen replied that this was undesirable, as Bukowina was too near Roumania. She stated that the wife of the Prince of Wied, late King of Albania, had never relinquished her claim to the throne, and that at the end of the war she expected to return with her husband to Albania.

She said she had been informed that the United States was in favor of the war because that country profited to the extent of a hundred million dollars a year by it. I told her that this statement undoubtedly emanated from an enemy of our country. I was sure that our government made no money on anything furnished European countries; that while individual manufacturers

and business men doubtless made profits, the government was losing many millions of dollars, and that if money could bring about peace, the United States would contribute sufficient to reestablish peace in Europe at once.

Her majesty said that she expected peace before the end of July, and that she believed that none of the participants in the war would derive any benefit. She sharply criticized the English, and said that that nation was deteriorating. She gave me a book entitled "Adnam's Orchard," by Sarah Grand, an English woman. On the first page her majesty had written, "Fiat Pax—Elisabetha." She asked me to read it and give her my opinion.

It was apparent to me that the queen was very ill, and I several times suggested that she might feel better able to continue the conversation at a later time, but she said that she felt like having a chat about the war and America. Two weeks later she died.

During our conversation, the queen told me that after the coronation of King Carol in 1880, she endeavored to establish a Court Ladies Society, and for that purpose invited the most popular ladies of Bucharest to a meeting. While awaiting the queen, the ladies took their places in the order they thought proper according to their standing. Her majesty's sight was deficient, and when she came into the room she greeted the first woman she encountered, and talked with her nearly all the time. Although this woman was prominent in a certain manner, she was not legally married to the man whose name she bore, and consequently the ladies of the party were highly displeased, and at length departed with as little ceremony as possible, declaring that they would never come to any such gathering again. One result was

that the preference shown by the queen induced the man to make the woman his legal wife, but another was that the other ladies persistently held aloof for a number of years.

Treatment of prisoners in Bulgaria was very much criticized, and it was claimed that the Serbians were abused even worse than the others. The chargé d'affaires of our Legation in Sofia was in disfavor with the Bulgarians because of his Entente sentiments, and consequently the authorities gave no heed to his requests. The English society, under the direction of Mrs. Take Jonsescu and Lady Barclay, were endeavoring to relieve these prisoners. They wished to send about seven cars of supplies, but doubted very much that they would be given to the prisoners.

Later I received a letter from our consul general in Sofia, Mr. D. Murphy, urging my immediate presence. He stated that the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs wished me to inspect the camps of the British prisoners in Bulgaria. I left Bucharest for Sofia on Sunday, May 28, and returned June 13. At Routchouck a great number of Bulgarian soldiers were marching through the streets and singing national songs. I understood their language and knew these songs were all very sad. On our tour I noticed that large numbers of trenches had been newly made. Accompanied by our military attaché and Mr. F. Klepal, of the American Red Cross, we arrived in Sofia on Tuesday.

By order of the secret police, no one was allowed to leave the depot without a pass, but I disregarded the order and went immediately to my hotel, leaving the other gentlemen waiting for their passes. They were detained until well after daybreak.



DETENTION CAMP FOR AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR PRISONERS
AT GRAMADA



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR PRISONERS
TRANSPORTED IN RAILROAD CARS IN SERBIA

The police objected to the presence of Mr. Klepal, and ordered him to leave Bulgaria. I made an appointment with the Prime Minister, and together with our military attaché and Consul Murphy, was received by him at ten o'clock that morning.

After the customary preliminaries, I requested protection for Mr. Klepal. It appeared the objection to him was based on the fact that at one time he had worked in a hospital in Serbia under Lady Paget. At the suggestion of Mr. Radoslavoff, I appointed Mr. Klepal as an attaché, and the secret police were notified of his standing, but nevertheless they insisted on deporting him. I then informed the Prime Minister that if this was carried out I would also leave Bulgaria immediately. It was apparent from the telephoning, that the Foreign Office and the secret police were not working in harmony, and also that the latter were superior and were the deciding power.

I made complaint to the Prime Minister that many American citizens traveling through Bulgaria were detained and badly treated, and inquired the reason. He assured me that he had never heard of anything of the kind, but if such things happened it was on account of the action of the chargé d'affaires in the Hurst case, but he promised to take immediate steps to end any such treatment. In all, I made about thirty-five different requests, which I asked the Prime Minister to write down, in order that he might not forget any. He promised in advance that he would do everything that I might ask.

The trouble over the Hurst action started before my arrival in Sofia. Mr. Hurst was the vice-consul of England, and had been permitted to stay there as

keeper of the records of the English Legation, but when the Bulgarian consul in Greece was arrested by the Entente Powers, the Bulgarians wished to retaliate by the arrest of Mr. Hurst. He, however, came to the American Legation and asked for protection. Our chargé d'affaires had rented quarters for our Legation in the Hotel Bulgaria, and when Mr. Hurst came to him, he promised that he would not give him up to the Bulgarian authorities. When the Bulgarian government demanded that he be given up, our chargé d'affaires refused. The Bulgarians then placed guards at the doors of these rooms so that Mr. Hurst could not leave. This incident caused a great deal of ill feeling, and our American citizens traveling through Bulgaria suffered by it. The action of our chargé d'affaires in this matter was undoubtedly the reason for his unpopularity.

The Prime Minister complained bitterly of the action of the Entente Powers, and said that if they had made any concessions regarding Macedonia, Bulgaria would never have joined the Central Powers. He said that in the room we then occupied, he had urged the Russian Minister and the English Minister to comply with their desires about Macedonia, which he thought were fully justified, and that they had answered him: "We don't need Bulgaria, and we shall do nothing for you."

After that decisive answer, he said it was necessary for them to join the Central Powers in order to obtain Macedonia. He stated that so many of the public men in Bulgaria came from Macedonia, it was of the highest importance that Bulgaria should secure that territory, as without it he believed they never could preserve order in their own country. He asked my opinion of the outcome of the war, and I expressed the belief that he was

on the wrong side, and stated that I felt sorry for the Bulgarians. He, however, expressed full confidence that the Central Powers would be victorious.

CHAPTER IX

ROUMANIA DURING PERIOD OF NEUTRALITY — DECLARATION OF WAR

AT the outset of the war, the Roumanian people were anxious to array themselves on the side of the Allies, but King Carol, who was a member of the Hohenzollern family, opposed it, and claimed that Roumania was bound by an existing agreement with Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. Because of this decision he was attacked daily by the papers and at public meetings. The Roumanian newspapers frequently employed cartoons, in one of which I remember King Carol was represented with a bag on his back on which was marked, "200 Million Lei," and underneath this the inscription, "You sackers can do whatever you please in Roumania. I am going to have a good time on my money in Germany." The king was old and feeble, and was very much hurt by these attacks, which perhaps hastened his death, on October 10, 1914.

While the king was undoubtedly pro-German, he desired the members of his family to refrain from any comments on the military or diplomatic conditions of Roumania. It is said, however, that the crown prince, the present King Ferdinand, at one time made a statement that he was a Roumanian crown prince, and willing to do what the majority of his people wished, and for this remark the king had him confined to his room for ten days.

During the early stages of the war, while Roumania was neutral, there was very little change in conditions of life in that country. The crops were excellent, and



INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION EXAMINING KITCHEN FOR THE
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN WAR PRISONERS



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR PRISONERS
WORKING ON THE RAILROAD IN GRAMADA

could be disposed of at very good prices. The government was making preparations for participating in the war if necessary, but it was done very quietly in order that the Germans would not suspect it.

It was current rumor that Roumania would wait until more certain which side would be victorious, and that she would then cast her lot with the winner. My firm belief is, however, that the liberal government of Bratiano was in favor of the Triple Entente, and I know that the sympathies of the majority of the Roumanian officers and people were with the Entente Powers.

In this period of neutrality, there was ordinarily not much entertaining in diplomatic circles, but I was giving a dinner to diplomats every Thursday. Aside from that, tea was served at the Legation once a week, and at one time I gave a tea party with a dance, and my daughters invited the diplomats of all the countries. To my surprise they all accepted, and at the Legation the Entente representatives congregated in one room, and those of the Central Powers in another. They held no conversation with each other but mingled while dancing. In the journal "Near East," one of the guests present wrote of this party as follows:

"Each nationality has its place of accustomed resort, and none trespasses upon that of another. The Germans go striding in their large German way into the Athenee Palace, where there is enough of gilding and enamel to make a fit frame for a Prussian officer. The Frenchmen are more at their ease in the faintly Bohemian atmosphere of the Moderne; two or three lean and easy English have colonized the establishment known as Capsa. Not even on that battle line which extends from the Baltic to Bukowina are the hostile races more definitely and

abruptly sundered than here, in this neutral capital which is the political storm center of the Balkans.

“Yet a few days ago, Bucharest held the spectacle of most of those young men gathered together in the same ballroom, somewhat stiff and formal in their politeness, with perhaps a spice of refined venom in their punctilious civility, yet going so far upon the road to peace as to acknowledge each other’s existence as human beings, and to leave each other’s throats alone. It was in the nature of a small miracle; Bucharest, which has watched them for months, saw it with amaze; and the worker of that wonder, the big, bland alchemist whose compounding of good nature and shrewd American common sense made it possible, was the Hon. Charles J. Vopicka, United States Minister to Roumania, Bulgaria and Serbia.”

In May, 1916, Roumania concluded a commercial treaty with Germany, by which Germany bound herself to export to Roumania articles of necessity in exchange for corn and petroleum. The Roumanian government claimed that the treaty was purely commercial and had no political significance, but France did not accept these views. The French Minister, Camille Blondel, who had held the post in Roumania since 1907, was replaced by Count de St. Aulaire, and it is possible that the treaty had something to do with the change of ministers. There followed great activity in business generally, and when the Roumanian government issued a state loan of 150,000,000 lei at 84, which rose to a premium of 1½ per cent, the amount was immediately subscribed. The government then increased the issue to 400,000,000 lei, which was all taken in a fortnight.

The Roumanian landowners made a great deal of

money, because they obtained very high prices for their grain, but the lower classes of people were poor. Meat was scarce in Roumania, and in Bucharest no meat could be sold in the restaurants and markets for three days in the week. This restriction was necessary to preserve stock, as the peasants were frequently attempting to take their cattle across the mountain passes and sell them to Austria and Hungary at extremely high prices.

The strongest political parties in Roumania were the Liberals and the Conservatives, the former being headed by Mr. J. C. Bratiano, and the other by Mr. Alexander Marghiloman. The followers of the latter were classed as pro-German, although it was claimed that the majority of the members of the club were anti-German. At the yearly meeting the Conservative party divided into two factions, one electing for its leaders Messrs. Lahovary, Take Jonescu and Filipescu, and this faction was strong for war on the side of the Entente. The other faction, headed by Mr. Marghiloman, advocated their neutrality, or favored war on the side of Germany.

In the summer of 1916 I took a vacation at Constanza, where many prominent Roumanian people and diplomats were staying. Many military officers of high rank were there, among them General Coanda, who was in charge of the department of artillery. We met every day, frequently playing bridge-whist at the Casino.

On August 10, I mentioned my intention of leaving on the first of September, and said that I had everything ready for the trip. One general asked if I was sure I was going, at which General Coanda looked at me and smiled very significantly.

On that day one hundred carloads of ammunition had arrived from Russia. This fact, coupled with the above

incident, indicated to me that Roumania was getting ready for war, and I was convinced that she would enter on the side of the Allies in a very short time. I telegraphed this to the Department of State nearly three weeks before Roumania finally entered the war.

During the summer of 1916, the Russian offensive, led by General Brussiloff, greatly influenced the belief in Roumania that the Entente would be victorious.

In the summer of 1915, the Roumanian Court, together with all the ministers and diplomats, moved to Sinaia. The ministers held their meetings nearly every day and whatever they did, they thought it was in secret.

One day I met Mr. Emile Perumbaro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and asked him directly whether Roumania would mobilize. He answered that they would not mobilize, but would concentrate. I told his excellency: "Ten minutes ago I telegraphed to my government that Roumania will mobilize under the name of concentration." At which he laughed so heartily and so long that we could not separate for some time. After catching his breath, he said, "Who is keeping you posted?"

The Germans and Austro-Hungarians had many spies in Bucharest who adopted every means to learn what was being done by our Legation. On one occasion a trap was set for me with a young woman of very charming appearance as the decoy.

At the Hotel Capsa, where I lunched, a table was reserved daily for me. One day, as I took my accustomed seat, I noticed that an attractive young lady was the occupant of a chair at the next table, almost touching mine. To my surprise, she began talking to me as soon as I was seated. As my official position was well known, it seemed



GERMAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR
PRISONERS IN BUCHAREST

strange that an imperative rule of etiquette should be thus violated, it being clearly established that a diplomat cannot hold conversation with anyone who has not been properly introduced.

I therefore sent the waiter to inform the chief of police, who was dining in a private room. The chief at once invited me to his room, and told me that the young lady was one of the cleverest of Austrian spies. The next day she was waiting at the same table, but I seated myself at another table, and she made no further advances to me.

The Germans and their allies omitted no opportunity to gain information through their spy system, but only two of their hirelings ever succeeded in getting into my affairs, and these spies were discovered before they did any harm. One was a clerk in the Legation, whose early presence at the office aroused my suspicion. I found he was opening telegrams, and I promptly discharged him. The other was a servant girl in my household, whose mission was to learn just what my sympathies and sentiment might be; whether strictly neutral, or with a leaning to one side or the other. Needless to say, she learned nothing which was of value to her employers, or that could give them any hold on me.

It was rumored that as a price of her participation, Roumania demanded that Transylvania, Bukowina and Banat be ceded to her, and that the Allies were willing to comply with these demands. From the remarks of the Entente ministers with whom I daily came in contact, I expected to hear any day that Roumania had entered the war on the side of the Allies. In April, 1916, I learned in Bulgaria, from all classes of people, that war with Roumania was greatly desired. Having this knowledge when I returned to Roumania, I was astonished by the state-

ment of the Prime Minister that Bulgaria would never declare war against them. Undoubtedly he made these statements because of the assurance of the Prime Minister of Russia.

The agitation fomented by the students in Roumania certainly influenced the decision to enter into hostilities. All the intelligent men of the country greatly desired that the four million Roumanians who lived in Transylvania should be free, and that that territory should be annexed to their own. The same was true of Banat and Bukowina, where the majority of the people were also Roumanians. All three of these countries were at one time part of Roumania but had been wrested from her by Austro-Hungary.

June 3, 1916, Dr. Kramarz, one of the Czecho-Slovak leaders, and a friend of mine, was condemned to death for high treason, by the military court in Vienna, together with five other prominent Czecho-Slovaks. I made every effort to save my friend from death. First I cabled the State Department, but fearing my cablegram might not be delivered, I made a personal call on Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, at his summer home in Sinaia. I told him that consideration was due me from his government because of my efforts as chairman of the International Commission that investigated the condition of prisoners of war in Serbia, and pleaded for mercy for Dr. Kramarz and his associates. He said he could not interfere with the court's action, as it would be resented as criticism. I told him I did not raise any question of guilt or innocence, but simply asked for mercy, and I left with him a written request. He promised to consider it, but the next day I received the following letter from him:

SINAIA, *June 19, 1916.**

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE:

In acknowledging receipt of your letter dated June 16, I beg to advise you that, to my regret, I am not in a position to interfere in favor of Dr. Kramarz.

Not only would such a step be beyond my discretion, but it would also be contrary to the esteem and confidence I have in our military judges who, by their sentence itself, have proved that the person in question is guilty.

In repeating my regret not to be able to serve you, I beg to remain

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) CZERNIN.

During July and August, many German and Austrian business men inquired of me whether they should remain in Bucharest or go to their own homes. Generally I referred them to their own ministers, although a few I advised to leave immediately. Those that asked their own ministers were evidently assured that nothing would happen, and they remained, and many were interned. For about a week before the proclamation of war, there were many internments on suspicion.

That war would be declared was not known to the German sympathizers until the night before it happened. The decision was made at the Crown meeting held on August 27. At this meeting there were present the king,

**(Original)*SINAIA, *le 19 Juin, 1916.*

MON CHER COLLEGEUE:

En vous accusant réception de votre lettre en date du 16 Juin, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir qu'à mon regret je suis hors d'état d'intervenir en faveur du Dr. Kramarz.

Non seulement qu'une telle démarche dépasserait ma compétence, mais encore elle serait en contradiction avec l'estime et la confiance que j'ai dans nos juges militaires qui, par leur sentence même, ont prouvé la culpabilité de l'individu en question.

En vous répétant mes regrets de ne pouvoir vous être agréable, je vous prie, mon cher collègue, d'agréer l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

(Signed) CZERNIN.

the ministers, the generals, and Mr. Take Jonescu and prominent members of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The king made a speech in which he said:

“Although I am a member of the Hohenzollern family, I am the King of Roumania first, and therefore I have to do what my subjects wish me to. I perceive that the majority of the people are asking that Roumania enter the war on the side of the Entente, and I therefore state to you that I am ready to comply with their wish.”

He had ready at the time a complete plan of action, especially regarding the movements of the army. The proclamation of war was prepared and read in the meeting, and it was delivered to the Austro-Hungarian government the same night by the Roumanian minister.

As a rule, the Roumanian people are undemonstrative, and not even given to loud applause at public meetings, but on this Sunday, when the decision of the government became known, thousands of people of all classes marched through the streets, cheering for their king and their country. After the procession ended and the crowd dispersed, I visited the smaller streets, and at nearly every house a soldier was bidding farewell to his family or his sweetheart. All expression of sentiment indicated that the Roumanians were actuated only by the desire to aid humanity and to free their brothers.

On the day war was proclaimed, the German Minister came and asked me to take over the German interests in Roumania. I asked him if he had expected the declaration, and he said he had not, because he had had assurances to the contrary from both the king and the prime minister. He said that had been promised him long before, and I told him he should have had the promise renewed every few days, because in war time conditions



ROYAL PALACE IN SINAIA, ROUMANIA



ROOM IN ROYAL PALACE AT SINAIA

are often altered very abruptly. I promised to take care of the German interests if approved by my government, and also told him that on the 10th of August I had informed my government that in my opinion Roumania would take this step about the first of September.

In taking charge of the German interests, I had to attend to the welfare of the staff of the German Legation, and also to arrange for their transportation from Roumania to Germany. It was agreed between us and the Roumanian Foreign Office that the Germans and Turks should leave together on one train, and the Austrians and Bulgarians together on another.

The Germans and Turks left on Sunday, the week after war was proclaimed. I sent the secretary of our Legation with them to the frontier, and also supplied them with 10,000 rubles in cash, as they were without funds. They were placed in a fine train with sleeping cars, but the Austrians and Bulgarians were sent away in cars that had all the windows painted black, so they could see nothing of what was happening in Roumania.

Before departure, the German Minister said that if Germany realized that it would lose in the war, and had only 500,000 men left, they would come back to Roumania as a last act and give her a lesson for the outrage perpetrated on Germany. Prince Schaumburg-Lippe said that they would all be back in six months.

After the war was declared, many subjects of the Central Powers were arrested. Among them were women who were accused of being spies for the Germans and Austrians, because they associated with the Roumanian officers, and obtained information which they sent to the enemy. There were 393 of these, including many German girls who were supported by the American Lega-

tion from funds sent by the German government, and they were interned at Vacaresti, a short distance from Bucharest, until about a week before the Germans entered Bucharest. When the chief of police left Bucharest he entrusted them to me, and I requested their discharge the day before the Germans entered the city. They were among the first to welcome the German soldiers on the 6th of December, when they presented them with flowers, candies and cigarettes.

CHAPTER X

ROUMANIA ENTERS WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE ALLIES— CONDITIONS OF UNPREPAREDNESS

IMMEDIATELY after the proclamation of war, the Roumanian army marched to Transylvania, the soldiers and people full of joy over the opportunity to strike a blow for the freedom of their brothers in that country. They expected to win quickly, but the first surprise and disappointment came in short order. The Germans sent airplanes, which made the first attack on Bucharest on August 29. The moment they crossed the Danube, with only twenty-three minutes' flight before them, all the city church bells began to ring, the policemen blew their whistles, and a gun located at the Athenee palace was frequently discharged. When these signals of attack were given, the populace was panic stricken. The greatest confusion prevailed during the nerve racking din of the bombardment, and nearly all the people took refuge in cellars.

During succeeding airplane attacks, windows and doors were protected by iron shutters in the day time, and at night the houses were kept dark, black paper being put on the windows and only candles being used for light. There were very few lights in the streets, and these were much subdued. It having been demonstrated that the bombs from the airplanes penetrated only to a depth of about thirty feet in the buildings, only the three upper stories of the four- and five-story hotels were unoccupied.

The Roumanians demanded that I cable my government after the first airplane attack, claiming that Bucha-

rest was an open town, and that the action was barbaric and unwarranted, but the Germans claimed that it was a fortified city, and that they were therefore justified.

The second attack was made September 4 at 2:00 A.M., with the powder factory the chief objective. The third attack was made September 5, between 2:00 and 5:00 A.M. This was directed against the city generally. In the garden of the Royal Palace, a bomb made a pit about five feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter. In these attacks, from four to eight airplanes were employed, which dropped bombs containing about five hundred pounds of explosives. Four of them struck within a thousand feet of the American Legation.

In their excitement, the people demanded that two German prisoners be executed for each person killed by the bombs, and even the newspapers endorsed this policy. At once I informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this agitation must cease, and I said: "If any German is killed on account of the airplane raids, I shall leave the city and you will lose your best friend, 'Uncle Sam.'" I stated firmly that no individual should be made to suffer because of methods adopted by all the countries at war. The Minister of Foreign Affairs accused me of favoring the Germans in this matter, but if the Roumanians had followed out this plan of revenge it is certain that the Germans would have retaliated mercilessly when they captured Bucharest.

On September 4, I served an ultimatum, in behalf of the Germans and Turks, on Prime Minister Bratiano. He told me that he did not wish war with Germany, but I told him that the German attitude was based on the fact that Roumania was at war with the German Allies.

All banking houses and business concerns belonging



STREET GROUP OF ORIENTALS



FLOOD OF LEPENITZA RIVER IN SERBIA

to the Central Powers were put in charge of administrators or custodians, and the deposits of enemy subjects were confiscated. I appealed to the Roumanian government in behalf of the poorer German depositors, and as a result these were given an allowance of from 100 to 500 lei a month, according to their needs. All enemy subjects were notified that they would be required to leave the city at a specified time for the places of their internment, otherwise they would be jailed in Bucharest. Among these were some Slavs of Austro-Hungary, who were friendly to the Entente, and I asked that they be exempt from this order, but as the Roumanian government had many important matters to occupy its attention, it was not until I had personally visited the camps and given a list of names of those who were entitled to freedom, that my request was complied with.

Naturally some very unfortunate errors occurred. In one internment camp I found a man seventy years old, whose two sons were officers in the Roumanian army. Of course, he was immediately released when this became known. Among the interned Germans were some priests and nuns, who received a little better treatment. Under an earlier agreement our Legation received 360,000 lei from Germany for the support of the Germans in Roumania, while at the same time our Embassy in Berlin was given 300,000 marks for the maintenance of Roumanians there.

After each airplane attack, I cabled the State Department, and on one Sunday morning at seven o'clock, I telegraphed the losses of the previous day, and added, "While writing this telegram eight German airplanes are coming to the city to do some more damage and killing." It was claimed that the airplane crews were attempting to kill the farmers while at work in the fields, and the

very serious charge was also made that it was intended to kill Queen Marie and her children. It was stated that it was intended to drop bombs on them on a certain day when she was expected to visit the summer home of Prince Stirbey, and that the postponement of that visit saved her life.

Immediately after the proclamation of war, the German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Legations were closed and the ministers with their attachés and employees had to remain within doors, their food being sent to them by the Foreign Office. This was done for their personal protection, as it was deemed unsafe for them to appear on the streets, owing to the intense excitement that prevailed.

Many Germans claimed exemption from internment, affirming that they were Roumanian citizens or pro-Roumanian in their sympathies, or else that old age or sickness justified their liberty. Hence, my office force had to work many hours daily investigating these different cases.

The Roumanian army had been very successful, especially in Transylvania, but met its first great defeat at Tukarcaia. Various reasons were assigned for this defeat, but my information from a private source was that on the night of September 6, 1916, four Roumanian regiments were encamped near Tukarcaia, and two other regiments a short distance away. Patrols of Bulgarians opened fire on these groups, and returning the fire in the darkness, these regiments began shooting at each other. This lasted for about fifteen minutes, and then the order was given to charge with bayonets. Only when they were in close contact was the fatal mistake discovered, and the fighting discontinued.

Meanwhile, several Bulgarian regiments began to fire from all sides. The Roumanians were at a great disadvantage. Also the civilian population of Tukarcaia, mostly Bulgarians and Turks, began shooting at the Roumanian soldiers and drenching them with boiling water.

As their position appeared hopeless, the Roumanian commander raised the white flag, but even then the Bulgarians did not cease, and in the end they had killed or wounded 10,000 men and taken about 25,000 prisoners. The escaping Roumanian soldiers fled in all directions. It was stated that the garrison at Tukarcaia included about 35,000 men, but the fate of more than half of these remains unknown. This was the beginning of ill fortune for the Roumanian side.

There were six mountain passes into Roumania, Palanca, Buzeu, Predeal, Campulung, Caineni and Jiu, and if properly guarded by about 60,000 men each, the enemy would have been greatly delayed in getting into Roumania, and perhaps wholly prevented from making the invasion. An important battle was fought and won by Roumanians at Jiu Pass, but the commander, General Dragamira, was mortally wounded. He was replaced by General Socec, and it is claimed that during his absence on a visit to Bucharest, the Germans made an attack and captured the pass. On this charge, General Socec was at first convicted by a military court, but on an appeal he was found not guilty.

King Ferdinand was commander in chief of the army, with Generals Grigoresco and Avarescu in charge of the first and second armies respectively. General Illiesco was acting chief of staff, to which place General Zlotow was later appointed. In a short time the latter com-

mitted suicide, because he believed he had made some serious errors. The Roumanian army, after being defeated in Transylvania, was forced to fight on its own territory.

The bulk of the Roumanian army was made up of inexperienced soldiers, who to a great extent were not well officered. Many generals whom I knew personally, were not able men, and some were even strong German sympathizers. It was the feeling of many officers that their troops were not well commanded. The rank and file was composed of men possessing all the elements of good soldiers, and in close encounters they invariably compelled their enemies to retreat. The Roumanian army lacked artillery, their heaviest guns being six-inch and the great majority only three-inch. There was also a great scarcity of hand grenades, which could have been very effectively used.

General Illiesco, who was chief of staff during the 1916 campaign, stated to the press that the old Russian cabinet of which Mr. Sturmer was president, was responsible for the Roumanian defeats in Walachia. In connection with this he said:

“From the beginning of the war our government knew we would have to join the Allies, and in August, 1914, we had already started the reorganization of our army. It was a difficult task, and of long duration. From the number of 180,000 men we had to build up an army of 820,000 men altogether, of which 560,000 had to be ready for fighting. The number of officers had to be increased threefold, and we had no ammunition or machine guns.

“It was not surprising that in July, 1916, considering the great difficulties regarding transportation and communicating with our Western Allies, notwithstanding



A SERBIAN PORTER



MARKET PLACE IN NISH

all the work, Roumania was not ready. Nevertheless, at that time, Russia practically forced us to immediate action. The wording of the official document, which I have at your disposal, is 'Now or never.'

"The Russian government submitted to us elaborated plans of action, but they had omitted to take into consideration the probable future course of Bulgaria. When we mentioned this, Mr. Boris Sturmer, the Russian Prime Minister, answered that Bulgaria would never go into war against Russia. We then requested 200,000 Russian soldiers for the Dobrudja front, but were told such a number was not necessary for a purely political demonstration. Twice we requested the Russians to start operations against Bulgaria by occupying territory on the right banks of the river Danube. Taking Roustchouk would have been a security for our capital. The French staff were of the same opinion, but Russia sent us a formal order to abstain."

General Illiesco gave us the exact story of the Transylvania campaign. The first army had to turn upon the Jiu in the territory of Orsova. The second had to go all over Transylvania, and the third had to advance with the Russian troops of Dornavatra.

"Unfortunately," he said, "the Russian troops did not advance a single yard. Today they are still at the same place as at the time we went into the war. This also compromised the Russians themselves, because quick action had to be taken to shorten the Transylvanian front.

"Mr. Sturmer's government forced us to declare war, having need of our troops to cover the left end of the Russian army in Bukowina. These troops had to remain where they were, contrary to statements made both to Roumania and France. The Roumanian defeat was

foreseen and planned by Mr. Sturmer, who expected through this to end the war.

“I believe that when Mr. Sturmer forced us to enter the war, and when he organized our campaign, he expected to conclude a separate peace as a result of the Roumanian failure, and one which would not mean a Russian defeat, which consequently would not lessen his powers, or those of the Czar.

“We have been beaten because they had a better commanding staff, but chiefly because of the unfair plan of the Germanophile party in Petrograd to sacrifice Roumania, in culmination of a long established plan. This was something sudden, which no Roumanian, French or English diplomat could foresee, and was the cause of our fall.

“Do not think for a moment that there was inefficiency on the part of the heads of the Russian troops, as these officers were great men. Notwithstanding our ill fortune, there has always been a perfect understanding between us and the Russians.”

About five weeks after Roumanian hostilities were started, I received a visit from the Prime Minister about atrocities committed by the Bulgarians in Dobrudja. On the same day, our chargé d'affaires in Bulgaria telegraphed me that the Bulgarian government had asked an investigation of similar acts committed by the Roumanians in the same place. After investigating, and finding grounds for the charges on both sides, I referred both complaints to the American Secretary of State.

The Roumanians claimed that the Russians did not give them sufficient support, but the Russians stated that at the beginning of the war they offered between 200,000 and 300,000 men to Roumania, but the Rou-

manians desired only 50,000 of them. The Roumanians expected an early victory, and believed that if the majority of the fighting men was composed of Russians, the latter would claim all the credit, whereas they wished the greater part of the glory for themselves.

The attacks of the German airplanes continued, which engendered so much hatred by the populace, that I feared, notwithstanding my protection, that some of the German prisoners might be killed in retaliation. Therefore I telegraphed my government and our Embassy in Berlin, stating that unless these attacks ceased immediately, I could not assure the safety of a single German in Roumania. After this all airplane attacks were stopped.

In November, 1916, the Roumanians in Bucharest, fearing German occupancy, removed their official records and goods into Moldavia. At one time, about 15,000 Roumanian troops crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, but they met with disaster, 5,000 being killed and wounded by airplane bombs and fire from the Austrian gunboat. There was no doubt that the Roumanian soldiers fought heroically, but lacking sufficient ammunition and being wholly without big guns, they did not have a chance in the encounter. The largest Roumanian guns were only six-inch, whereas the Germans employed from six- to fourteen-inch guns.

CHAPTER XI

BURIED GERMAN EXPLOSIVES FOUND IN ROUMANIAN CAPITAL — PLOT TO INOCULATE HORSES AND CATTLE

ON October 5, 1916, the Prefect of Police of Bucharest asked my permission to search the building and the garden of the German Legation, stating he had been informed by the guardian that there were many bombs hidden in the building, and some buried in the garden.

As representative of the German interests, I could not give him this permission, but he stated that if explosives were buried in the garden, it was dangerous for the entire city, as bombs from the airplanes might fall on that spot. He said he would not insist upon going into the building, but he felt that the garden should be thoroughly searched, and I therefore gave him that permission, sending the secretary of the Legation with him in order to have exact knowledge of what conditions might be disclosed.

After much digging, the secretary and the prefect reported to me that they had found fifty Bickford cords with charges, and fifty metal boxes of elongated rectangular form. They also found a box, inside of which there were six wooden cylinders, in each of which was a glass test tube containing a yellow liquid. On the inner wrapper enclosing the large box, the following inscription was written:

*"Very secret. To the Royal Colonel and Military Attaché.
His honor Herr von Ham t in"*

The name had been partly erased, but distinct traces remained of some of the letters, and it might have been



ROUMANIAN KING ADDRESSING PEOPLE



MOUNTAIN HORN BLOWERS IN ROUMANIA

Hammerstein. Within the box was a typewritten note as follows:

“Herewith four tubes for horses and four for horned cattle. For use as directed. Each tube is sufficient for 200 head. If possible administer direct through the animal’s mouth, if not, in its fodder.

“Should be much obliged for a little report on success with you. If there should be good news to report, Herr K’s presence here for a day desirable.”

They brought the bombs and boxes to the American Legation, but I ordered their immediate removal, fearing an accidental explosion. The prefect sealed the boxes and sent some of them to the laboratories for analysis and test. Later, the Royal Pyrotechnical Laboratory of Bucharest reported by letter that the contents of the bombs were of very high explosive character. The Roumanian Institute of Pathology and Bacteriology also reported that the liquid in the test tubes would inoculate horses and cattle with infectious diseases of deadly character.

The Russians had promised to furnish Roumania with 2,800 carloads of ammunition, but had sent her only 100 carloads before the opening of hostilities, and no more was sent thereafter. It was claimed that Prime Minister Sturmer of Russia had all the other cars of ammunition sidetracked in Russia, and that when he assured the Roumanians the Bulgarians would not make war on them, he knew that the Bulgarians desired the war.

I could obtain very little definite information from any source regarding the Roumanian military situation, until Mr. Stanley Washburn, an American, and representative of the “London Times,” came to Bucharest. He was allowed to go to the front with the Roumanian Army,

and upon his return from Transylvania, he said to me in confidence, "Poor Roumania is lost." This was heart-breaking, as my sympathy with the people among whom I was living was very great, but his opinion was confirmed by all the information I could obtain later from the highest sources.

By invitation, on October 1, I accompanied the queen to her hospital in the Royal Palace. She went from room to room, speaking to the wounded soldiers and giving them cigars, cigarettes, or candy from a tray carried by Prince Nicolai. She was utterly downcast, and the tears continually rolled down her cheeks. She afterwards expressed to me great fear that if the Germans captured Bucharest, these wounded soldiers, who would be unable to leave, would meet their death.

My colleagues, the foreign ministers, were nervous and were making preparations to move with the royal family to Jassy. The English, Russian, Italian and Serbian ministers requested me to take charge of their interests in Roumania, and with these and Turkey, Germany, Roumania, and my own country, I had the honor and responsibility of representing eight nations. Also I was to take care of the French and Belgian interests from the time the minister of Holland was recalled. The foreign ministers soon departed, and the secretary of our Legation, accompanied by the military attaché and two American officers, also went to Jassy. The king left on December 2, and the next day the Prime Minister and other officials followed, leaving the people in a state of great depression. I also experienced a sense of desolation.

In war times the envoys and consuls are sometimes justified in exceeding their authority, especially as uncertain delivery of mail or telegrams makes it impossible

to receive official instructions in time. One case of this kind I recall was in November, when it appeared that the Roumanians would be obliged to retreat from Walachia. Mr. Everett Sadler, in charge of the Standard Oil Company's interests in Roumania, urged me to go to Ploesti to assure the safety of the Americans working there. From what he told me, it was certain that the danger was great. But I could not leave my post and I could not wait for instructions from the Department of State, as the enemy might capture the town at any time, and was likely to accord the Americans no better treatment than the natives.

I therefore appointed Mr. Sadler a vice-consul, giving him an official seal and a sign which he could place on the building, showing that it was occupied by an American vice-consul; first having him furnish me the bond required from such officials. We next secured the confirmation of the Roumanian government, and he returned to Ploesti, where he put up his sign reading, "Office of the American Vice-Consul," and when the Germans came, all the American employes and their families took refuge in this building. The Germans respected the sign, and none of the occupants were molested.

At the time of Mr. Sadler's appointment, he handed me his signed resignation for use when desired. As a matter of fact, I had no right to appoint a vice-consul when no American consulate existed there. If there had been such in Roumania, with the consul temporarily absent, I would have had the right to make such an appointment. I unhesitatingly exceeded my authority, for the protection of American citizens, and I notified the State Department of my action, but before my dispatch arrived

in Washington, Mr. Sadler had resigned as vice-consul and was on his way to America.

After the loss of Tukarcaia, the next great loss the Roumanians sustained was the taking of Constanza on October 7, by the German and Bulgarian troops. The enemy went in that direction as far as Harchova. In the west, the Roumanians lost Crajova and a part of the Olt River. After this river was crossed, Pitesti was taken, and then the enemy marched southeast and captured Titu. The Roumanian army operating at Campulung retired across the mountains to Campina, and from there endeavored to reach Ploesti. The Germans were forcing the Roumanian army near Bucharest and north towards Ploesti.

The Bulgarian troops crossed the Danube near Zimnicea, and also near Oltenitza, and were fighting near Bucharest, together with the army coming from Crajova. On Sunday, December 3, the battle ended in favor of the Germans, the Roumanians retired to the east of the city, and it was generally expected that Bucharest would be obliged to surrender on the next day.

That afternoon I was told that in the morning the Roumanians had taken about 5,000 German prisoners, but in the afternoon the enemy was reinforced by General Falkenhayn's troops, and then the Germans not only retook their soldiers who had been captured, but also made some of the Roumanians prisoners.

The civil population of Bucharest was in panic. So many fled from the city, that there were only about 150,000 inhabitants remaining. On the next day many Russian soldiers arrived on foot in Bucharest, and they strenuously opposed capitulation. It appeared that the Russians did not arrive in time on Sunday to reinforce the Roumanians because of the bad conditions of trans-



SERBIAN PEASANTS



PEASANT GIRL FROM PRAHOVA, ROUMANIA

portation, the Roumanians having only one main line over which they could come, and that could not provide sufficient accommodation and therefore they were obliged to march on foot.

Following the departure of the court from Bucharest, the people were very nervous, and feared that the enemy would murder many inhabitants and commit all manner of crimes. I gave them assurance that their fears were groundless, and succeeded in quieting them.

The new Prefect of Police, General Mustatsi, issued a proclamation, calling upon the people of the city to receive the enemy hospitably, requiring that all houses be left open and all arms of every description be delivered at once to the town hall, and that no injury to the invading army be attempted. The penalty for disobeying this order was death by shooting.

Many prominent ladies came to the Legation, asking permission to sleep there, and there were between five and six thousand women and children in the street asking for protection.

The last man who left Bucharest before the city was taken by the Germans, was General Stefanik, who was there with the French flying corps, and who afterwards was the first minister of war of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Owing to illness he was unable to leave any earlier. He asked me to send my chauffeur with him to the headquarters of the Roumanian General Staff, but when he arrived there he found that his airplane was out of order and could not be used.

My chauffeur had to take him to Ploesti, from which city he escaped in the nick of time. On the return trip to Bucharest, within about an hour my car passed through the advance lines of the Germans on their way to

Ploesti. The Germans, and especially the Austro-Hungarians, would have been very glad to capture General Stefanik.

CHAPTER XII

BUCHAREST TAKEN BY ARMY OF CENTRAL POWERS— RIGOROUS RULE OF VON MACKENSEN

IN THE evening of the fourth of December, a blind-folded emissary of von Mackensen's arrived in Bucharest, bringing an ultimatum to the effect that unless the city was surrendered within twenty-four hours it would be bombarded. The next day, the mayor of the city asked me to go with him on the following morning to meet the Germans on the outskirts of the city, where he would discuss the surrender.

Early in the morning of the sixth I was summoned to the office of the Minister of Interior, and at nine o'clock, the mayor in his automobile, bearing a huge white flag, followed by the Holland Minister and myself in our cars, with our respective flags flying, went to the outskirts of the city to meet the Germans by appointment. We waited over two hours, meanwhile hearing firing in the direction of Chitila, but as the Germans did not appear, we returned to the city.

Half an hour later the German troops began to enter the city. I was again summoned to the City Hall, where I found Prince Schaumburg-Lippe, with five other officers, who came to receive a proposal for the surrender of the city, which they were to convey to General Falkenhayn. The mayor signed the capitulation with tears in his eyes and handed it to the Germans. Prince Schaumburg-Lippe laughed when I said to him, "I am sorry you did not keep your word. You said when you left you would come back in six months, but you have returned in three."

The German troops who were then arriving appeared to range from sixteen to sixty years in age; their uniforms were ragged and dirty, and they looked weary and haggard. But as they marched, they sang "Deutschland ueber Alles" and "Heimat," and they were doubtless very much cheered by the gifts of flowers and cigarettes which were freely offered by the women. A few of these were natives, who evidently intended to placate the invaders, and seemed much relieved that the soldiers did not immediately start murder and pillage. But most of them were German, Austrian, and Bulgarian actresses, who had been released from internment the day before. That evening all the officers of the German staff came to the Legation to pay their respects to me. They chatted freely about the campaign against Roumania, and expressed the wish that all others might be as easily conducted and with such small loss to them. The next day I received the following letter:

"The Foreign Office has the honor to confirm the receipt of the reports from the American Legation in Bucharest, from the beginning of the war up to the end of September, in regard to the Germans who stayed in Roumania, and has the honor to express to the Minister the thanks of the German Government for his valuable service and for the sending of the reports."

The day after von Mackensen's military government assumed control of Bucharest, the following proclamation was posted on all the government buildings:

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF BUCHAREST

The city of Bucharest is now occupied by my troops and is under martial law.

We are at war only against the Roumanian and Russian army, not against the Roumanian people.



ROUMANIAN WEDDING



GUESTS AT THE WEDDING

Those who offer no resistance to my army, and willingly submit to the orders of the military authorities and their deputies, their life and property is secure. But whoever does injury to the troops in my command or attempts to give aid to the Roumanian and Russian army, against which we are fighting, will be punished with death.

In case of any opposition to my troops, either from the civilian population or the civil officials, the city of Bucharest will be held responsible and may expect the severest measures for punishment.

The Commander-in-chief,
(Signed) V. MACKENSEN.
General Field Marshal and General Adjutant.

Headquarters, December 6, 1916.*

All inhabitants of Bucharest were ordered to turn in to German Headquarters, at once, two-thirds of all their provisions and supplies on hand. A short time after they were again required to make another division of the meagre remainder of their supplies. Disobedience of this order was very severely punished.

German reporters, who came with the victorious

*(Original)

AN DIE EINWOHNER DER STADT BUKAREST

Die Stadt Bukarest ist von meinen Truppen besetzt; sie steht unter dem Kriegerrecht.

Wir fuhren den Krieg nur gegen die rumaenische und russische Armee, nicht gegen das rumaenische Volk.

Wer meinem Herre keinen Widerstand entgegengesetzt und sich den Anordnungen der militaerischen Befehlshaber und ihrer Beauftragten willig unterwirft, dessen Leben und Eigentum ist in Sicherheit.

Wer es aber unternimmt den mir unterstellten Truppen Nachteil zuzufuegen oder dem rumaenischen und russischen Herre, gegen das wir kaempfen, Vorschub zu leisten, wird mit dem Tode bestraft.

Fuer jeden Widerstand, der meinen Truppen von seiten der Zivilbevoelkerung einschliesslich der Zivilbeamten entgegengesetzt wird, wird die Stadt Bukarest zur Verantwortung gezogen und hat die schwersten Zwangsmassnahmen zu erwarten.

Der Oberbefehlshaber,
V. MACKENSEN.
Generalfeldmarschall und General-Adjutant.

army, greatly praised the valor of the Roumanian soldiers, mentioning that some three hundred of them, who were unarmed, were discovered crawling toward the German lines, evidently intending to capture some of the enemy's arms, and that all were killed by German artillery.

I was frequently asked what my attitude would be, and particularly if I intended to call on General von Mackensen. I stated I would call on him only if invited to do so. He did not invite me, but one day when he was walking on the street, with a detective in front and another behind, I was in my auto, which bore the American flag, and he saluted and I raised my hat. His features were of a pleasant type, and I was informed that he was very agreeable in manner and well liked by the ladies of Bucharest.

Before the arrival of the Germans, I told the American residents to fly the American flag from their windows, in order that the Germans might not molest them. Two weeks later, a German colonel, who was quartermaster, called at the Legation, sending his card to me. When he came in my office he was accompanied by an ill-looking civilian, and I said, "I did not receive any card for your companion, so please tell him to leave, as I am not ready to receive him."

The colonel told me that the other was head of the secret service, and that he wished him present during our conversation. I refused consent and the man retired. Then I explained that it was proper to send in the cards of all the party. This colonel was bitter toward all Americans, because when he was fighting in France he was wounded by a shell made in America. In a high-handed manner he said I had no right to advise Americans to put

out their flags, and he demanded that I order them removed. I replied that the order was also for the benefit of the Germans, as if any Americans had been attacked, it would have put the Germans in a dangerous position, and therefore they should thank me for the precaution.

He did not press the point further, but inquired then who were the occupants of a building across the street. I said that my clerk, Miss Palmer, lived there, and he asked if he could enter a house where the American flag was out. I told him Miss Palmer occupied only the second floor and had nothing to do with the rest of the house. Later that day he sent soldiers, who removed all the valuables from the remainder of the house, but they carefully avoided Miss Palmer's apartment.

One evening I attended a reception at the home of one of the social leaders, but as it was apparent from the conversation that society, as it existed then, was decidedly pro-German, I thenceforth accepted no more invitations, because of my neutral position.

I now held daily conferences with the civil governor of Bucharest, to whom I reported all complaints. In the first two days there were thirty cases of robbery and heinous attacks on helpless women by soldiers. I urged the governor to take preventive steps, and he then placed six soldiers on guard at the crossings, to whom complaints could be made, and this acted very effectively as a check. The Germans always claimed the Bulgarians committed the crimes, while the latter placed the blame on the Austrians, who in turn charged the Turks with them. The women were unable to identify their assailants, as the soldiers generally remained in the city only a day or two.

I thanked the governor for his precautions, and told

him it was far better to be decent than to repeat the acts of the Germans in Belgium. He was very boastful, and asserted Germany would win the war even if America entered against her. I silenced this boasting by offering to make a liberal bet that Germany would lose if our country took part; his tongue was very loquacious, but his money was unable to talk.

On New Year's Day I wished to send a telegram to the Czar of Bulgaria, as I had done each year, but General von Mackensen refused to allow it, stating that the Kaiser had ordered that no New Year telegrams be sent from the front. I informed him that I was not at the front, and anyway that I would not take orders from the Kaiser, not being accredited to his country. Then I sent the telegram through the Bulgarian secretary, and received an answer in a few days.

One of the first acts of the Germans after occupying Bucharest was to remove all the telephones. They then strung their own wires and installed instruments only where they wished them. My telephone and that of the Hoiland Minister were allowed to remain.

The Germans took over all the first and second class hotels and restaurants at once, and the public was allowed only in those of lower grade. I was invited to eat with the Germans in the Casino, but I could not accept because of my neutrality. My staff and I were accorded the freedom of all the restaurants. It was the custom of the officers and soldiers at first to order what they chose in the restaurants, cafés and stores, and to make no payment. The proprietors protested to me and I arranged with the governor that each soldier should leave a written acknowledgment of his debt.

The first few days the restaurants were ordered to



AT THE BATHS IN TEKIRKIAL



BULGARIAN BEAUTIES

serve everything they had to the officers, but as the supplies soon ran low, it was then ordered that only one kind of meat should be served, and each person was required to give a certificate for what he was served.

In a short time I had a disagreement with the German police, but in the end had my own way. I had been issuing passports, with the consent of the Roumanian authorities, to the Germans and Turks, whose countries I represented, in exchange for the passports of their countries, and when the Germans took possession of Bucharest, I asked the governor for similar authority in behalf of the subjects of the other countries I represented. After examining the form, he gave consent, but stipulated that I show the form to the captain of police, who was known to have been very cruel in Belgium. When I showed the form to the captain, he said, "Mr. Minister, you will not make out any passports, I will do it myself." I answered, "I did not come here to ask you for any advice or instructions. I arranged with the governor as to what is to be done, and I stopped here at his request, merely to show you what will be done."

The next day he telephoned that he was coming to see me. I began immediately to make out passports and issue them, and continued to do so. He made no further attempt to interfere with me, and in a few days he was sent away from Bucharest.

The subjects of the other countries were in line daily at the Legation to procure passports. Frequently those who were found without them on the streets were arrested, and as they were shifted from one jail to another, it was then difficult to locate them. Therefore men sometimes fought for precedence in the line. One morning I saw a man about seventy-five years old pushed from the

line and knocked down. I went out immediately and announced that because of that action I would issue no passports that day except to that one old man. The punishment was severe for the rest of them, but thereafter no more rough conduct occurred.

Mr. Marghiloman, who remained in Bucharest as head of the Roumanian Red Cross, was also known as one of the leading pro-Germans, but he had to ask my assistance in procuring the release of some people who had been arrested. We secured the discharge of some of them, but the others were interned for eleven days. When I protested to the governor, he said it was only retaliation for similar acts on the part of the Roumanians. And this I knew was the truth, as many people were imprisoned for a short time, and those known to be very antagonistic to the Central Powers were sent to Bulgaria and Germany, and there interned.

One day, Princess Bibesco, who was in charge of a Roumanian hospital, came to me in great alarm, stating that some valuables belonging to a German soldier patient had disappeared in the night and she feared the consequences. I went with her to the German hospital management and reported the matter, asking an investigation, and fortunately it was discovered that a German attendant was the thief.

Princess Cantacuzene was in charge of a hospital with over four hundred patients, and was unable to get fuel or a sufficient supply of food, and the patients were in great distress. As her appeals to the German authorities were ignored, she indulged in some very plain talk which was reported to German headquarters, and in consequence she was ordered to remain at home forty-eight hours as a punishment.

The Roumanians complained that the Germans took everything they desired for their own use, and did not hesitate to deprive the poor of all they possessed, even leaving them without food or the means to procure it. They certainly took all the wines and delicacies from the homes of the well-to-do. It was also charged that horses had been stabled in Roumanian churches, but I know of no proof of such accusation. The royal palaces were not disturbed, and I was told this was due to respect for former King Carol, who was a friend to Germany.

Under the German rule, the old mayor, Mr. Petrescu, was retired, and Colonel Verzea appointed in his place. Also, eleven members of the council were removed and eleven friends of the Germans substituted. The Jews had expected representation in the new council, but in this they were disappointed.

Before the entrance of the Germans, all the wounded Roumanian soldiers who could be moved were sent to other places in Moldavia, but many badly wounded were left behind. Nearly all the Roumanian doctors had gone into the army, so that very few remained. In one of the hospitals there were 300 wounded men under the care of Doctor Bayne of Washington, who worked tirelessly day and night. He remained in Bucharest up to June, 1918, and I spoke to the queen and the Prime Minister of his work, and he received a high decoration from the King, for distinguished services.

The nurses and attendants in Doctor Bayne's hospital were fearful that they would be imprisoned by the Germans, and I was obliged to give a personal guarantee that they would not be molested if they remained at their posts.

Among the prominent people in Bucharest during

the German occupation were Messrs. Peter Carp and Alexander Marghiloman, and also some officers in the Roumanian army, all of whom turned out to be German sympathizers. Among them was Prince Sturdza, who had been sentenced to death by the Roumanian military court in Jassy because of a plot to entrap the Roumanian army and compel its surrender. He was the son-in-law of Mr. Peter Carp, and under the administration appointed by the Germans he was allowed to escape to Germany.

During the war, many American colored men passed through the Balkan states, traveling from one country to another and giving entertainments. Groups of from four to ten came to the Legation in Bucharest and asked me to help them to get to Russia, where they could earn more money. Being so many of them, I required that all should demonstrate to me what kind of entertainment they could provide. In one case, two of them who were standing close to me when the question was asked, made a lightning change, and within a minute they appeared as camels. Another set, who were waiting for passports, I asked to sing, and they rendered "My Old Kentucky Home" so well that I not only granted them permission to go, but advanced money for their expenses as well. I made a number of similar loans, but, unfortunately for me, not one has ever been repaid.



MONUMENTS ON TOMBS OF SERBIAN SOLDIERS



MONUMENTS TO SERBIAN SOLDIERS WHO FELL ON THE
BATTLEFIELD, ERECTED IN THEIR VILLAGES

CHAPTER XIII

AN AMERICAN REPORTER'S VIEWS—THE AMERICAN LEGATION OUSTED

THE Germans, during the occupation of Walachia, made themselves fully at home there. They printed and put into circulation 2,200,000,000 lei, Roumanian currency, and thereby created an indebtedness for Roumania, which they had no right to do. With this money they paid the different bills of their government.

When the Germans took possession of Bucharest, their troops brought with them the German people interned in different places in Roumania, whom the Roumanians could not take along to Moldavia, also many German refugees from Transylvania, and then they established public kitchens for them. In these places they served good food, especially pork and beans.

On the other hand, the poor Roumanian women, wives of the soldiers who were with the Roumanian army in Moldavia, and their children, were in a very bad position. No money was left for their support and nothing could be bought in the open market for their relief. There was only one public kitchen opened, with the help of the Roumanian Red Cross, but it was very small and gave relief only to very few. I tried to better the conditions of these people, of which daily there were about five to six thousand in the street opposite the Legation, asking for support. I made some ten per cent of these women, about six hundred of them, sign a petition to the mayor of the city, asking for help. I then wrote a letter to the new mayor, and asked him to let me know whether he would take care of these people

or not, or if there was any money left for their support. I never received any answer to my letter, but a few days after, I read in the German paper, the only one which was published in Bucharest, that all these women who signed the petition in the American Legation received thirteen francs each, and those who did not sign received only three francs. From that time on all the women wanted to sign a petition, and that certainly was not very pleasant for me.

I telegraphed to the Roumanian government in Jassy to send a few million lei to the National Bank of Roumania in Bucharest, but received no answer. Probably the message was not delivered. Then I applied to America, asking that the Swiss Red Cross visit Bucharest and work there.

When the Germans arrived at Bucharest, there was neither wood nor coal anywhere, and one can imagine how the people lived and suffered, as they had no fuel to prepare their meals. I remember one case when a Turkish lady gave birth to a baby. As she had no coal, her neighbors came to me and asked me to provide wood and milk for the baby, which I gladly did out of my small supply.

The first American reporter to visit Bucharest with the German troops, sent the following to his newspaper in America:

“Our flag floats over six Legations here, and the American Minister, with his staff of twenty clerks, is the busiest man in Bucharest. When Roumania declared war, and later, at the capture of Roumania by the Germans, compelling the diplomatic and consular representatives of the various warring powers to leave the city, most of them entrusted the interests of their countries to Mr.

Vopicka, with the result that to-day he is looking after the affairs of eight nations, including his own.

"Germany and Turkey said to him, 'Kindly take charge of our affairs,' when they made their hurried exit from Roumania at the end of August, 1916. England, Russia, Italy and Serbia said the same when the Roumanian government fled to Jassy at the threat of von Mackensen's approach to Bucharest. Roumania herself also requested his good offices in the matter of numerous details as to which she felt he might profitably intervene with the conqueror. The result is that our flag is the best known in Bucharest, and for more than a week after the German entry, it floated over the entrance of the ornate building of the German Legation in the Calea Victoriei. Then the Germans got themselves adjusted, thanked Vopicka and took charge of their own affairs.

"'I think my neutrality is pretty well established,' he said to the 'Tribune' to-day, 'for of the seven countries I have been representing of late, five are at war with the other two.'

"Furthermore, the Portuguese, the Argentinians, the Japanese, the Chinese and men of other nations which have no diplomatic or consular representatives in Bucharest, come to Vopicka with troubles. The Jews, whose troubles are, as usual, numerous, regard him as a father. Roumanian washwomen who cannot obtain coal from the authorities of their own city, turn to Vopicka and demand coal not as a favor but as a right.

"I was sitting in the Legation when one of these requests came in. A legation clerk laid it before the minister with the remark that the woman's request did not seem justified in view of the supply she had already


received. 'Yes,' said the minister, 'if she is not lying now, she lied the first time.' 'Possibly both times,' said the clerk. 'Nevertheless,' said the Minister, 'give her the coal.'

"With his motto of 'No monkey business,' the Chicagoan has probably been more useful in these times than any other diplomat in the Balkans. His line of conduct has been simple and direct, and in the most distracting times and among the most devious people in the world, simplicity and directness have carried him through. Two principles have guided him, and he voiced them to me in these words: 'They must first look up to your country, and then they must respect you.' The other principle: 'You must be firm and do justice to all, and stand by in every complication and with every nationality.'

"'We have tried to remember that in this Legation, and that is why Germans, Russians, Jews, Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese have passed with equal confidence the flag that hangs over our doors.'"

After about six weeks, the Germans thought that their purpose would be best served if there was no foreign representative in Bucharest, and on the eleventh day of January, 1917, I received a communication from the von Mackensen government that I was recalled by my government, that a diplomatic train would be ready for me in two days, and that I should give the number of persons and also the amount of baggage I wished to take with me.

The first trouble I had with the von Mackensen government was when they opened the Russian Consulate which was under care of our Legation and on whose doors were fixed our seals. I therefore sent a letter to the German military government as follows:



FORTRESS HOTIN IN BESSARABIA (FIFTEENTH CENTURY)



GERMAN PRISONERS IN ROUMANIA

BUCHAREST, *Jan. 2, 1917.**

I have just been informed that the guardian of the Russian consulate, Vasile Jacovilew, was arrested yesterday, January 1, at 3 o'clock, and that the seals at the two back entrances of the Consulate, which were put there by the American Legation, have been tampered with, as I have personally ascertained. Furthermore, the seals of the German government were put on the front entrance across those of the American Legation.

I am further informed that four officers and one civilian entered the building of the Russian Consulate, today, the 2d of January, at about 8 o'clock in the morning, in order to seal the rooms, which were already sealed with the seals of this Legation, with those of the German government.

I am therefore taking the liberty to protest against this procedure, which is against all international agreements and without precedent, and I would therefore be very grateful to the Imperial German Government if it would kindly furnish me with the reason for this action in order to enable me to inform my government regarding this case.

I am further taking the liberty of asking that Vasile Jacovilew be set at liberty—this man is now in the employ of the American Legation—in order to enable him to look after the building of the Russian Consulate as heretofore.

I beg the Imperial German Government to accept the assurances of my highest esteem.

AMERICAN MINISTER.

**(Original)*

BUKAREST, *den 2 Januar, 1917*

Ich werde soeben davon verstaendigt, dass der Hueter des russischen Konsulats, Vasile Jacovilew, gestern Montag den 1 Januar um 3 uhr nachmittags verhaftet wurde, und dass, wie ich mich persoendlich ueberzeugen konnte, die Siegel der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft, die an den beiden rueckwaertigen Eingaengen des russischen Konsulats angebracht waren, verletzt worden sind, und ferner das der Haupteingang, der ebenfalls mit dem Siegel dieser Gesandtschaft versehen war ausserdem noch mit dem Siegel des kaiserlich deutschen Gouvernements versehen wurde.

Es begaben sich, wie ich ferner verstaendigt werde, heute den 2 Januar gegen 8 Uhr morgens, 4 Offiziere und ein Zivilist in das Gebaeude des russischen Konsulats um die Innenraeumlichkeiten, die bereits die Siegel dieser Gesandtschaft tragen, auch mit den Siegeln des kaiserlich deutschen Gouvernements zu versehen.

Ich erlaube mir nunmehr ergebenst gegen dieses Vorgehen zu protestieren, welches gegen alle internationalen Vereinbarungen ist und ohne Prezedensfall

On January 8 I received the following answer:*

*Kaiser I. Government
of the
Fortress of Bucharest.
Political Division
No. 1064.*

BUCHAREST, *January 8, 1917.*

Your Excellency is hereby notified by the Imperial Government that the Russian Consulate is sealed by the secret field police of O. K. M. and therefore stands under German protection.

To inform your Excellency if and why the rooms of the Consulate were searched, the Commander-in-chief must decline.

The matter of the liberation of the Russian subject, Vasile Jacovilew, will be decided in the regular way.

*For the Government,
Chief of the General Staff,
(Signed) FREIHERR VON STOLZENBERG,
Lieut.-Col.*

*To His Excellency
The American Minister,
MR. VOPICKA.*

dasteht, und waere dem kaiserlich deutschen Gouvernement sehr dankbar, wenn es die Guete haben wuerde, mich ueber den Grund dieses Vorgehens aufzuklaeren, damit ich meinem Gouvernement die noetigen Informationen, diesen Fall betreffend, zugehen lassen kann.

Ich erlaube mir auch ergebenst die Freilassung des Vasile Jacovilew zu beantragen,—derselbe steht nunmehr in den Diensten der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft—damit er nach wie vor einen Posten als Hueter des russischen Konsulats, versehen kann.

Ich bitte das kaiserlich deutsche Gouvernement den Ausdruck meiner vorzuglichen Hochachtung entgegennehmen zu` wollen.

AMERIKANISCHER GESANDTER.

**(Original)*

*Kaiser I. Gouvernement der
Festung Bukarest.
Politische Abteilung
No. 1064.*

BUKAREST, *den 8 Januar, 1917.*

Eurer Exzellenz teilt das kaiserliche Gouvernement ergebenst mit, dass das russische Konsulat von der geh Feldpolizei des O. K. M. versiegelt ist und damit unter deutschen Schutze steht.

On the 10th of January I received the following:*

HEADQUARTERS, *January 10, 1917.*

The Foreign Office in Berlin announces that all diplomatic representatives of the neutral States, who still remain in Bucharest, are recalled.

For the departure of the ministers, their families and their diplomatic personnel, the Commander-in-chief of von Mackensen's army has placed special cars in readiness for the trip by way of Budapest to Berlin on the 12th or 13th of January.

The exact hour of departure will be announced at the latest ten hours before the departure.

The Commander-in-chief begs you to give an approximate list of the persons who will leave, and how much space is necessary for baggage.

By order of the Commander-in-chief,
per order

Chief Quartermaster,
(Signed) HEUTSCH,
Colonel.

To the Minister of the
United States of North America,
MR. VOPICKA, Bucharest.

Eurer Exzellenz mitzuteilen, ob und warum in Konsulats Raeumen Durchsuchungen stattgefunden haben, lehnt das Oberkommando ab.

Ueber die Freilassung des russischen Staatsangehoerigen Vasile Jacovilew wird auf dem ordnungsmaessigen Wege entschieden werden.

Von Seiten des Gouvernements,
Der Chef des Generalstabs,
FREIHERR VON STOLZENBERG
Oberstleutenant.

Seiner Exzellenz,
dem Amerikanischen Gesandten,
HERRN VOPICKA.

**(Original).*

Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe
VON MACKENSEN
Pol. No. 3850.

H. QU., den 10 Januar, 1917.

Das Auswaertige Amt Berlin teilt mit, dass alle in Bukarest zurueckgebliebenen diplomatischen Vertretungen der neutralen Staaten abberufen sind.

Fuer die Abreise der Herren Gesandten, ihrer Angehoerigen und des diplomatischen Personal stellt das Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe v. Mackensen am 12. oder 13. Januar Sonderwagen zur Reise ueber Budapest nach Berlin bereit. Die genaue Abfahrtstunde wird spaetestens 10 Stunden vor der Abfahrt mitgeteilt.

On the 11th of January I received the following letter:*

HEADQUARTERS, *January 11, 1917.*

For the door-keepers, clerks or servants left in the Legations and Consulates, no identification cards can be made out from here. But there is nothing in the way of the American Legation giving credentials to the above mentioned persons.

It is understood that after the departure of the ministers of the neutral countries, the protection of the Legation and Consular buildings will be taken over by the German military authorities.

By order of the Commander-in-chief,

per order

Chief Quartermaster,

(Signed) HEUTSCH,

To the Minister of the United States,

Colonel.

MR. VOPICKA, Bucharest.

Das Oberkommando bittet umgehend eine namentliche Liste der abreisenden Personen einreichen und angeben zu wollen, und wieviel Platz ungefaehr fuer Gepaeck beansprucht wird.

Von Seiten des Oberkommandos

Im Auftrage,

Der Oberquartiermeister,

HEUTSCH,

Oberst.

An aen Herrn Gesandten der

Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika,

HERRN VOPICKA, Hochwohlgeboren, Bukarest.

**(Original).*

Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe

VON MACKENSEN

Pol. No. 3863.

H. QU., den 11 Januar, 1917.

Fuer die in den Gesandtschaften und Konsulaten zurueckbleibenden Thuerhueter, Angestellten oder Diener koennen von hieraus keine Identifikationskarten ausgestellt werden. Es steht aber nichts im Wege, dass den betreffenden Personen Ausweise der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in die Hand gegeben werden.

Es ist selbstverstaendlich, dass nach der Abreise der Herren Gesandten der neutralen Staaten der Schutz der Gesandtschaften und Konsulatsgebaeude von den deutschen Militaerbehoerden wahrgenommen wird.

Von Seiten des Oberkommandos,

Im Auftrage

Der Oberquartiermeister,

HEUTSCH,

Oberst.

An den Herrn Gesandten der

Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika,

HERRN VOPICKA, Hochwohlgeboren, Bukarest.



SCENE AT A RAILWAY STATION IN SERBIA



ROUMANIAN PEASANT BRIDE AND GROOM



On January 11, 1917, I sent two letters to the German government. In answer to their letter of the 10th, I stated that I had received no notice from my government that I was recalled, and would like to know where the von Mackensen government had received the information that I was recalled. I stated that I had recently received a telegram, in which not a single mention was made about my revoke, and that I therefore could not comply with the request of the German government to leave Bucharest, and that if I was obliged to leave, I would do so under protest, and I also asked that all Americans living in Bucharest be permitted to leave with me. I asked that if I was obliged to go, the trip be postponed. I received in reply a letter dated January 11, as follows:*

In answer to your letter of January 11, the following explanation is given:

The information that the revocation of the American Minister had been ordered was transmitted to this place from the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Berlin, through the chief military command.

Prolongation of the time for departure is impossible on account of railroad technicalities. The special train will probably leave on January 13, in the afternoon. The exact departure will be announced.

The special train is only for the ministers and their diplomatic personnel; no place is reserved for other persons. The departure of American families will be possible probably in February. A special announcement will be made at the proper time regarding the transportation of civilians.

*(Original).

Auf das Schreiben vom 11 Januar wird ergebenst folgendes erwidert.

Die Mitteilung, dass die Abberufung des Herrn Amerikanischen Gesandten von Bukarest ausgesprochen ist, ist vom Auswaertigen Amt Berlin durch die Oberste Heeresleitung hierher uebermittelt worden.

Eine verlaengerung der Zeit zur Abreise ist aus eisenbahntechnischen Gruenden nicht moeglich. Der Sonderzug wird voraussichtlich am 13 Januar nachmittags abfahren. Die genaue Abfahrzeit wird noch mitgeteilt.

Der Sonderzug ist nur fuer die Herrn Gesandten und das diplomatische

Chauffeur Rudolph Nagler has been placed on the list of persons who will leave.

In regard to the matter of the German subjects, German deposits and German valuables, it is respectfully asked that everything be arranged through Rittmeister Prince Schaumburg-Lippe, of the political department of the Imperial Government.*

*By order of the Chief in Command,
The Chief Quartermaster,
(Signed) HEUTSCH,
Colonel.*

I could do nothing else but leave under protest, especially when Prince Schaumburg-Lippe told me that if I did not leave, I would not be recognized as minister after the departure of the train.

Personal bestimmt; fuer andere Personen ist kein Platz vorhanden. Die Abreise amerikanischer Familien wird voraussichtlich im Februar moeglich sein. Ueber den Eisenbahnverkehr der Zivilbevoelkerung erscheint zur gegebenen Zeit eine besondere Bekanntmachung.

Der Chauffeur Rudolf Nagler wurde auf die Liste der abreisenden Personen gesetzt.

Wegen der Interessen der deutschen Staatsangehoerigen, deutscher Depositen und deutscher Geldwerte wird ergebenst gebeten, das Noetige unmittelbar mit der politischen Abteilung des Kaiserl. Gouvernements, Rittmeister Prinz Schaumburg-Lippe, erledigen zu wollen.

*Von Seiten des Oberkommandos,
Im Auftrage,
Der Oberquartiermeister,
HEUTSCH,
Oberst.*

CHAPTER XIV

BERLIN ADMITS BLUNDER — BACK TO AMERICA —
RETURN VIA ORIENT AND RUSSIA

AFTER three days' traveling, we arrived in Berlin at midnight. There was only one cab at the depot and the driver was very drunk. It was difficult to get him to take us to the hotel. Mr. Reinbaben, former secretary of the German Legation at Bucharest, awaited me at the depot and handed me a letter from the sub-Secretary, Herr von Bussche, in which I was requested to call at his office at nine o'clock the next morning. I tried to call our Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, on the telephone, but he had retired.

The next morning I went to the office of Herr von Bussche, and he said to me: "My dear colleague, von Mackensen's government made a big mistake; you are not recalled."

I answered: "I am sorry, but you must settle this matter with my government. This is nothing less than kidnapping, and a *casus belli*."

He replied: "We do not want you to take it that way. As you have done so much for the Germans, we do not want you to be in any way dissatisfied or handicapped. We want to give you full satisfaction."

He told me that the von Mackensen government had preferred sixty-one charges against me, which had been telegraphed to Washington, but he had not believed them, and he stated that he would see Ambassador Gerard the same morning, and have all the charges revoked, so there would be nothing against me when I

arrived in America. As a proof of his friendly feeling, he invited me to attend the christening of his child, born that day. I accepted the invitation, and met many prominent Germans at the ceremony.


I remained in Berlin until the 27th of January, and received many visitors. Most of them wished to inquire about their relatives and friends in Roumania, and particularly those who were prisoners of war there. That they appreciated my actions was indicated by the number of gifts of flowers sent to me daily.

During my stay in Berlin, I was interviewed by many American, German, and other reporters. Among the former was Mr. William Bayard Hale, representing the Hearst newspapers in Germany, who was living at the same hotel and had his wife and children with him. I had brought with me some sugar and canned milk, which I offered to him on my departure. I thought it only a trifle, but he, having been living in Germany three years, prized it very highly, and assured me that it would save his children. In traveling during the war, it was necessary to carry food supplies, because in most places nothing could be bought, no matter how much money might be offered. In this respect, diplomats fared no better than other persons.

At the embassy in Berlin, many letters awaited me, which could not be forwarded to Bucharest, and these I answered while awaiting the leave of absence I had telegraphed for to Washington. On my departure, ten persons accompanied me, namely, my private secretary, Mr. Andrews, and my clerk, Miss Palmer, both of whom were Americans, one Frenchman, one Bohemian, three Roumanians and three Englishmen, all of whom were working in the Legation. The Berlin police ordered the



TURKISH MOSQUE IN SKOPELJE (USKUB), MACEDONIA



PALACE OF THE METROPOLITAN IN CERNOVITZ, BUKOWINA

Roumanians to remain at home while they were in the city, as the Germans disliked seeing them walking the streets. I protested against this order, and it was rescinded, but they were required to report at the police station four times a day, so they had little opportunity to stray far from their abodes.

A few weeks previous, I had suggested the exchange of Roumanian and German prisoners, which was agreeable to both governments, but owing to changed conditions the plan could not be carried out. While in Berlin, I brought the matter up again with Mr. Gerard and Herr von Bussche, and later on, Mr. Gerard informed me the German government had suggested a plan whereby the exchange could be effected.

Up to the time I left Germany it appeared that the Germans did not anticipate any trouble with America in the near future, as von Bussche gave me all the details of the proposed exchange of prisoners with Roumania, and asked me particularly to see that the officers were set at liberty on their word of honor. Ambassador Gerard took charge of all my correspondence, evidently not dreaming that he also would be obliged to leave Germany in about a week after my departure, which was on January 27. Diplomatic relations were broken off February 4.

My passage was engaged on a boat sailing from Copenhagen February 8, but the Scandinavian steamship companies did not wish to risk sending boats through the war zone, and England objected to their going any other way. At the request of our State Department, the English permitted me to sail on any boat which would take me to the United States, but with the restriction that I could be accompanied only by my personnel

and three American diplomats, whose names were given in advance.

On March 1, I left Copenhagen, for Malmo, but arriving there I found there would be no regular train for Christiania until the next day, which delay would probably cause me to miss connection with the boat. The royal train was in the depot, and I had a telegram sent asking if it might be put at my disposal. Within an hour the permission was received, and the next day I arrived in Christiania on the royal train, to the great astonishment of all beholders, including our minister to Norway. Then I boarded a small freight boat, which landed me in Halifax in fifteen days.

I proceeded immediately to Washington, and called at once on President Wilson. I stated my belief that if our country declared war with Germany, we should at the same time proclaim war with Austro-Hungary. The President, however, seemed to put faith in the assurances he had received of the friendly feeling of the Austro-Hungarians, though I expressed a contrary belief, and I advised him to obtain copies of Austro-Hungarian newspapers from the date he had demanded satisfaction for damages to Americans on a ship destroyed by an Austrian submarine. I do not know if he ever received these papers. I also told him that the Allies expected that Austro-Hungary would be included in the declaration of war. He thought our friends, the Slavs of that country, would suffer by the declaration, though I claimed they could be exempt.

Being urged by my friends, during the next two months I made some forty speeches in different places, describing the existing situation in European countries, and declaring my belief that our country should enter

the war on the side of the Allies, not only for the sake of humanity, but for our own protection as well, and also for the liberation of the German people themselves from militarism.

After three months' stay in the United States I received instructions from the State Department to proceed to Jassy, which was then the capital of Roumania. Although this city could be reached in about nine hours' direct travel from Bucharest, I could not have gone that way after the German occupation, but would have had to come to America and make the trip around the world in order to get there.

Accompanied by my two private secretaries and forty members of the American Red Cross, including eight members of the commission and eleven nurses, we sailed from Vancouver to Yokohama, and went from there to Tokio. There we were met by our chargé d'affaires, Mr. Post Wheeler, and later I had a long talk with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. We remained in Tokio six days and were very much entertained. Thence we went by special train to Zsuruga, and by Russian boat to Vladivostock. I never saw anything dirtier than that boat. My cabin had been preëmpted by a huge colony of cockroaches, and consequently I slept on the deck, most of our company doing the same.

Around the harbor of Vladivostock there were great piles of merchandise and ammunition, and in the city streets we saw about three hundred large wooden boxes, which we ascertained contained automobiles of American make and were told had been there a long time. The Russian authorities took charge of us on the trip from there to Harbin. It was August, and the weather

was about the same as in New York or Chicago. All across Siberia were fields of wheat, oats, rye and barley, seemingly without end. Twice we had a swim in Russian rivers, and whenever we had a stop en route for any length of time, we had a game of baseball. I think we were the first to play that game in Siberia.

Our first long stop was at Harbin, in Manchuria. This city is only about fourteen years old, but numbers 100,000 inhabitants. It is dirty beyond description, but business conditions are excellent, as Siberia affords a market for a vast quantity of goods of every description. Human life has little value, and one risks robbery or murder by remaining outdoors at night. American interests are very ably looked after by Consul Moser.

At the depot we witnessed a Chinese method of loading passengers. Two big Chinamen stood on the platform and literally "chucked" women and children through the windows to another pair inside, and the car was filled in a jiffy. As no one was injured, it was equal to a movie comedy. After the loading was finished, all the Chinese began to talk at once, and the clatter was like the gabbling of a flock of excited geese.

At Harbin we boarded the same train that carried the Russian Czar and his family to Jekaterinburg, where they were later murdered by the Bolsheviki. At Omsk we were delayed four hours, it being the day the first Russian republic was proclaimed, and the new citizens wished to confiscate our train. But when it was explained to them it would be very unwise to interfere with "Uncle Sam" we were allowed to proceed.

At Moscow, there were lines of people in many of the streets, waiting for provisions and such supplies as were obtainable, just as we had seen them in every



PRINCE REGENT ALEXANDER OF SERBIA IN CONFERENCE WITH
OFFICERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD



RAILWAY STATION IN SERBIA

other war-ridden country. Here the stores were almost bare of stocks, and not even any desirable furs were to be had. The city seemed to wear a sombre look, although there were many beautiful buildings, chief among them the world-famed Kremlin. Within this were marvels of furnishings, rare paintings and jewels of enormous value. One could not help pondering on what might have been the condition of this unhappy country if the cost of all these had been used for the education of the Russian people.

With three members of the Red Cross I went on to Petrograd, where we were met by Ambassador David R. Francis, who had arranged a meeting with Prime Minister Kerensky on the following Monday. The next day I met Mr. Masaryk, now President of Czecho-Slovakia, who was there in the interest of his country. On Sunday evening, while we were dining, a messenger from Kerensky arrived with the information for Mr. Masaryk that General Korniloff's offensive had started. Our Ambassador was not made aware of this until the next day at eleven o'clock, when I told him.

That Sunday evening, Mr. Masaryk was my guest at the opera. At about 11:30 a French officer came to our box and said: "Mr. Minister, the shooting will commence at twelve o'clock. Will you please go home now, as we would not like to have you hurt." So I promptly escorted Mr. Masaryk to my automobile and took him to his hotel, and proceeded without delay to the hotel where I was staying.

The Prime Minister was so much occupied with meetings and discussion of matters of grave importance that it was impossible to meet him that day, and fearing that the Korniloff action might lead to an indefinite delay in Petrograd, I immediately started for Jassy.

CHAPTER XV

AT JASSY, TEMPORARY CAPITAL OF ROUMANIA — SANITATION PROBLEMS — RUSSIAN OPPORTUNITY LOST

WE arrived in Jassy September 16, 1917, and were met at the depot by a delegation headed by Colonel Bratiano. All around the depot was an enormous crowd of people. A truly royal reception was accorded us, and we were deeply affected by our welcome, but conditions in the city were saddening. With a normal population of 90,000, there were now over 300,000 refugees seeking aid and accommodation. The military government had taken charge and was doing everything possible to relieve the distress.

Roumania was now feeling the full extent of war's misery, and it was fully exemplified in Jassy. Typhus was raging, and the supply of medicaments for the sick, and for the wounded soldiers, was very meagre. No meat or vegetables were to be had, and bread, of which there was very little, was made from potatoes with any kind of grain obtainable. There was no sugar, and no fuel of any kind. Soldiers and civilians were dying by thousands.

The foreign ministers did everything in their power, but they could only partly relieve the great distress. Sufficient food, fuel and supplies were absolutely unobtainable at any price. The hospitals were overflowing. There were but few doctors, and the scarcity of instruments, linen, etc., was deplorable.

When I visited the hospitals, the sights there, particularly in the one in charge of Princess Elisabeth, actually

made me ill. She seemed to have selected the worst cases for her care and supervision. The queen did everything possible to aid the ministers to obtain supplies. Her palace was converted into a workshop, and there the finest ladies of the land were busy day and night, knitting socks and making underwear and other things of which the army was greatly in need, which could not be obtained otherwise.

Killing lice, the carriers of infectious diseases, was a most difficult and disagreeable task, but one of the greatest importance. Sanitary trains were established under direction of Mrs. Popp, who was nobly aided by the royal family, government officials and the ministers of the Allies. Of her work, Mrs. Popp says:

“As is known, filth, disease and poverty are usually found together and in the same proportion. Where cleansing the people and destroying the lice is required as a protection against the spread of disease, relief from hunger and poverty is also necessary.

“A bath and disinfecting train has been conducted by me for the Roumanian Sanitary Department. It consists of fourteen cars. The disinfector is a converted oil car, and will contain the entire clothing of two hundred people at one time, disinfecting articles under a pressure of two atmospheres of steam. The bath coach is provided with sixty douches. At each end of this coach is a set of two cars, one for undressing and the other for the dressing of the bathers. One car is also for shaving and hair cutting. All of these coaches are connected by a direct passageway. In addition there are the following: one first class coach for the doctor, administrator, and three nurses; one for the twenty-two sanitarians and three engineers; one kitchen, one

magazine, two tank cars for water, and a locomotive.

"This train goes from station to station, stopping from one to a few days at each place. Here we get in communication with the military and with civilians, and with their assistance and that of the police, we encourage the people to come and bathe. With the aid of motor cars we are able to cover a continuous area of six kilometers on each side of the railroad.

"The train has been on the road for the last two months and is doing very successful work. We have had the hearty support of the railroad authorities, and of both the civilian and military authorities. The people have responded to the advantages of the train much more readily than we had anticipated. It is only in this way, or by work in this direction, that the much dreaded diseases of typhus exanthematicus and intermittent fever can be checked. The poor people are found to be covered with lice and fleas, and have almost no opportunity of keeping themselves clean.

"We have found that some of the civilians with whom we have come in contact are greatly in need of relief. This train would make a very good means of distributing clothing, soap, food and medical aid to the people requiring them. In addition we already have the facilities for doing this work, including the staff and magazine on the train, and we come into contact with hundreds of poverty suffering people every week, covering quite a large area of the country."

Mrs. Popp proposed that the relief work on the train be carried out by the combined relief units of the allied countries, France, America, England and Russia.

Great joy was felt upon the arrival in Jassy, with me, of the American Red Cross unit, consisting of forty



VASIL RADOSLAVOFF, PRIME MINISTER OF BULGARIA

persons, bringing with them medicaments and supplies. The shipload of similar material, however, which was promised to arrive about two weeks later, failed to appear. After many weeks of disappointment, Colonel Henry W. Anderson, the chairman, sent Captain C. T. Williams to Archangel to start the shipment forward at once, and at the same time to buy everything else that was obtainable in Russia. He purchased carloads of fish and other supplies, which were a great help to the starving Roumanians. The Red Cross started two hospitals, and one canteen where the poor received food and clothing.

Members of the Red Cross unit comprised American physicians and engineers, and experts in economics, sociology, hygiene and sanitation, and their advice and assistance were invaluable to the Roumanians. They remained in Roumania until March 9, 1918, when the Germans ordered them to leave, together with all the missions of the Allies.

Among the members of the American Red Cross sent to Roumania was Captain Vladimir Ledochowski, from Baltimore, a Russian nobleman who had come to America and married the daughter of the Governor of Maryland.

It was easy for him while he was traveling through Russia with his unit and with me, but when he stopped in Russia with one or two members of the American Red Cross, he had difficulty with the police authorities, and when he wanted to return to the United States with the commission of the American Red Cross, he found he could not do so without a passport proving his American citizenship.

He asked me for an American passport. I could not

give it to him, because he had only his first citizen papers, but seeing that my action meant for him either prison in Russia or heaven in America, where he could again join his wife and child, I stretched a point, and on a blank of an America passport I asked that he be allowed to proceed on his journey to America as a member of the Red Cross. However, when he came to Petrograd, the American consul there refused to *visa* his passport for Russia, and the son-in-law of Maryland's governor had to stay in Petrograd for several days until Major R. G. Perkins, a member of the American Commission, told him to risk it and go on with them without the *visa*, and they would protect him. In China the passport I gave him without consular *visa* was satisfactory.

Poor Count! His property in Russia was confiscated by the Bolsheviki, and his title was lost when he became an American citizen, but he is happier in America as a simple citizen than he would be in Russia with a high title, even if a more civilized government were in control there.

During the Marghiloman pro-German administration, certain newspapers criticized the American Red Cross. One paper, "Opinia," stated that the American Red Cross had sold clothing of very inferior quality to the Roumanian government, for a huge price, and a second charge was, "The Americans have not delivered us goods until after we have paid them the money, some three millions. As to the goods delivered, they are fit only for Hottentots. The fault is ours and not the Americans'. We thought they were soldiers and find they are what they have always been—merchants."

I at once sent a letter branding the statements as false, and giving the exact facts, which were that the

American Red Cross had advanced the necessary money to the Roumanian commission in Russia to make desired purchases, and that later this amount was refunded by the Roumanian government. The contemptible efforts of the pro-Germans were rendered harmless, and to this day all Roumania is grateful to the American Red Cross for its splendid and heroic work, and to the Y. M. C. A. workers also, who performed excellent service in establishing canteens behind the front for supplying the soldiers with tea and other comforts.

To my surprise, the king advised me not to unpack my trunks, stating that we might have to move to Russia at any moment. He said that half their offices were already in Kherson, and that for three months Roumanians had been sending their valuables there. It seemed to be the general opinion that the move would have to be made, and also that the Russians would leave the trenches on the first of October. As the Russian commander-in-chief of the army in Roumania could give me no definite information, I went to the front for it, accompanied by Colonel Yates, with two members of the American Red Cross and several others. My main object was to talk to the soldiers and try to persuade them to remain at their posts, in order to preserve the Russo-Roumanian front and prevent the withdrawal of Austro-German soldiers for service on the Western front.

At Galatz, where the 6th Russian army was located, we were cordially received by the civil and military authorities, and my request for permission to address the soldiers was granted after the Soviet Military Committee had scanned the speech. My first audience numbered 16,000 men, and they received my speech

so enthusiastically that I was asked to repeat it elsewhere. Next day I addressed the Russian soldiers in the trenches, and the reserves behind the front, who showed their appreciation by taking me on their shoulders and carrying me around the field. During the performance, a bomb exploded within one hundred and twenty-five feet of us! Thereafter we spent considerable time on the road, talking to the Russian troops. From time to time I sent reports to the Minister of the Interior, who wrote to me as follows:

MY DEAR MR. VOPICKA:

It is with the greatest satisfaction that I read your letter today. Your success on the Russian front in Bukowina had already been made known to me by my prefect. I appreciate it all the more as the result will be a benefit to our country, as I know that, aside from your official duty, you love Roumania.

(Signed) CONSTANTINESCU.

The French Minister saw that my speaking tour had a good influence upon the Russian soldiers, and he also made one or two speeches to the Russian troops. Colonel Yates and I continued our speeches until the armistice was signed, thereby aiding in delaying by over two months the intended defection of the Russian troops.

While I was engaged in talking to the Russian soldiers at the front in Roumania, the situation in Russia changed very much. The provisional government was overthrown by the Bolsheviki, whose leaders were Lenine and Trotsky. Minister Kerensky had to flee. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army at that time, General Doukonine, was murdered, and Krilenko, the underofficer, was made commander-in-chief by Lenine and Trotsky. He at once tried to make a proposal to the Germans for immediate peace, and wanted an imme-



PRINCE CYRIL OF BULGARIA



KING BORIS OF BULGARIA

diate armistice with the enemy. He also advised the soldiers to rebel against the officers and leave the front.

One can imagine how hard it was after this to induce the Russian army in Roumania to stay in the trenches against the order of the chief commander of the Russian army. General Tcherbatcheff, who was in command of the Russian army in Roumania, believed that the orders of Krilenko were not for the benefit of the Allies but of the Germans, and he therefore refused to recognize the orders of the new Russian regime, and commenced openly to fight the Bolshevik idea.

He put under control all the Bolshevik committees in Roumania, and those Russian soldiers who tried to free these committees were disarmed by the Roumanians. This action of General Tcherbatcheff made the Bolsheviki his enemies, and in Jassy they actually tried to kill him.

Russian troops, along different parts of the front, made a truce with the Germans, which of course helped to demoralize this army still more. As soon as the Russian Bolsheviki made an armistice with the Germans, the Roumanians were very restless and frightened. They demanded from us (the Allied ministers) consent also to make an armistice. I personally, together with the American military attaché, Colonel Yates, was against an armistice because I was afraid that it would bring peace between the Roumanians and the Germans.

The Allied ministers asked the Roumanian government to wait two days, until they received instructions from their governments as to whether the permission should be granted to the Roumanians. The Prime Minister promised to wait, but the army was afraid that if they waited, the Germans might make an attack at

any time and destroy them, and the same evening General Prezan, chief of the Roumanian staff, signed the armistice, of which I received secret information from the clerk who was employed in the office of the Russian commander.

The Roumanian government urged General Tcherbatcheff to sign with them at the same time for the Russian army on the Roumanian front. This was done in Focsani and this action was approved by the Allied ministers only to protect the front.

In this armistice, the Austro-Hungarians and the Germans bound themselves not to remove any troops from the Roumanian front. This was done in order to prevent soldiers being sent to France.

In the month of November, the king, supported by the general staff and the chief commandants of the armies, was in favor of marching with his army to Russia. He purposed to establish order there, to fight the Germans, and with the Cossacks to protect the Siberian railroad. But because of the change in the Russian situation and because the Allies could not guarantee the safe conduct of the royal family through Russia, the march into this country was first postponed and then abandoned. From the beginning of December, conditions in Russia changed rapidly, and the Allied ministers had their hands full and shouldered responsibility beyond comprehension.

After the armistice was signed, Russian soldiers, from different parts of the Roumanian front, left the front and on their way burned houses, feloniously assaulted women, and devastated the country, and if it had not been for the firm stand of General Tcherbatcheff, to whom the Roumanians will be forever indebted,

Roumania might have fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviki and the royal family murdered.

The outlook was very bad for the Roumanians. The Prime Minister at that time was ill, and the four ministers, Sir George Barclay, Count de St. Aulaire, Baron Fasciotti and myself, who were responsible for all the interests of the Allies, were obliged to go to his house for conferences nearly every day.

After the actions of the Russian soldiers, the people in Roumania became very much alarmed and made an appeal to their government that something radical be done at once. We began to formulate plans to stop their barbaric actions, and at the same time satisfy both the Roumanian government and the people. In our conference each of us suggested a certain remedy. I stated that leaving the front in the manner in which it was done, if it had happened in America, would be resisted either by the police, the state militia or the regular army, just as we disperse mobs. I gave it as my opinion that if a small division of 20,000 or 25,000 men could be given the best arms and tanks, they might solve the difficulty which was now prevailing in Roumania.

My colleagues and Mr. Bratiano were in favor of police protection. We recommended it to the Crown meeting and it was approved by General Tcherbatcheff and by the French military mission. The Crown meeting approved, and three days after, it was adopted and put in force. Prime Minister Bratiano, full of smiles, reported the success of the police action to me. This police division consisted of Roumanian soldiers with a Russian officer in command. Of course, this action brought on the proclamation of war by the Bolshevik government against Roumania, and in consequence

many Roumanian citizens and officers were detained in Russia, especially those in Odessa, and it also occasioned the arrest of the Roumanian Minister in Petrograd.

After the armistice was proclaimed, many officers in the Russian army in Roumania wanted to enlist in the American army, and the office of our military attaché received several thousand applications not only from officers, but also from Russian soldiers.

Our government at that time was interested in establishing order in Ukrainia, and I was of the opinion that there was a chance of obtaining enough soldiers, probably 200,000 of them, to effect it. I therefore telegraphed to my government, asking authority to draw \$50,000,000 as a fund for maintaining these soldiers, if the government was willing to engage them.

These officers and men were satisfied with five to seven rubles a day. They did not want to enlist in the French or English army because of prejudices, but they were very anxious to join the American army. My colleagues, the Ministers of the Entente, were satisfied with the plan and recommended the adoption of it to their respective governments.

These Russian officers and soldiers wanted to have an answer as soon as possible, and I expected that if I received an answer within two weeks, the plan could be accomplished, as it was hard to keep the Russians in the front longer than that. To my sorrow, the answer did not arrive until four weeks later, and then it was too late for any action.

Our government approved of the plan, and notified me that the English military attaché or the minister would furnish the money necessary, and that our military attaché would be in charge of this new army.



PRINCESS NADESCHA OF BULGARIA



PRINCESS EUDOXIA OF BULGARIA

If this American army of 200,000 men could have operated, Ukrainia might have been saved from Bolshevism, and the Bolshevik government itself might have been overthrown.

CHAPTER XVI

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION DISRUPTS PLANS AND DEPRIVES ROUMANIA OF ASSISTANCE

WHEN I came to Jassy, I learned that the Slavs who had been interned and released in Bucharest, had been interned again by mistake in Moldavia. I at once secured their release, but that was not the end of it, as they were all destitute. Work was obtained for as many as possible, and some were sent to their homes, but the remainder I had to support until they could take care of themselves, and that was a long time for some of them. When the Roumanians were obliged to retreat to Moldavia in December, 1916, an appeal was sent to Russia for sufficient troops to save Moldavia. The Russians came in great numbers, but they were not given so hearty a welcome by the Roumanians there as they should have received. In 1917 there were 1,100,000 Russians there, and they were occupying the entire Moldavian front. After the capture of Bucharest, the Germans expected to conquer the remainder of Roumania in eleven days, but the combined Russian and Roumanian army was able to hold the Moldavian front.

In March, 1917, the Russian revolution broke out, and this operated much to Roumania's disadvantage. While the German attacks were growing weaker, the remainder of the Roumanian army was being reorganized by French instructors, and in time it became one of the best fighting organizations in Europe. But on the other hand, the Russian troops began to deteriorate. This was because the Petrograd Workers and Soldiers Council, acting for the provisional government, had

begun what they called the democratization of the army, which was actually intended to discredit the high command and the officers of the army, and place the real command in the hands of the Soldiers Committee. The Council believed the success or downfall of the republic depended on the action of this high command, and therefore they feared it.

The commanders on the fronts had been urging on General Alexeieff, the commander-in-chief, that the army be divorced from politics, and that the anti-militarist and pacific propaganda be stopped, lest the army disintegrate. Opposing this, the Workers and Soldiers Council claimed that action against the democratization of the army was treachery to the revolutionary cause.

Minister Kerensky should have promptly settled this dispute, but he declined to render any positive decision, being fearful of incurring the enmity of either faction. In fact, he signed a Declaration of Soldiers Rights, and abolished capital punishment in the army, which acts sadly crippled the high command.

The Allies were urging an immediate offensive on the part of the Roumanians and Russians, and the Roumanian command decided to begin on the first of July, with half the combined army attacking on a small front, while the other half held a long front. The morale of the Roumanian troops was excellent, and that of the Russian but little lowered at this time. In a later attack near Adjud, the Germans were routed, but two days later Minister Kerensky telegraphed orders to stop all offensive. Following this there were minor engagements, with the Roumanian-Russian forces mainly on the defensive, but at Maracesti, the Roumanians, with smaller Russian assistance, defeated General von

Mackensen's army in a ten-day engagement, during which about eighty thousand men on each side were killed or wounded.

It is claimed that there was a disagreement between General von Mackensen and his staff as to the manner of conducting an attack, and the Kaiser came to Roumania to decide the controversy. He supported von Mackensen's plans, but because of the defeat of the Germans, von Mackensen lost prestige and remained in Bucharest without further activity. This was the greatest victory of the war for the Roumanian-Russian forces, and it materially weakened the forces of the Central Powers.

The demoralization of the Russian army made Roumania's position uncertain and insecure. The best that could be done was to try to keep the Russians in place, and thereby help protect the Roumanian front.

The ministers of the allied countries, especially the English, French, Italian and American, were placed in a very difficult and delicate position, requiring continual alertness and the greatest tact and patience, in order best to serve the interests of their respective countries, and withal, to avoid the many pitfalls by which they were surrounded. It was also our duty, as far as diplomatic usage permitted, to protect the interests of Roumania, to which country we were accredited, and as conditions were constantly changing, the situation was extremely complicated.

It was my custom to make memoranda of all important occurrences and new conditions, sometimes supplementing these with notations of cause and probable effect. These proved of inestimable value, enabling an accurate review of circumstances leading up to the



FRENCH HOSPITAL AT VRNJANKA BANJA, SERBIA



ARRIVAL OF SCHLEPP NO. 220 LOADED WITH FLOUR FOR THE AMERICAN RED CROSS IN BELGRADE

affairs of the moment, eliminating the possibility of omission or misconception of detail through lapse or fault of memory, and thus better enabling us to meet emergencies or contingencies as they might arise.

The gist of the more important of these memoranda, together with necessary explanations, is given in the following pages. In this manner, there is presented not alone a consecutive record of events, but also a clearer revelation of the difficulties and heartrending conditions that day by day confronted us. Perhaps the reader will share our daily hopes and fears, our disappointments and our hard earned triumphs, and realize, as we did, that we not only had to cope with the perils and problems of the hour, but also forecast and prepare for what the morrow might bring forth.

(*Dec. 2, 1917.*) We have learned that one of Lenine's officers telephoned to General Tcherbatcheff an offer of the General Command of the Russian army, stating that a cipher telegram had been received by the representative of the Italian army in Russia to the effect that the Allies did not object to a separate Russian peace. The general declined the offer, but requested that we representatives of the Allies confirm the statement made to him by General Berthelot, of the French Mission, that this telegram appeared to be spurious and was absolutely contradictory to the declared policy of the Allied governments.

We made this declaration to General Tcherbatcheff, who accepted it, and we have urged upon him the necessity, according to information received by us, of precautions against an intended attack by the Bolsheviki, designed to disrupt the Roumanian government, destroy

the telegraph, telephone and railroad systems, and violently remove the royal family and staff and the foreign representatives.

Measures have been taken by the Roumanian staff to repulse this attack, but in order that it may have no appearance of being a conflict between the Russians and Roumanians, we have insisted that the Russians take part in the defense. General Tcherbatcheff has assured us this will be done.

During the conversation, he gave us his personal and confidential advice that an interallied corps should immediately be sent to Russia, which would not only be of material assistance, but a moral force which would have considerable effect. Our experience and observation leads us to endorse this opinion.

(*Dec. 3.*) The Prime Minister advised us he had sent the following telegram to the Roumanian ministers in allied countries:

“The Maximalists have absolutely overmastered the two northern fronts and are occupying Stawka. On the Russian fronts, the disintegration of the army is complete. The Russian army on the Roumanian front made armistice, and replaced the generals by lieutenants. General Doukonine went to Krilenko. In these circumstances, General Tcherbatcheff will be obliged to give his place to a Maximalist, or to interfere with the conclusion of a regular armistice, with the result that the same will last until a legal government, chosen by regular election, establishes the peace conditions. He thinks this would be the only means by which he could hold the front. But he would do it only with the consent of the Allies. In this matter he will act in accord with the ‘Rada’ and as commander of the southwestern

and Roumanian fronts. Any other attitude on the part of Roumania will transform the Russian army in Moldavia into a million enemies led by the Maximalists, with Rakowski as representative, and make it impossible for the Roumanian army to resist. Resistance would mean destruction for us without benefit for our allies, in case of hostile retreat of the Russian army through Moldavia. In such case the Allies should not indulge in illusions regarding Ukrainia or South Russia, which could give aid only as long as a Russian front exists."

Mr. Bratiano says General Tcherbatcheff desires immediate answer, failing which he may be replaced by a commander appointed by Krilenko. In order to gain time, we have given him a copy of the following statement:

"The undersigned, not having the necessary authority to make promises in the name of their governments, have requested telegraphic instructions. Being convinced that the Russian Commander will do everything in his power to protect the cause of the Allies, which is the cause of liberty and democracy, they recognize and have signified to their governments the value of the considerations requested by General Tcherbatcheff, also the necessity of avoiding an intended attack by the Maximalists on the Russo-Roumanian and Southwestern fronts. They also recognize, together with the Prime Minister, the gravity of the danger threatening the Roumanian army in the existing situation."

(Dec. 4.) We have sent telegrams to our governments, in effect as follows:

"The situation rapidly becoming worse. May at any time require immediate decision, and therefore we request instructions at once as to what is to be our attitude in these hypotheses: If, contrary to General


Tcherbatcheff's opinion, the armistice bespeakings do not prevent the disbanding of the Russian troops, or lead to the conclusion of a separate peace, must we admit that the Roumanian government should do likewise, or should we encourage them to try to leave the country, which would result in a government appointed by the enemy, and hostile to the Entente? Or in case General Tcherbatcheff is replaced by a Bolshevik commander, must we avoid intercourse with him? It is apparent that this would threaten even greater danger for the royal family and government. It would then be necessary for them to leave, which is only possible with the aid of the Russian authorities."

The Russian staff received a communication from the Ukrainian government that peace at any price is desired. On the other hand, press advices are that General Kaledine will remain passive, which statement seems to be supported by the quietness of the Cossacks on the Roumanian front. According to our best advices, the state of anarchy in southern Russia and the absence of organization make it impossible for the Roumanian army to move out of Bessarabia. Of course, if these conditions improve, we will act with all our strength. Colonel Yates and I urge that the Roumanian army march immediately into Russia, but my colleagues and their military attachés claim it is impossible, for the foregoing reasons, and also because the roads in Bessarabia are impassable in winter.

(Dec. 5.) A Russian newspaper prints the statement by the High Command that General Tcherbatcheff, with the consent of the Roumanians, has proposed an armistice, and that before doing so, he notified the representatives of the Allies.



FAMILY MEETING AT SOFIA



A TURKISH HOUSE IN MACEDONIA

In accordance with telegraphic advices from our governments, we have informed the Prime Minister that the Entente is opposed to an armistice and desires that the Roumanian army be kept up. Mr. Bratiano states that through the treason of the Russian army, the Roumanian army is put in an unforeseen plight. He says a meeting, presided over by the king, has instructed the Roumanian parliament to act in accordance with the armistice. He says it is impossible for the Roumanian army to move to Russia at present, owing to lack of credit to provide food and other supplies. The French Minister, in our names, has advised the king of the allowance of unlimited credit for feeding the Roumanian army, and to make these funds immediately available, it is necessary to advise the banks in Odessa and Kiev.

(*Dec. 7.*) We have telegraphed our governments:

“The Prime Minister advises us today of telegrams from his representative in Paris. He states the insistence of the Allied Powers upon the removal of the Roumanian army to Russia, is in disregard of existing conditions, and is asking the impossible. He repeats that the Roumanian army is between a million hostile Russians and the Austro-German enemy, and there is no aid for them in southern Russia. He has telegraphed this to the Roumanian Minister in Paris.”

Mr. Bratiano states if the Allies persist in their demands he will retire, and adds that public opinion is turning against his government and the Allies. We have informed him that last night General Tcherbatcheff warned us of an impending attack by the Bolsheviki on the Russian Legation and staff in Jassy, as well as on the Roumanian heads of state, urging that precau-

tionary steps, and even more energetic measures, be taken.

(*Dec. 10.*) Our colleague from Russia has received notice from Trotsky demanding his resignation and that of all Russian representatives who do not support the foreign policies of the Maximalists. He and Bratiano have asked our advice, giving due consideration to the fact that Russian troops in Moldavia are exposed to Maximalist attack, and are dependent on Russia for food. He and his staff have decided to repudiate the Bolsheviki. We have signed a declaration that we have no objection to any solution which does not involve recognition of the Maximalists.

The Prime Minister has telegraphed the Roumanian ministers in the allied countries today, instructing them to inform the respective governments that if circumstances force an immediate decision on the part of Roumania, it will be impossible to wait for the advice or approval of the Allies. We realize that this is true, and think it advisable to give Roumania proof of our confidence.

We perceive the danger of the Allies, who do not seem to realize that owing to their inability to control events in Russia, the situation in Roumania is hopeless. It should be realized that Roumania is actually between two enemies, and that yielding to the one would at least restore peace and order, and permit return to their homes; while acknowledgment of the other, and recognition of its theories, would result in treason, anarchy and famine. We determine to do everything in our power to sustain Roumania in her difficult position, and have again asked our governments for general instructions, and for specific instructions previously requested.

Mr. Bratiano calls our attention to the fact that, while his government has discussed an armistice, there has been no talk about peace.

Our Russian colleague, having ignored the notice from Trotsky, is discharged, and with him will go all members of the legation. They intend to leave minor routine affairs in the hands of a clerk. If Trotsky sends a representative to Jassy, many difficulties will be encountered in our intercourse with him.

We realize that the probable departure of the Roumanian royal family and officials can only be effected through arrangement by the Allies' representatives with the Russian authorities. In case of general disbanding of the troops and inability to organize a new campaign of resistance, the only means of checking the probable intention of the enemy to arrange a separate peace with Roumania, would be the absence of the king and the government.

Failing in this, the king and officials would inevitably fall in the hands of the enemy, or be obliged to enter into negotiations. This must be avoided at any cost.

We have again advised our governments of the necessity of eventually establishing relations with the Maximalist agents, though on conditions which will not involve the recognition of their government, and have requested that instructions to that effect be given the representatives of our governments in Russia.

(*Dec. 14.*) The Ukrainian government has requested financial aid from the Entente, in order to free themselves from the Maximalists. We think this should be given, as their friendship, and the friendly feeling which would be stimulated elsewhere, would be of great value. This should be in the nature of a credit which

would establish Ukrainian issues on a basis higher than the current value of the ruble, and would tend to depreciate the Maximalist issues, and to bind Ukraina to us, as well as other parts of Russia that might follow her example.

We urgently request information as soon as possible as to how we can avail ourselves of credits allowed for feeding the Roumanian army.

Owing to cancellation of rank and pay of officers, and arrest of committees by the Maximalists, a group of officers, through Ukrainian influence, has organized in opposition. They have arrested the Maximalist committee in Jassy, and the Russian staff at the Ukrainian front, and are developing their military plans. Conditions in Ukraina and the Cossack territory seem more favorable.

It is very necessary that this movement be vigorously developed, as the only means to combat Maximalist and pacifist action. The funds at the disposal of the English and French Legations are enough for immediate necessities, but insufficient for the powerful organization which will be necessary.

A military budget of the two fronts, under control of the Allies, should be instituted. One of the first results would be to stop the forwarding of funds to Petrograd.

Realizing the extreme gravity of the present situation, the ministers of the Allies request, according to the policy adopted by the food commission of the Roumanian army, that the necessary credit be allowed to provide the two Russian fronts, through the banks of Jassy, Kiev and Odessa.

(Dec. 19.) Being informed that Mr. Take Jonescu



TURKISH PALACE AT BARDOVAC, USED FOR WAR PRISONERS



SERBIAN FORTRESS AT BELGRADE

intended to leave the country, which would result in a ministerial crisis, we went to him in a body, protesting that his departure, and the consequent crisis, would be inimical to the interests of the Entente, and should be avoided at any cost. He implied that impending events might make it imperative for Roumania to make a separate peace, and he wished to avoid any responsibility. We said we regarded his presence, and that of the supporters of the war policy, as a guarantee, and everything possible would be done to prevent this occurrence.

Von Mackensen has telegraphed the Roumanian staff, asking if they consider the original armistice replaced by the Russian armistice for the front on the Baltic, and General Prezan answered that Roumania recognized only the armistice for the Russo-Roumanian front.

The Maximalist movement, unopposed by either Roumanians or Russians, develops more and more, and is a serious menace to all Roumania as well as to the Russian commanders. It caused the abandonment of the front by the Russian troops, and as a consequence, the defeat of the Roumanians by the Austro-Hungarians. Stripping the officers of their rank and authority converted the troops into mobs that ravaged the entire country. Deprived of system and organization, these troops were condemned to famine.

CHAPTER XVII

DEFECTION OF RUSSIANS ON ROUMANIAN FRONT— UKRAINIA DECLARES INDEPENDENCE

(December 20, 1917)

THE Prime Minister called us to a meeting and explained the general situation. He stated that all are in accord as to the advisability of a police operation to control disbanded troops and restore order. The station of Socola, now a Bolshevik hotbed, must be brought under strict rule.

As immediate decision is necessary, we have addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister:

“You have explained to us the situation in which Roumania is placed by Maximalist acts, and we realize its extreme gravity, and the impossibility of correcting it without the aid of the Roumanian army within a short time. You inform us that measures to check the Maximalist movement are being successfully carried out in Ukrainia. We approve, and are ready to aid, by all means, the police operation proposed, which seems the only means to restore order in Moldavia; and we recognize the imperative necessity of maintaining a front which connects with the Ukrainian front. We realize that if this operation fails, and if Roumania is unable to carry out her plan for the removal of the troops and the departure of the royal family and officials, the Entente must admit that Roumania has done her duty, and loyally kept her engagements.”

(Dec. 22.) The situation is becoming worse. Last night, armed Bolsheviki from Socola appeared in Jassy

and endeavored to seize General Tcherbatcheff. They were arrested by the Russian guard and turned over to the Roumanian troops. Bolsheviki detachments from Russian territory, and from Moldavia, are advancing on Jassy. Execution of the police operation plan becomes imperative, especially so as large quantities of ammunition are at Socola in the hands of the Maximalists.

The Prime Minister informs us that immediate action was decided upon by the government ministers in meeting last night, and he states that this is the last act by which the Roumanian government can attempt to remedy the desperate situation. He adds that, if this fails, or in other words, if instead of restoring order in the Russian ranks, it results in a conflict between the Russian and Roumanian troops, and at the same time an attack on the latter by the Germans, further sacrifices would be of no benefit for the Entente. Roumania would have done her full duty, and would not be justified in further exposing the country to massacres and to the ravages of an army of destruction.

We understand the Prime Minister's attitude is that, in case of absolute necessity, his country may make a separate peace, although the Entente will still be bound by the terms of its agreement.

(*Dec. 24.*) The first steps have been taken against the Maximalists, and met no resistance. They produced good effects and sensibly bettered the morale in Roumanian circles. At the demand of General Tcherbatcheff, the English and French Legations have placed at his disposal funds to pay the Russian troops that remain under his command. These troops are without present fighting value, the immediate object being to

prevent further depredations on their part, with the hope of ultimately making them effective again.*

(*Dec. 27.*) We have arranged with the Minister of Finance for the realization of the credit of \$20,000,000 for feeding the Roumanian armies. He urges that, owing to the situation in Russia, due allowance should be made Roumania for depreciation, and difficulties which would not have been encountered if the credit had been allowed when it was asked for, about five months before. The banks have been closed, the public generally having withdrawn deposits.

We have today placed at the disposal of the Roumanian government five million dollars, six hundred thousand pounds and two million francs. The proportionately small amount of francs is due to the fact that dollars and pounds are easier to negotiate. These amounts are to be handed to the president of the Inter-allied commissions of South Russia.

The English and French agents in Odessa state that they cannot accomplish their work without the aid of the Russian authorities, who will not consent unless the

*It was at this time that I cabled my government, as previously mentioned, that a force of 200,000 fighting Russians could be enlisted to establish order in Ukraina and effectually check the rising tide of Bolshevism, and I begged for immediate approval and action to finance the organization. But the approval came too late. Had it been given within fifteen days, this force could have been organized and maintained, and history might have been spared the frightful record of subsequent events and conditions in the unhappy countries that were denied this means of salvation.

The plan had the unqualified approval of all the representatives of the Allies in Jassy, and it was their unanimous opinion that if America acted promptly, it would most favorably alter the Roumanian situation. Furthermore, the generally beneficial effects of this operation would encourage similar action in Northern Russia, which could be put into effect by the representatives of the Allies in Petrograd, and thereby the Maximalists could be kept out of Moscow, the most important railroad center, and connection kept open with southern Russia, Archangel and Vladivostock. Being in position to fully understand the situation in every respect, the ministers in Jassy believed our governments could not fail to realize the vital importance of these steps.



ON THE ROAD TO KNJASHEVATZ, SERBIA



TOMBS OF SERBIAN SOLDIERS

Russian troops on the Roumanian front are fed. This cannot be done out of funds in hand, and will necessitate a new and special credit.

(*Dec. 30.*) We learn that while police operations against the Maximalists have been effective in maintaining order and lessening depredations, discipline is sadly lacking in the Russian troops at the front. The Prime Minister considers the situation very dangerous and states that unless improvement can be speedily brought about, other measures must be adopted. We recognize the peril, and believe the only remedy is to form a few Russian units, and have able officers return to the aid of General Tcherbatcheff, whose greatest need is the support of capable officers.

(*Jan. 2, 1918.*) The Prime Minister informs us that Russian troops continue to abandon the front, and that the Roumanian army is in danger of being surrounded. Also that news from Ukrainia is bad. Our advices from military sources do not agree with his statement.

All the heavy artillery of the Germans has been sent to other fronts, and as a result of the removal of troops, the German force is inferior to the Roumanian. A menace to the Austrian troops on the Roumanian front lies in the friendly relations they are establishing with the Russians.

(*Jan. 16.*) Apprehension having been expressed by the Bessarabian authorities regarding the sending there of Roumanian troops to maintain order and protect the railroads and the food depots from the Bolsheviki, we have, at their request, approved the following written guarantee:

“This is purely a military measure, as its only object is to guarantee the normal functioning of service for the

Russo-Roumanian front, in conformity with the rules established in the belligerent countries. This can thus not affect in any way the actual or future politics of Bessarabia."

(*Jan. 17.*) We were visited by the Ukrainian delegates, Mr. Galip, sub-secretary of the Foreign Affairs department, and Mr. Golicynsky, Director of Finance. According to Mr. Galip, the situation may be summed up as follows:

(1) According to public opinion, the Ukrainians do not consider themselves bound by any treaties which originate from the Czarist system.

(2) That Ukrainia cannot possibly go on fighting, as she has no army, and that concerning the Brest-Litovsk conference, the Ukrainian people so much want peace that it would be impossible for the government to act to the contrary, the more as the Bolsheviki have contracted peace with the Austro-Germans.

(3) That the Ukrainian government is recruiting troops by voluntary enlistment to maintain order in the interior, to fight against the Bolsheviki, and to guarantee the independence of the country against the foreigners.

(4) That Ukrainia will not admit interference from other Russian states in her interior affairs, and that she will respect the independence of those other states. (However, Mr. Galip adds that his country does not exclude the possibility of a federal bond with the other parts of Russia, and that he has even tried to get into connections with the South Russia Union, also with Bessarabia.)

(5) That as a result of the interior conditions and the connections with the foreign states, the economic and financial situation of Ukrainia is particularly grave.

Therefore, Mr. Galip has made the following demands:

(1) That the independence of Ukrainia be recognized by the great powers of the Entente, and that diplomatic allied representatives be appointed at Kiev.

(2) That the Entente financially aid the Ukrainian government.

(3) That the Entente facilitate the sending of manufactured goods to Ukrainia.

During the conversation, Mr. Galip admitted that the military position in Russia would be changed entirely if allied forces were sent to Russia, provided the Allies were masters of connections with Vladivostock and could come to an agreement with Turkey and Bulgaria, whose representatives in Brest-Litovsk have shown a certain ill-feeling against Germany and Austro-Hungary.

We stated to Messrs. Galip and Golicynsky that we would give them a reply after deliberation. Consequently, we called on them this morning and stated to them as follows:

(1) That first of all the Allied Powers request that Ukrainia, if not at present able to go to war, shall agree not to contract a separate peace. We call the attention of the Ukrainian delegates to the fact that this engagement was already clearly contained in a note that their government addressed to the Allied embassies in Petrograd, which mentioned that Ukrainia did not intend to contract a separate peace, but would only participate in a general peace and with full consent of the Entente.

(2) That the Ukrainian government should meantime not get into economic relations with the enemy.

(3) That the Ukrainian authorities should organize, together with the allied military missions, an army

strong enough not only to maintain order in the interior, but to guarantee the country against exterior attacks.

(4) That the Ukrainian government should get into connection with the other autonomic states of Russia, as also with Roumania, so as to be able to oppose a strong resistance to the Central Empires, which are the natural adversaries of the nationalistic principle, as was once confirmed by the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

(5) That the Ukrainian government should agree to facilitate the sending of foods to Roumania, and that the necessary steps should be taken to insure a regular service on the railroads, together with Bessarabia and the Roumanian government.

We also considered it our duty to protest as regards the statement from Mr. Galip concerning the treaties of the Czarist system. We called his attention to the fact that the Allied Powers joined the war, not for a reason which interested the Czar and his government, but at the request of Russia, because of a small Slavic population that the Central Powers would crush; that the war, started by the Central Powers, was being sustained by the Allies to defend the principle of nationalism in conformity with the feelings of the Russian people. Consequently, the Entente Powers have treated, through the intermediary of the Imperial government, with the whole of Russia, and the fundamental principles of this treaty must be accepted and recognized by all the Russian states, and especially by Ukrainia.

We also asserted that the attitude of the Allied Powers towards Ukrainia in regard to recognizing its independence, giving financial aid, and in the military coöperation, were depending on the answer that we should receive concerning the five foregoing stipulations.



TURKISH MOSQUE AT NISH

The French Minister added that he has from now on the authority to recognize the independence of Ukrainia, and that he was ready to do so immediately, provided the answer of the delegates should prove satisfactory.

Mr. Galip told us he did not have the necessary authority to make the requested engagements, and that he would telegraph to Rada.

The statements of the Ukrainian delegates are fully in accord with information received from the allied agents at Kiev, proving that the Entente cannot expect any real help from Ukrainia for the present. All we can expect is to gain time, so that the Allies will have a chance to ameliorate the general conditions at the front. We again express our opinion that the only means to get Ukrainia's attitude in accordance with our interests, is to send inter-allied forces to Russia in the conditions which we have already mentioned. The Roumanian government is under the same impression after a meeting with the Ukrainian delegates.

Prime Minister Bratiano has telegraphed to all the Allied countries a protest against the arrest of Minister Diamandy. We think it would be wise policy for our governments to show sympathy with Roumania in this matter.

We representatives of the Allies in Roumania feel it our duty to declare that Maximalist agents are guilty of political and military treason, and of the commission of monstrous crimes. They are delivering their war material to our enemies in exchange for alcohol, and they are committing murder, arson, robbery and unspeakable crimes against women. Having used the greater part of the resources of their country, they are extending famine conditions by wantonly destroying food depots in Moldavia and Bessarabia.

(*Jan. 21.*) That the only means of suppressing the anarchy in Russia lies in sending there a few American or Japanese troops, is apparent, for the following reasons:

(1) All the Russian and Ukrainian officers assure us that if the Kiev government succeeds in maintaining independence and organizing an army, they will not only refuse to fight, but also to occupy the trenches at the front. No more than the Russian army at the present time, will the Ukrainian army start the war again; Ukrainia is ready to do anything in order to stay out of war. Only inter-allied pressure can change these circumstances.

(2) Three or four Japanese or American divisions would suffice to ruin the Bolshevik authority, and bring around them, with the defenders of order, all those that hide themselves now and do not dare to speak. It would be possible to rapidly form an army around these. All Russians agree that the soldiers would easily accept very severe discipline at the hands of foreign officers.

(3) This matter is so important, that if nothing is done by the Allies, something will be done by the enemy. It is a fact that the Russian patriots on one side, and the landowners and capitalists on the other, mostly Germanized Jews, wish to maintain the Russian state, the others the security of their properties. If they cannot get this from the Allies, they will ask it from the Germans.

(4) Numerous inter-allied technicians state that materially there would not be great difficulty in making the Japanese or Americans come to Russia. Once the Oriental bases of the Transiberian railroad are occupied, a few armored trains would quickly clear the road.

(5) The moral effect in Russia would be considerable, and if we do not do it now, our enemies will do it soon.

(6) The Maximalist army, although insignificant now, brings danger to the free movements of the Cossacks and Ukrainians, and it threatens communication with Roumania. It is to be foreseen that they will soon undertake the conquest of Southern Russia on account of the German command. A few divisions of German cavalry would suffice to break all resistance, and would serve the German purpose. On the contrary, the hesitating elements, especially the Ukrainians, state that they will definitely bind themselves to us if we will give them military help in due time. If not, they will telegraph to the French Commission at Kiev: "The hands that are stretched towards Germany become more numerous and more supplicative."

(7) The sending of inter-allied troops to Russia, even in small numbers, would demobilize a much greater number of enemies. In fact, our military interference would have the double advantage of permitting the Roumanian army to resist longer, and the organization of a Russian army.

(8) The general opinion is that if the question has not yet been settled, it is because it has not been presented in proper terms; either the importance of the effort has been exaggerated, or the attention of the Japanese and American governments has not yet been called to the extreme gravity of the danger, which is worse for them than for the Allies, if we leave the Germans to act freely in Russia.

(9) The sending of these troops could be effected without weakening the Western front, if these troops consist of Japanese, or even Chinese, who would do very well for the purpose.

(10) If the Japanese government continues to refuse

to aid us, the only means would be in sending a small number of Americans, aided by Chinese, Japan not being in a position to remain disinterested regarding actions in the extreme Orient.

(*Jan. 22.*) The chief of the Ukrainian delegation communicated to us the following information:

The Ukrainian delegates at Brest-Litovsk have received full authority to negotiate peace with the Central Powers. They especially insist upon the reopening of economic relations. They ask to exchange manufactured goods for foods in Ukraina. The Kiev government, having no army, and being obliged to use their weak police forces against the Maximalists, cannot resist the pressure of the Central Powers.

According to Mr. Galip, Ukraina, even after conclusion of peace, will endeavor, in order to safeguard their future interests, to keep on good terms with the Allies, to act with their consent and limit to the extreme minimum the foods to be sent to the enemy. Mr. Galip also states that Ukraina will facilitate the feeding of Roumanians and the removal of the Czecho, Serbian and Transylvanian national armies.

It is doubtful that Ukraina, even if sincere, will be able to work out these intentions, on account of the present state of anarchy and the German influence.

Mr. Bratiano, to whom Mr. Galip has made similar statements, declares that the situation of Roumania has grown much worse, and he cites the following points:

- (1) The isolation of Roumania by destroying the railroad connections, which would become complete in case Ukraina makes peace.

- (2) The conflict between Roumanian troops and part of the 6th Russian army, which bombards Galatz.



TURKISH MOSQUE AT USKUB, MACEDONIA



WALL AROUND THE PRISON IN WHICH AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PRISONERS WERE INTERNED IN BARDOVAC, MACEDONIA

(3) Ultimatum from the 9th Russian army to the Roumanian government, to obtain the free passage of their arms and luggage to go and join the Maximalist troops in Russia. The attitude of these troops is the result of orders from Krilenko.

(4) Resistance on the part of some of the populace and the Maximalist troops to the Roumanian troops, which have to occupy the railroads in Bessarabia, and the arrest of Roumanian members of the inter-allied commission of Kichenev.

(5) Impression, in a sense favorable to peace, made on public opinion by these happenings, and possibility of a counter act in the next meeting of parliament.

There is dissension between the Liberal and Conservative ministers. A note has just been presented to the king, in which the Conservative members contend that in no case should a separate legal peace be concluded.

(*Jan. 25.*) General Tcherbatcheff advises us he has been notified by the Ukrainian delegates of receipt by them of a telegram from Kiev, stating peace will be concluded by Ukrainia within eight or ten days. He asks our interference, and we informed him our agents in Kiev have done everything possible, but their belief is that the conclusion of such peace is inevitable. We state we count on his loyalty, and he assures us he will not participate in a peace with the enemies of the Entente.

The General admits that the Ukrainian peace would put the Roumanian army in a very bad way, by reason of being cut off from their supplies of war material. There is a depressing sense of complete isolation, which we are trying hard to overcome. Belgium and Serbia are at least in contact with the Allies, but we are absolutely cut off, and without hope of aid from them.

CHAPTER XVIII

PEACE TERMS IMPOSED ON ROUMANIA — RATIFICATION URGED BY CENTRAL POWERS

(*January 27, 1918*)

THE Roumanian Prime Minister expresses deep concern over the apparent increase of Austro-German sympathizers. He has communicated to us the instructions from General Coanda looking to securing a clause in the expected treaty which would permit Roumania the free disposal of the foods and depots, but he doubts that the Austro-Germans would consent. With the approach of the opening of the parliament, pacifist tendencies seem increasing. We are advancing the view that a serious Austro-German offensive on the Roumanian front would be impossible at present.

(*Jan. 30.*) The Prime Minister advises us that he has telegraphed our governments of the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Maximalist government, and of the sequestration of Roumanian funds in Moscow. He also states that Ukrainia has asked that troops be sent to Kiev, Poltava and Odessa. He thinks the Allies should protect them against the loss of the funds, and I stated that while I cannot do so without authority from our governments, if the Roumanian army will march into Russia, I will join my colleagues in such a guarantee.

We have repeatedly stated that the only way to help Roumania, and to protect the Allies against new attacks, is to better conditions in Russia by sending inter-allied troops into that country. The fact that Ukrainia asks for troops from Roumania, the most

unpopular in Russia of all the Allies, is a sure indication that an inter-allied expedition would be welcomed.

(*Feb. 2.*) We have addressed a letter to the Prime Minister, assuring him of the confidence of our governments, and stating that in event of the alternative of either suffering another Austro-German offensive or making a separate peace, the best way to overcome the pacifist tendencies would be through military activity on the other fronts, if possible.

The Prime Minister stated to us today that Roumania is the only one of the Allied countries with which the Bolsheviki have broken off diplomatic relations, and he suggests it would be wise policy on the part of our governments to maintain amicable relations with the Bolsheviki in Ukrainia.

(*Feb. 4.*) The Roumanian ministers have asked us to arrange for the safe return of their representatives now in Odessa. We have instructed our consuls general in Odessa, and have advised our governments of what we believe would be the wisest procedure. Prime Minister Bratiano again calls our attention to the sacrifices made by Roumania, stating that it was with our consent that he undertook the police protection against the Maximalists, and if grave consequences result therefrom, he holds that the Entente should consider that Roumania has fulfilled her obligations, and they should keep all their agreements, even if Roumania should be unable to continue the fight against the Germans.

This indicates the state of mind of the Roumanian government and of the majority of the people. We are doing our utmost to counteract it, but the position is very difficult, with the impossibility of any military assistance

from the Allies thus far, and the tempting peace proposals made by the Germans.

(*Feb. 5.*) The Prime Minister has conferred with us regarding the message received from von Mackensen. He understands it to mean that unless peace negotiations are begun, another attack will be made on Roumania. We believe that von Mackensen regards an armistice as of no value unless it is followed by peace proposals, and that he considers the military standing of Roumania as crippled by the defection of the Russian troops and the conflict with the Maximalists. We have expressed the belief that the enemy is not in good form for an offensive, but Mr. Bratiano says the Germans do not make threats unless they intend to fulfill them.

(*Feb. 6.*) The German Staff has fixed a limit of four days for peace negotiations to be begun.

(*Feb. 7.*) Certain of the Roumanian ministers take a decided stand against the negotiations of a separate peace. The Prime Minister declares he will resign unless a peace conference is held, but he is willing to aid the members of the Conservative party in forming a new cabinet. We have informed him that the attitude of our governments has been clearly stated, and that we are unalterably opposed to any peace negotiations.

It is the general belief that the Germans will be comparatively moderate in their terms, and that King Ferdinand will be permitted to retain the throne. This strengthens the peace party.

The leaders of the Conservative party in a conference with us, at which General Berthelot was present, declared they were opposed to peace negotiations, but the Prime Minister does not share their views. The



AT THE FUNERAL OF QUEEN ELISABETH
CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES MONTEFORTI OF PERSIA. HERR VON
BUSSCHE, GERMAN MINISTER, COUNT CZERNIN, AUSTRO-
HUNGARIAN MINISTER AND CHARLES J. VOPICKA, AMERICAN
MINISTER



PRINCE NICOLAI OF ROUMANIA IN THE PARADE ON MAY 10

Conservatives feel they are too much in the minority to be effective, especially as they cannot get the support of General Averescu, whose authority is great, and who has declared in favor of the peace negotiations.

The resignations of the ministers have been accepted by the king. We have urged Take Jonescu to accept the office of Prime Minister, but he declined, saying he would have neither the king's approval nor the Liberal party's coöperation in his policy.

The Maximalist committees of Odessa have proposed that a mixed commission investigate matters in Bessarabia and the Russo-Roumanian front. We have sanctioned the participation of Allies' delegates, as suggested by the Maximalists. This is important, as the continuation of hostilities between Roumania and the Maximalists will be one of the main arguments in favor of a separate peace.

After the armistice was signed between the Bolsheviki and Germany, many people who at the beginning of the war had been obliged to leave their homes, in Russia, Poland or in the district where the armies were operating, were returning to their homes via Jassy, in a condition which was more than pitiful.

One case was especially touching. In a train full of Polish families the two rear cars had no windows or doors. The weather was frightfully cold, and when I arrived to see these travelers, who had applied to me for aid, I found many women nearly frozen, with children on their laps, and among them were six women who were so far gone with cold and hunger that they did not know their children were dead.

The Roumanians did not have very much to give,

but this picture of misery touched me so much that I went directly to the Minister of War and asked him to give these people the necessary bread, so that they could be sustained until their arrival at Odessa. I also obtained for them from my friends a supply of tea, coffee and sugar, and helped them to bury their poor babies before they proceeded, although for a while they refused to part with them. I also had two good cars substituted for the ones without windows. This was one of the most pitiful scenes that I witnessed during the war.

(*Feb. 9.*) The king has authorized General Averescu to form a new cabinet. The day after he was made Prime Minister he informed me that he was in favor of peace. It is evident that negotiations between Roumania and the Central Powers will lead to a separate peace in a short time, unless the Entente can bring about a decided change in conditions. We think this can only be effected by authorizing the four ministers of the Allies to make the following representations to the king of Roumania:

(1) That the Allied Powers will absolutely maintain all their engagements with Roumania in the convention of Bucharest of August, 1916. That they will not conclude peace without the freedom of Roumania and that the king will be replaced on the throne in case he has to leave the country, that in any case, the king and the Roumanian government, even after having been compelled to leave the country, will participate at the peace negotiations, and finally that all financial and other aid will be furnished to the king, the government, the parliament and the Roumanian army, even out of the national territory. It would be desirable that this

statement be made also in the name of the American government, although it did not sign at the Convention of Bucharest.

(2) That anything accomplished on the invaded territory would be considered nil by the Allied Powers.

(3) That the Allies will undertake a powerful offensive on the Western front, and on the Italian front, and if possible also on the Balkanic front, in case Roumania should be threatened to be crushed on account of breaking off the conference at Focsani.

(4) That the Entente would do everything possible to terminate the conflict with the Maximalists.

If our governments approve of this course, it will be necessary to give instructions accordingly without delay.

We urge the importance of giving publicity, through the press of the Allied countries, to events and conditions in Roumania, fully setting forth the sacrifices that have been made, and emphasizing the woeful state of isolation.

(Feb. 12.) The German Staff has allowed an extension of time for beginning peace negotiations, in order to permit the formation of a new cabinet. Von Mackensen stated he expected results in forty-eight hours, adding that he presumed the new cabinet would not contain any anti-Germans or any of the former Bratiano ministry. This insolence is greatly resented, and the king has ordered the chief of the Roumanian staff to declare at the outset that negotiations can be conducted only on principles in force between independent states.

Germany's attitude seems to indicate that her terms will be harsh, which may cause a change of the Roumanian sentiment, particularly if the Entente military operations become more successful.

(Feb. 15.) We understand delegates have been sent

to Bucharest to ask extension of the armistice one month. General Averescu appears to have little faith in the eventual success of the Allies. It is estimated that there are 800,000 English on the French front, and the Roumanian Minister in Washington advises that 500,000 Americans will be there next fall.

In a conference today, General Averescu declares that no possible benefit can accrue to the Allies through any further sacrifices by Roumania. He says the public is strong for peace, and he favors it also, though he will not accept any conditions humiliating to Roumania or the Allies. The Germans have extended the time for opening negotiations to February 22.

(Feb. 18.) The news came today of the break of the armistice between Russia and the Central Powers. The result can plainly be foreseen: Russia will be unable to offer any resistance, and the enemy will take possession of Ukraina, and then Roumania will be completely surrounded by her foes.

Also, the Maximalist Committee at Odessa, presided over by the Roumano-Bulgarian agitator, Rakowsky, has sent an ultimatum to Roumania to remove her troops from Bessarabia, and is making other unacceptable demands. This confirms the belief that in case of a German offensive, the Roumanians will not be able to retreat to Russia.

We are forced to realize that no effort on our part can delay the conclusion of a separate peace, unless the German demands are so intolerable as to be rejected, but even then, resistance can be of only brief duration.

(Feb. 20.) Without awaiting Roumania's answer to their ultimatum, the Odessa Maximalists have seized and imprisoned the Roumanians in that city, many of



AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE IN BELGRADE



TALKING WITH ENGLISH LIEUTENANT WHO WAS AT THE HEAD OF THE ENGLISH WAR PRISONERS' CAMP IN PHILIPPOLIS, BULGARIA

whom are confined in the hold of the ship "Sinope," where they are subjected to inhuman treatment. We have telegraphed our consuls to protest energetically, and have urged our governments to do everything possible to secure the freedom of these prisoners and their return to this country.

It has been arranged that General Averescu will meet Czernin and von Kuhlman the day after tomorrow, and will learn the German terms. The Prime Minister says that if they are beyond acceptance, the blame for an "unnecessary slaughter" will rest on the Central Powers.

The Prime Minister has been advised of the arrest of General Coanda, in Kiev, and we are making every effort to secure his release.

(Feb. 25.) General Averescu has returned from Bucharest, where the negotiations were halted by the abrupt departure of von Kuhlman and Czernin for Brest-Litovsk. Up to that point, the time had been taken up mainly by Austrian Minister Czernin's speech, in which he violently assailed Roumania's attitude during her neutrality, also the treatment he received when he was obliged to leave Bucharest. There was a hint of contest of Roumania's rights in Dobrudja, and also of a heavy levy on wheat and petroleum.

(Feb. 26.) General Averescu sums up Czernin's utterances as follows: "The last moment has arrived when it will be possible for a peace which will guarantee the existence of Roumania and the Roumanian crown. If she does not bow to the terms, she will be crushed within one month, and will disappear forever from the map of Europe. Roumania need not be surprised at receiving the same treatment she would accord Hungary, if Roumanian troops occupied Budapest."

Just before his departure, Count Czernin demanded an audience with King Ferdinand, in order to hand him personal communications from his sovereign. After much hesitation, the king has granted the audience for tomorrow, in Moldavia.

Today, as on previous days, all discussion by the Roumanians seems to get back to two points, namely, that resistance could not possibly be prolonged more than two months, and that retreat into Russia is impossible. And as on previous days, we have urged the possibility of improvement in Russian conditions, and the probability of great changes in favor of the Allies on the other fronts.

(Feb. 28.) The Prime Minister, returning from Bacau, states that Czernin demanded of the king that Dobrudja should be ceded, and not to Bulgaria alone but to the fourfold alliance. In readjustment of the border in favor of Austro-Hungary, the Portes de Fer, the Jiu Pass and the district of Dornavatra must be given up. Also the wheat and petroleum are to be taken, which represent the greatest wealth of the country.

General Averescu says only two courses are open for Roumania: either capitulate, and lose independence for an indefinite period, as well as lose her valuable material resources, or fight to the end, which would only postpone the same conditions. In either case, there would be no benefit for the Allies. He reiterates that the Allies cannot aid Roumania, and that retreat through Russia is impossible, and asks if, in the circumstances, the peace is not better for the Allies as well as for Roumania. We adhere to our fully declared belief in fighting to the end.

(*March 1.*) We have urged our governments to give fullest publicity to the German ultimatum, also to the threat to divide Roumania between Hungary and Bulgaria.

(*March 2.*) A Polish brigade has deserted the Austrian service, and is now in the north of Bessarabia. The commander has sent one of his officers to us to state that the Poles are highly indignant over the Ukrainian peace. They wish full publicity of their sentiment in all the Allied countries, and to have it understood that the freedom of Poland, giving her an outlet to the sea, is one of the great objects of the war. We desire the aid of this brigade, and other troops at the front, and we have therefore stated that, according to the chiefs of the Allied governments, the freedom of Poland is one of the chief objects of the Entente, and they will not recognize any treaties imposed on her by the enemy. The Poles state that a good part of the Austrian troops on the Italian front are Poles, and these will be favorably affected by a proper declaration by the Allies.

(*March 4.*) At a Crown meeting, the king stated that personally he was in favor of fighting to the end, but as a constitutional monarch he must defer to the advice of the responsible ministry. The crown prince, in his own name and that of his mother, Queen Marie, declared most earnestly in favor of war to the end. Thereupon the Prime Minister tendered his resignation, but later on, at the request of the king, he withdrew it.

The Germans have made new demands, and amplified their former ones. We have asked our governments for authority to formally express the sympathy of our countries, with the assurance that the good will of the

Allies shall not be lessened when the hour of the Peace Conference arrives.

(*March 9.*) Day by day, the Central Powers have extended their demands. Today we are informed that Count Czernin, contrary to previous assurances, now states that our military missions may not depart at once in safety, but will be held in quarantine thirty days. These missions, together with the members of the American Red Cross, protested against the thirty days' quarantine and have decided to leave today for Russia. The king has assured us that he will not accept any conditions dishonoring Roumania, and it is a point of honor with her that the officers of the Allies receive safe conduct.

(*March 11.*) The military missions left yesterday, and today the Prime Minister informed us that the Central Powers had yielded to the protest, and promised to facilitate their return. However, they advised a delay of ten to fifteen days until the railroads were repaired.

(*March 12.*) Count Czernin having gone to Vienna, the peace negotiations will be discontinued until March 14. Coupled with their former demands, the Central Powers will make the following conditions:

(1) Monopoly of wheat exports for from five to ten years.

(2) Cession with contract to a German company of the petroleum fields of the state.

(3) Control of the railroads until the end of the war.

(4) Equality of rights of Catholic and Orthodox churches.

(5) Equal civil and political rights for the Jews.



MINISTER VOPICKA, CONSUL GENERAL MURPHY, COLONEL YATES AND CAPTAIN KLEPAL, VISITING THE CAMP OF ENGLISH WAR PRISONERS AT PLOVDIVO, PHILIPPOLIS



DETENTION CAMP OF ENGLISH WAR PRISONERS AT PHILIPPOLIS

General Averescu having failed to properly defend Roumanian rights in recent negotiations, the king has summoned Mr. Marghiloman from Bucharest, and requested him to form a new ministry, stating that one of its principles must be the maintenance of amicable relations with the Entente. The Germans would prefer to treat with General Averescu, regarding him as more favorable to their interests.

CHAPTER XIX

CZECHO-SLOVAKS IN RUSSIA—VALOROUS DEEDS AND INVALUABLE AID TO ALLIES

(March 13, 1918)

CONFIDENTIAL advices from Bucharest are that the Central Powers are more than ever confident of ultimate victory, because of their easy success in Russia, and the large quantity of food stuffs they will be able to obtain there. In order to counteract the effect of this on the Roumanians, we have requested our governments to give us full information regarding the interior conditions of the Central Powers, as well as the extent of the resources they will acquire in Russia. It is also important that we be advised of the prospects for protection of the Transiberian railroad.

I sent three special telegrams to my government urging such protection there, either with our own soldiers or those of Japan, and I have received assurance that the situation is not so bad as I believe, and that the government will keep it in constant view.

At that time the most feasible solution seemed to be an arrangement with the Japanese, as they had an army ready for immediate action, but our government appeared to prefer postponement of such an arrangement until it was absolutely necessary. The Roumanian government, and my colleagues and I, had been anxious to have the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia brought to Bessarabia to guard the railroads and the provisions which the Allies had furnished for the Roumanian army.

When Professor Masaryk, the present president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, was in Jassy, in January,

1918, we discussed the matter and endeavored to have the plan carried out, although he said: "You have not enough food for yourselves. How can you provide for our soldiers in addition?" I sent a telegram to the Czecho-Slovak commander through the English consul in Kiev, assuring him that the other allied ministers and I had funds and authority to provide fully for them. As this was not answered, probably the telegram did not reach its destination. Owing to the strike of the Bolshevik railroad men, it was impossible for the troops to come. However, they performed most valuable services in Russia.

Many of the Czecho-Slovaks were enlisted with the Russians, especially under Generals Brussiloff, Douk-onine and Alexeieff, and many times they achieved glorious victories over the Germans and Austrians. As soon as Ukrainia declared its independence, it announced its intent to make a separate peace with the Central Powers. The Bolsheviki in Moscow opposed this, but the Ukrainians were not disposed to take orders from a government that they felt was going to pieces.

The Czecho-Slovaks were between two fires—on one side the Bolsheviki, and on the other the Ukrainians, from which perilous position they were rescued by the splendid diplomacy of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly. The Bolsheviki in Ukrainia and Moscow remained passive, expecting that the Czecho-Slovaks would imbibe the Bolshevik doctrines, but in this they were greatly disappointed. The Czecho-Slovaks declared that they would take no part in Russian affairs, but would continue to fight German autocracy and Austrian oppression.

Their position became very difficult after the election

of a new Germanophile Hetman (governor) for Ukrainia. After this the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly severed relations with Ukrainia, and decided to remove the troops to the western front in France, as they could not join the army of the Allies in the north, there being neither supplies nor railroad transportation obtainable. The Ukrainians and Bolsheviki consented to the removal of the Czecho-Slovak troops over the Transiberian railroad to Vladivostock.

Emperor Karl, of Austro-Hungary, made overtures to the Czecho-Slovak army for an honorable surrender, assuring them amnesty and promising autonomy for Czecho-Slovakia, but they had no faith in Austrian promises. They knew the old emperor never kept his promises, and they placed no faith in his successor. In fact, they believed, if they were caught by the incoming Austrian army, that they would be shot or imprisoned.

On February 15, 1918, they started to march on foot to the banks of the river Dneiper. They were well supplied with ammunition which they had taken from the Russian warehouses, but they had no food, clothing, shoes, fodder or field kitchens. Nevertheless, this ragged looking army was composed of intelligent men, some eighty per cent being university students. Each division had a library of several hundred books, and they also published an eight-page daily paper.

They were obliged to pull their wagons themselves, as their horses were too weak to be of service. They lived on horse meat, dogs and frogs. They roasted barley and made a substitute for coffee from it, and they ate the grounds. They did not rob the peasants, but when they arrived in a village where the inhabitants were unwilling to give them food, they remained quietly



ROYAL PALACE AT SINAIA, ROUMANIA

in the public square, sometimes from morning until night, until the villagers had compassion and brought them food. They paid for everything they received, and their conduct in every respect assured a favorable reception for those who came after them. When they were able to get grain they took it to the nearest mill to be ground and they said, "We have no need of tooth powder, because the millstones are so soft they leave enough grit in the flour to keep our teeth clean and sharp."

After twenty days of marching, they encountered a division of German troops at Bakmatch, who had expected to overcome and annihilate the Czecho-Slovaks, but to their great surprise the Czecho-Slovaks turned the tables by beginning the attack themselves. The battle lasted four days, after which the Germans retreated in disorder, leaving two thousand dead on the battle field, while the Czecho-Slovaks lost only four hundred men. After this defeat, the Germans were very wary of the Czecho-Slovaks, whose army rumor declared was 300,000 strong.

At Bakmatch, the Czecho-Slovaks took possession of one hundred engines and three thousand cars, which had been abandoned by the Bolsheviki when the Germans approached. These cars contained all kinds of goods and army material, such as rifles, flour, sugar, uniforms, airplanes and provisions of every description. All these, and a number of other abandoned trains discovered as they proceeded, were saved for the Russians from German seizure.

The Bolsheviki knew that the Czecho-Slovaks would not support their policy of anarchy and destruction, and they feared this army might join the conservative Russian elements.

At Kurks, the Bolshevik commander of that station demanded that they surrender their arms, and after some delay the machine guns and batteries were given up.

On March 20, Professor Masaryk obtained written permission from Lenine and Trotsky for passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops, but when they arrived at Pensa they were notified by the local Soviets that they could not proceed without complete disarmament. After two days, the Czecho-Slovaks were obliged to accept the proposition that three battalions of each regiment should completely disarm, and only one battalion was to retain rifles, with one hundred cartridges for each rifle, and also one machine gun. As much as possible, the soldiers evaded this by hiding many rifles, cartridges and hand grenades in the cars.

This was a scheme of the Germans, who were at that time dictators in Moscow, to leave the Czecho-Slovaks at the mercy of the German, Austrian and Magyar ex-prisoners in Siberia, who, as was later discovered, had been freely armed and organized for the purpose of exterminating the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.

Some of the first trains arrived in Vladivostock by April 25, but the majority of them were greatly delayed all along the route. They had frequent encounters with the Bolsheviks, who demanded their complete disarmament. The Czecho-Slovaks were victorious from Pensa to Vladivostock.

At Chaliabinsk, many delegates and members of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly held a consultation. The Bolsheviks were endeavoring to check the movements of the troops, and endeavored to divert them to Murmansk, where they expected to entrap them.

Three trainloads of German and Austro-Hungarian ex-prisoners reached the Siberian station when a Czecho-Slovak echelon was there. The ex-prisoners complained that they were starving, so the Czecho-Slovaks shared their rations, giving them all they could spare, but instead of being grateful, these ex-prisoners were arrogant and insulting, and as one trainload of them was departing, a German in the last car flung a big iron bar into a group of Czecho-Slovak soldiers, seriously wounding one of them.

The wrath of the Czecho-Slovaks was without bounds. They pursued the train and compelled the engineer to stop, and the man who threw the iron bar was beaten so severely that he died from his injuries. The Soviet garrison, two thousand men strong, ordered an inquiry, and placed a number of the Czecho-Slovaks under arrest as witnesses. The Czecho-Slovaks sent an armed company and demanded immediate release of the imprisoned men. The Soviet not only released the men but apologized as well.

The Soviets claimed that instructions from Moscow were being awaited, and the Czecho-Slovaks were detained about ten days. Then a telegraph operator on the latter side intercepted a telegram from Trotski giving instructions to the Soviet at that place, and to the Bolsheviki everywhere, to arrest and disarm all Czecho-Slovakian troops, and thereafter if any were found with a rifle they were to be shot. This was the customary Bolshevik method, but it was accepted by the Czecho-Slovaks as a plain declaration of war, and they proceeded immediately to take possession of the stations, seizing all the provisions and war material and disarming the Bolshevik garrisons.

At the city of Chaliabinsk, the Soviet garrison had orders to imprison the Czecho-Slovaks the next morning, but during the night the latter surrounded the barracks of the garrison and fired a salvo in the windows. In fifteen minutes the barracks were in their possession and the whole garrison made prisoners, and next they took possession of the entire town of about 70,000 inhabitants. The people of the city were greatly relieved, and warmly thanked the Czecho-Slovaks for liberating them from the Bolshevik misrule. The Czecho-Slovaks also took charge of the Siberian railroad, keeping it open for the Allies, and preventing the Germans and Bolsheviki from obtaining supplies from Siberia. Likewise they controlled navigation on the Volga River. They also were the means of keeping in Russia the many thousands of German and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners whose release had been arranged by the Central Powers. The Czecho-Slovaks prevented the enemy from organizing a new army of these prisoners of war. The appreciation of the Allies was shown by their ready consent to giving independence to Czecho-Slovakia.

The Czecho-Slovak army stayed at its post until the end of the war in 1919. Several thousands of them were killed or died from sickness. During their encounters, they were reinforced by the Polish, Serbian and Roumanian war prisoners, as well as anti-Bolshevik Russians, so that at one time their army was over 100,000 strong. Towards the end of the Allies' campaign in Siberia, they were also fighting at the side of the American troops.



KING FERDINAND I OF ROUMANIA

CHAPTER XX

NEW ROUMANIAN CABINET—PEACE TERMS DEPRIVING COUNTRY OF MOST VALUABLE RESOURCES

(*March 16, 1918*)

MR. MARGHILOMAN is expected in Jassy, but it appears doubtful that he will accept the new ministry. In this case, one will probably be formed of the generals and officials, who are likely to accept the conditions imposed by the enemy without discussion. The German sympathizers are doing everything possible to retain General Averescu, and the internal dissension which is likely to result will be a favorable factor for the Central Powers. It is to be noted that neither of the two great parties favorable to the Entente have consented to take part in the negotiations.

(*March 17.*) The Prime Minister informed us of the protest of the German staff against alleged propaganda, by officers of the Allies, among the troops of the Central Powers. We answered that this charge was without foundation, as the Allied officers on the Roumanian front have at all times worn their national uniforms, and the only ones that remained have been in Jassy ever since the opening of negotiations. This protest indicates the attitude of the authorities of the Central Powers towards the Allied legations.

Mr. Marghiloman has arrived, and has consented to form the new ministry. While there is no doubt of the attitude of any ministry which he will form, the conditions, in any event, will place the Roumanian government wholly in the power of the Germans. The king has received a telegram from Bucharest, stating

that Marshal von Mackensen declares that the ministerial crisis cannot affect the proceedings of negotiations, and consequently all the conditions mentioned by the Central Powers must be accepted by the signature of Roumanian plenipotentiaries before noon on the 19th of this month, and if they are not accepted by that time, the terms will be made still harder. Also he demands that General Averescu shall be a member of the new cabinet.

Likewise, in addition to the six Entente sympathizers who have asked to be sent to Switzerland, the Austrian delegate has asked that about thirty other persons also be sent out of the country. The most important one of the six was Mr. Take Jonsescu, and among the thirty others are the brothers Bratiano, several of their former intimates, and a number of high officials of the court and the state.

The character of the Austro-German demands plainly indicates a disposition to reduce Roumania to a condition of slavery, at least until the end of the general war.

(*March 19.*) Mr. Marghiloman's cabinet has been formed and the members have taken their oaths this morning. It is composed of very ordinary men except the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. M. C. Arion, who has been a minister several times, and although he remained in Bucharest, he has not been unfriendly to the Entente.

(*March 22.*) The Central Powers impose on the Roumanians a contract for the concession of the exploitation and sale of petroleum, which embraces the complete control of this industry, and seems a disguised means of involving all private Roumanian interests in the petroleum business, and also to acquire any kind of

property throughout the country. The contract stipulates that for a period of ninety-nine years the exclusive rights to exploit will be given to a society to be indicated by the Central Powers. The present concessions will not be renewed, and will go to the new society at the expiration of their term.

This society will have the use of all present connections and installations belonging to the state, and will be allowed to establish others as they see fit. For this purpose, they may dispossess any individuals without having to prove the public utility of their contemplated work. Thus there will be no place in the country that they cannot invade on the pretext of establishing a railway or road. Any disagreements will be arranged by arbitration. If the two parties to a dispute cannot agree on an arbitrator, it will be arranged by the Tribunal of Leipzig. Any fault will be brought before the Tribunal of Bucharest or the Tribunal of Berlin, according to the wish of the defense. By this means there will be no chance of discrimination in favor of the Roumanians.

The capital of the company, which will monopolize the petroleum trade, will be more than three-fourths Austro-German and the rest Roumanian. This company will not be under the Roumanian laws governing foreign associations. The organization will dispose of all the petroleum produced by individuals, or other societies, at its own prices, and in exchange for bonds. Any new installations by others are subject to the society's approval. It will also have a monopoly of the export of petroleum and its products. By this means Roumania will be deprived of the most valuable of her natural resources, for the benefit of a foreign country. The

Austro-German companies will have as many rights as the Roumanian state, and even more. The Roumanian government is required to ratify all these concessions.

Information from Southern Russia is that the Germans continue to advance without resistance on the part of the Russians. They have recruited a great number of late Russian prisoners, who have been under German instruction for a year, and also the Austro-German prisoners they have found there. They have also started organizing a Ukrainian army, and expect soon to occupy the Donetz, where there is an abundance of raw material, which they lack.

In these circumstances, and as the departure of the Allied missions from Russian territory is regarded as an abdication by the Entente, it appears that an energetic and important military action will be the only means of uniting the different elements which are still favorable. To be thoroughly effective, this movement should start from the extreme East, and the majority of the troops would have to be Japanese.

(*March 26.*) A courier dispatched to Switzerland by the Swiss Legation has been stopped by orders of von Mackensen, and compelled to return to Jassy. The reason given by the German staff is the desire to completely isolate Roumania. If they carry this further it will make it impossible for us to correspond with our governments. By taking the wireless our only means of communication will be cut off.

(*March 30.*) In addition to previous demands, the Central Powers have given a memorandum to the Roumanian government of the following requirements:

(1) Reestablishment of the commercial conventions adapting them to the new state of affairs, with reserva-



TILEAJEN VALLEY. VIEW OF MONASTERY



ROOM IN THE ROYAL PALACE IN SINJIA

tion of modifications that might be required by the customs rules between the Central Powers.

(2) Concession of rights in order to safeguard the financial interests.

(3) Cancellation of privileges that had been granted during the war to another state, and concession of the same privileges to the Central Powers.

(4) Judiciary convention between Roumania and Austro-Hungary.

(5) Convention regarding protection of trademarks.

(6) Damages granted to interned civilians.

(7) Coöperation of Roumania in a new navigation act for the Danube River, and changes in the European commission.

It is apparent that the concession of rights for the defense of the financial interests signifies the complete control by the enemy of all economic resources of the country.

The protection of trade-marks will probably afford opportunity for the Germans to imitate manufactured goods of the Allies.

The new navigation act is construed as indicating a removal of the former international commission, and its replacement by appointees of the Central Powers.

(*March 31.*) Developments in Southern Russia appear very unfavorable to the Allies' interests. The Central Powers intend to extend arbitrarily the borders of Ukrainia to all the districts which they wish to exploit. They comprise the Black Sea district, part of Bessarabia, the Don River, Crimea, and Caucasia, thus occupying the route to Persia and India. Odessa is intended to be a free city under Austro-German control.

The Austrians and Germans disagree regarding polit-

ical ruling of Russia. The Austrians, being less ambitious, are in favor of a nominally independent Ukrainia, while the Germans are in favor of a federal Russia. By their acts, the Austro-Germans are generally received as liberators in the cities. In the country districts they are seizing all the provisions, but they meet with opposition, and are sometimes killed by peasants who were former soldiers.

The chief of the food service estimates that the Central Powers stocks have been increased fully twenty per cent already acquired in Russia, and this increase will be vastly greater by September, when the new crops are due. It seems probable that the acts of the Austro-Germans in seeking to greatly increase their own supplies at the expense of the Russians will cause an uprising in favor of the Allies, and facilitate interference on their part.

(*April 2.*) Mr. Marghiloman, who has returned from Bucharest, thinks the Austro-Germans, having hastened the demobilization of the Roumanian army and arrived at an understanding of the territorial and economic questions, will delay conclusion of the peace negotiations in order that the bulk of their troops may remain in the occupied territory. The attitude of the enemy negotiators is almost unbearable. Czernin constantly threatens drastic action in Bessarabia if Roumania does not accept all the conditions. Members of the cabinet are now feeling that the only ultimate salvation of Roumania will lie in success of the Allies.

We believe none of our governments will accept the proposed changes in the Danube Commission, and are awaiting instructions from them for us to make protest to the Roumanian government.

(*April 3.*) We are advised that the German staff is considering having the French Military Mission at Constantinople interned, which is contrary to the agreement made with the Central Powers at the beginning of negotiations.

A radio from Lyons states that Japanese interference in Siberia depends on Russian consent. This news has made a very favorable impression here, as it is believed such consent has already been given.

(*April 6.*) The Prime Minister states that negotiations are being conducted by the Germans and the Hungarians, Messrs. Graz and Stereni, the Austrians passively following their lead. The Hungarians are very severe with Czernin, and reproach him for any concessions he is disposed to make.

Mr. Marghiloman will go to Bucharest in three or four days to sign the peace. He assures us that the war material and equipment will remain untouched in the depots, and that property located in the occupied territory will be guarded by Roumanians.

The direction of the society for the exploitation of the monopoly of petroleum will be exclusively German. Austro-Hungary will have only a financial participation, in the same degree as the Roumanians.

No part of the territory still free will be occupied by the Central Powers. As regards the occupied territory, they should in principle move out only at the general peace conclusion. But they would start to move out gradually at the signing of the peace with Roumania. Mr. Marghiloman hopes that he will be able to rush the removal of the German troops in case no violent manifestations against them take place.

Dobrudja will be definitely acquired by Bulgaria at

the general peace, with the exception of the city and part of Constanza, and the railroad from Constanza to Cernavoda, which would remain international.

Mr. Marghiloman realizes that the peace will bring enormous economic advantages to Germany. The terms give rectifications of borders to Hungary and nothing to Austria, and considerable advantages to Bulgaria. He thinks that the peace conditions could not be very much bettered after the mistakes made by the previous cabinet. He seems to believe that the general peace will come after a series of separate peace treaties, and that each country will be too much occupied with its own interests to interfere in favor of Roumania.

We have again asked information from Mr. Marghiloman as regards the sending back to their countries of the Allied military missions that remained in Roumania. He has renewed his promise that he will do everything possible to settle this matter on the basis of the previous statements.



DIPLOMATS AT THE FUNERAL OF KING CAROL OF ROUMANIA



ROUMANIAN COTTAGE

CHAPTER XXI

UNION OF BESSARABIA AND ROUMANIA — UKRAINIA BEING GERMANIZED

(*April 8, 1918*)

THE union of Bessarabia and Roumania seems to be approaching. The Prime Minister left yesterday for Kishenev in order to hasten it. We have not interfered with the negotiations to this effect. If the event is accomplished, it will be necessary to publish the sympathy of the Allies to this effect, because we will be entitled to the credit which undoubtedly will be claimed by the Austro-Germans.

Our attention has been called to the Roumanian agents in France. They are receiving no compensation from their government, and are obliged to live on their own resources, which for the majority of them are insufficient. It will be necessary to arrange what can be done for them, taking into consideration the sacrifices of Roumania for the cause of the Allies.

(*April 9.*) In order to avoid giving the Germans a pretext to take away our wireless station, it will be necessary to reproduce as private information news received from Bucharest by way of Switzerland, or from Vienna or Berlin, also, after a certain delay, all information contained in our telegrams and used for propaganda.

We wrote the Prime Minister today as follows:

“According to a communication received by the administration of the wireless station, by reason of congestion this service cannot be used by the Foreign Legations until Tuesday next.

“Also we note that the German government has requested the Roumanian government to suppress the service of code telegrams forwarded by the legations.

“We do not doubt, in case this information should be confirmed, that your Excellency will continue to insure the free use of this service, which is the only means for the foreign representatives of communication with their countries.”

(*April 10.*) The union of Bessarabia and Roumania was proclaimed yesterday at Kishenev by the Bessarabian Assembly, under conditions of a liberal autonomy.

As it is understood from a recent speech of Czernin, the Central Powers have declared that they are not against this union. We confirm that, in order to prevent them from getting the credit for this event, we shall receive it with sympathy, the more as this application of the nationalist principle, approved by a free assembly, seems to be in conformity with the program of the Entente.

The events also seem to be in conformity with our interests, Bessarabia being too weak to guarantee its independence by its own means, and being cut off from Russia, having no other alternative but to join Roumania or Ukrainia, which voluntarily became a German colony.

Through their projects regarding the traffic in cereals, and their control of the railroads and navigation on the river Danube, the Central Powers are entirely the masters in Roumania. As regards the means of communication, it has been indicated that they will have to follow the Austro-German system of railroads and rivers. Roumania must agree from now on that she will establish the necessary roads to lengthen not only railroads existing on the other side of the borders, but those that will

be constructed during a certain period. The tariffs will be uniform and cannot bring any protection to the commerce or national liberty.

The European commission of the Danube River will be replaced for the full actual rights, by a commission representing only the countries through which the river passes. Roumania will have to grant to German and Austro-Hungarian shipping concerns all the necessary territory for the installation of their agencies, warehouses, etc. In the Danubian ports, the installation effected by Germany during the war will be granted for a period of fifty years.

Under the pretense of equality, the Central Powers are completely mastering the commercial resources of Roumania.

A Hungarian commissioner has the right of permanent inspection of the Roumanian railroads, and therefore he can examine at any time into the whole administration.

The compact relative to agricultural products of all kinds states that the surplus over local consumption must be sold to the Central Powers for a period of five years after the general peace treaty. The quantities to be considered as surplus will be determined the first year by the Austro-Germans, after consultation with the Roumanian government, and for the following years by the Roumanian government in collaboration with Austro-German representatives.

This will mean the rationing of Roumania by the Central Powers to their benefit after the peace, and an unlimited war indemnity.

(*April 12.*) I had a long interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Marghiloman, and during our conversation he repeated that he believed in the victory of the

Central Powers, and that whatever may be done for Roumania will be done by the Central Powers.

I argued with him for an hour, telling him that our country went to war for the sake of humanity, and that until that purpose was achieved we would stay in the fray. We would spare no efforts to hasten this victory by sending troops to the Western front, and if necessary, to Russia, and we would stay in the war until we were victorious. The Germans might win one, two, five or ten battles, but the end would be the same, they would lose the war, and the Allies would see to it that the supplies for the German army from Russia were stopped.

(*April 13.*) According to information regarding the situation in Ukrainia, it is as follows:

(1) Ukrainia has been completely cut off from any communication with Russia.

(2) Ukrainian officers are gradually being replaced by Austro-Germans.

(3) German and Austrian currency must be accepted.

(4) An order has been issued that any Entente officer who might eventually be in Ukrainia be arrested. To our knowledge, all our officers have left Ukrainia.

(5) The houses of the consuls in Odessa have been examined in order to lodge Austro-German officers there.

(6) There are rumors that the German government intends to suppress the Rada of Kiev and establish a German government in its place.

It can be stated that Ukrainia is being transformed into a German colony.

(*April 14.*) We are advised from a good source that Mr. Marghiloman is more and more convinced of the victory of the Central Powers. Having faith, no doubt, in information from German sources, he expresses



JON. I. C. BRATIANU

his opinion that the last events on the Western front prove the weakness of the Entente, and that they will not be able to resist the Central Powers, even before using the natural resources of Russia.

Mr. Marghiloman adds that Roumania will have nothing to expect from the Allies, notwithstanding the enormous sacrifices that she has had to bear for her participation. He bases his statement on information received in Bucharest, according to which the United States would have made an agreement with Austro-Hungary to let them act as they wished in the Balkans.

In regard to the strictly confidential character of this information, it should not be referred to in telegrams for the press. But it will be of great advantage to get a statement from the United States government denying the negotiations with Austro-Hungary, and especially any agreement concerning the Balkans. This statement should immediately be extensively published. It would be more efficient if the other Allies would join. It must be observed that any wires giving the military situation should be written in such way as to reestablish faith in the victory of the Entente.

(*April 15.*) According to authorized information from Bucharest, confirmed from all sides, the trouble between the different nationalities of Austro-Hungary, and especially between the Austrians and Hungarians, becomes worse each day. In regard to an Austrian offensive on the Italian front, and a participation of the Austro-Hungarian troops in the German offensive in France, we think it advisable to take advantage of this state of mind. We think that the agents of those different nationalities will succeed in disbanding the recruited units.

(*April 17.*) The Minister of Foreign Affairs has notified us, in writing, of the union of Bessarabia with Roumania. A simple acknowledgment could only have made an unfavorable impression, and we have preferred to await instructions from our governments to decide the way in which to reply. As we have already explained, the union of Bessarabia proclaimed by representatives of the population is in conformity with the principles and interests of the Entente, so far as it will not lead Roumania to interfere further with Southern Russia. We must avoid furnishing the Austro-Germans with a pretext to get the full credit for this event through a reserved attitude on our part.

It is up to our governments to appreciate how far it will be necessary to keep up connections with Russia. We think that if they have no reasons for objection, it will be advisable to authorize us to state orally that the Entente looks with sympathy on an event in conformity with the principle of nationalism, and the rights of the people to choose for themselves. We would of course give the Roumanian government to understand that any previous stipulations will be revised at the Peace Conference by our governments, and as regards Bessarabia, they will take into consideration the attitude of Roumania from now on until that time. We all four ministers were personally in favor of this union.

(*April 23.*) We have received the following telegram from Mr. Marghiloman as an answer to the letter of our colleague, Sir George Barclay, the English Minister:

“I have the honor to reply to your note which your Excellency has sent me last night in his name and the names of Messrs. Vopicka, de Saint Aulaire and Baron

Fasciotti. The new circumstances created by our peace treaty and our desire to observe a scrupulous neutrality makes it our duty to accept plain telegrams only for transmission. The Legations will be assured of communication with their governments under these conditions, as I am sure that the Legations do not want in any way to forward military news regarding the states with which their countries continue to be in state of war."

The following is a copy of a letter sent to the Prime Minister on the 24th of April:

"We have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your wire of the 23d inst., in answer to our note of the 22d relative to the use of the wireless station.

"As regards the question of principle, we beg to confirm the contents of our previous communication.

"However, we recognize that the Roumanian government is in an abnormal situation as a result of this fact, but we express the wish that it will spare no efforts to prevent the situation affecting the fundamental rights of all independent states."

During the time that we were unable to send cipher telegrams, we were obliged to send our messages the best way we could, either by airplanes, by couriers or otherwise. In one case we were "double crossed" by a Russian pilot, who received a big amount of money for his trip from Jassy to Salonika, and after he had received the mail, instead of going to Salonika, he went straight to Bucharest, where he gave all our mail to the Germans.

In this mail there was a letter for Mr. G. Seidel, manager of the Standard Oil Co., in Roumania, in which one of his men in Jassy informed him of the petroleum

business in Jassy and Moldavia. He was immediately arrested and brought before the military court.

When I was informed about this affair the next day, I immediately went to the Prime Minister, asking him to intercede in favor of Mr. Seidel, and if possible have him set free, as I knew he was not guilty of any act charged against him by the Germans. Mr. Marghiloman kindly promised me to do so, and to this action of mine, and the employment of an able Germanophile lawyer, who was paid royally, Mr. Seidel is indebted for his discharge and liberty.



PRINCE B. STIRBEY

CHAPTER XXII

NEW GERMAN DEMANDS ON ROUMANIA

(*April 24, 1918*)

ACCORDING to information, the Germans try to create trouble in Walachia and Moldavia in order to maintain and enlarge their occupied territory. They even intend to abolish the crown, and the German military authorities talk clearly in this respect. They also officially distribute to the population of the occupied territory, and to the demobilized soldiers who return home, violent pamphlets against the king and the politicians responsible for the war. This is an evident attempt to start a revolution in Roumania in order to strengthen German hold on that country. To avoid revealing the official source of this information, it would be advisable to have it first published in the press of neutral states, Switzerland especially, and from this the Allied wires would emanate.

(*April 25.*) Ukrainia will probably appoint a plenipotentiary minister to Roumania. We intend to sustain only personal relations with him, and to state that the question of recognition of Ukrainia is beyond our authority, and can only be settled by our governments.

The Germans request that the use of the wireless station for code telegrams be discontinued, not only for the Allied legations, but also for the neutral legations and the Roumanian government. Such a request shows the desire they have to hide the violence and the exploitations in Roumania, which are without precedent even in the African colonies.

Among the new demands of the Germans, the following can be stated:

(1) A project of monopoly for the exploitation of large properties, which would reduce the Roumanian population to complete slavery for the benefit of German capitalists.

(2) The absorbing of the total agricultural production without taking the local needs into consideration, unless to extend the system of requisitions to Moldavia and Bessarabia, as done in Walachia, where this system will continue to prevail after the peace. These exports will be paid for by the Roumanian government for the account of the Central Powers, who will reimburse Roumania when they think fit to do so.

(3) Monopoly for the exploitation of the ports, rivers, shipping concerns, etc., in favor of the Central Powers.

(4) Control of the railroads, post, telegraphs and telephones, also in Moldavia and Bessarabia, contrary to the previous assurances given.

(5) Forced recruiting of Roumanian laborers to be used by the Central Powers. This clause is disguised deportation.

(6) The Roumanian government will be responsible for all damages caused through the occupation, including the requisitions made from the civil population through the Central Powers, and the exchange of the paper money issued by the Central Powers, amounting to over three milliards of lei. And the Germans demand that the treaty shall mention that they impose neither indemnities nor taxes.

(7) The Roumanian prisoners will only be released gradually against payment of money or wheat.

(8) The prosecution or deportation of all Ententophile politicians.

(9) The retirement of all officers who have distinguished themselves in the present war.

The German press of Bucharest advocates quite clearly that all politicians favoring the Entente should be murdered. From this information an opinion can be formed regarding the character of the first peace which the Central Powers are imposing. Even in unoccupied territory, the press, in the pay of the Germans, starts an injurious campaign against the Allies, with the tolerance of a censor, who on the other hand is without mercy as regards the attacks directed against the Central Powers.

(*May 5.*) According to some information, the Germans are trying to obtain authority from the Roumanian government to negotiate with the Russian authorities the return of the Roumanian funds in Moscow. The best way to counteract this maneuver would be, if the relations of the Allies with the Russian authorities in Moscow permit, to arrange with them that this money be transferred to a safe place, and sufficiently far away.

The transfer of the funds can be justified for reasons of security, and can be represented to the Roumanian government as an amicable proceeding. This action would have a double advantage, to deprive the Germans of the money, and to give us a valuable deposit. It would also increase the authority of the Allies here in showing that they are capable of action in Russia.

(*May 9.*) We requested this telegram sent to our consuls general at Moscow:

“The peace has been signed on the 7th day of this month. The press publishes the text of the treaty, which will no doubt be sent on by wire. The Parlia-

ment has been dissolved and the new one is to have a meeting on the 17th of June."

(*May 15.*) The Allied ministers, having instructions, addressed the following note to the Roumanian government:

"As per order of our governments, we have the honor to protest to the Roumanian government the prohibition on our forwarding code telegrams.

"Through his telegram dated from Bucharest the 23d of April, his Excellency the Prime Minister has informed the Minister of Great Britain that the action he took was on account of the desire to observe the strictest neutrality.

"The Allied governments cannot accept this view, and have instructed their representatives in Jassy to inform the Roumanian government to this effect.

"In fact the prohibition to forward cipher telegrams can only prejudice the Entente Powers, the representatives of the countries with which they are at war having every facility for communicating with their governments. The Roumanian government in this way, far from keeping its neutrality, goes beyond it in favor of one of the belligerent parties.

"During the war the question of code telegrams has been raised twice, in the United States and in Spain. In those two countries the representatives of the Central Powers were in a similar situation as the Allied missions in Roumania, i. e., that they could only communicate with their countries by means of wireless.

"In order to keep their neutrality and to respect the rights of the diplomatic missions of foreign countries, the governments of Washington and Madrid have always authorized their telegraph stations to forward



TAKE JONESCU

code telegrams which were entrusted to their care. It was a fact though that in Spain the principal object of the German telegrams was to give information of the movements of the trading vessels of belligerent or neutral countries to their submarines, which vessels were sunk without distinction.

“The Roumanian government cannot lose sight of Article VIII of the Convention of the Hague (1907) which does not oblige neutral countries to prohibit the use of the wireless stations in their territory to a belligerent party.

“The principles of justice, and the conventional right, make it a duty for the Roumanian government to revise this decision, on the subject of which we have expressed our reservations by our letter of the 24th of April, and in consequence of which we have been instructed to formulate the most formal protest.”

(*May 16.*) To complete the information already transmitted, we mention among the conditions of the Roumanian peace those that show better the monstrous hypocrisy and the voracity of German imperialism.

The Germans have demanded that in the peace treaty it should appear that there are no annexations or indemnities. As regards the annexations, the disposing of Dobrudja and the rectifications of the border all along the Carpathian Mountains will mean about 26,000 square kilometers and 800,000 inhabitants, or a loss to Roumania of about one-tenth of the total population.

The reasons given, justifying these rectifications, are unacceptable. In fact, the Central Powers are victorious, and Roumania, becoming a German colony, cannot be a danger to them. However, they cannot

forget that the victory of the Entente will return Roumania its old borders. The truth is that these rectifications comprise the richest forest of the Carpathians, and will extend the Hungarian hunting territories; it will also enable them to get hold of the wood, the wealth of the Forestry Societies, in which the Germans and Austro-Hungarians are very much interested. It would be interesting to reveal this aim in the Socialist circles of Germany and Austro-Hungary.

The Germans claim that these rectifications comprise only naked districts. But in this way they take 170 villages with a population of over 130,000 inhabitants. This part of the population represents the purest Roumanian race, those who have sought refuge in the highest mountains during the successive invasions and the Turkish domination.

As regards the indemnities, the Germans state that this expression only applies to the war expenses and the money due to the families of the victims of the war. They refuse to consider as indemnity the different taxes imposed on Roumania, of which the total is about four milliards of lei.

This figure has of course been fixed arbitrarily, without taking into consideration the ancient war right. Germany especially requires considerable sums for the keeping of the Roumanian prisoners, half of whom have died of hunger and bad treatment. The Roumanian government will also have to pay the requisitions made not only for the requirements of the occupation troops, but also for the requirements of the civil population of the Central Empires. They will also have to reimburse the issues of paper money made or to be made, as long as the occupation lasts, without any limit being fixed.

The conditions of monopoly in favor of Germany for the exploitation and sale of petroleum, also the export of cereals, represent another unlimited war indemnity. For cereals only for the present year, they consider that this indemnity will amount to one milliard lei, this being the difference between the real value and the price fixed by Germany.

It is not to be overlooked that the Austro-Germans will have the right to determine the quantity to be exported, that this quantity will be determined not according to the amount of the crop, but according to the needs of the Central Powers. This clause permits that after the peace they can impose rations on Roumania to the extent of famine. In fact, the cost of the exported cereals will be advanced by the Roumanian government, for which the Central Powers will open an account current, which they will settle or not, according to their pleasure.

The treaty states a delay for the approval of the peace by the Roumanian government, but this does not concern the question of rectifications. The dullness of one of the interested governments will suffice to make the advantages of the Austro-Germans in the present circumstances last indefinitely. We can also mention that the peace of Bucharest has not yet been ratified by the Bulgarian government.

The ratification by the Roumanian government will have no legal basis. In fact, this government has been formed under the German bayonet, without the help of the two great historical parties, and without the participation of the soldiers, who have not had time to return to their homes. The choice of the candidates has been submitted to the Germans, notwithstanding

the guaranties of the Prime Minister that no Ententophile parties will take part in the elections.

Far from partially freeing Roumania, the peace will end in slavery and ruin. Six enemy divisions will continue to occupy her territory, even after the ratification, which the Germans can delay as long as they wish. The railroads, the navigation on the rivers, the post and telegraph remain in the hands of the Germans. A German delegate is placed in each Ministry, "at the request of the Roumanian government," according to the style imposed by Germany. Roumania will only keep police powers. The war material and the ammunition are placed in depots situated in the occupied territory under the guard of the German staff.

The Germans have created a German company for agricultural exploitations, with a capital of eighty millions. This society, by means of disguised expropriation under the form of leasing for a long term, recognized by the peace treaty and in favor of the occupation, tries to get a monopoly of agricultural products of Roumania. This is another speculation of the Austro-German capitalists that should be revealed to the Social Democracy.

Orders issued by the German military authorities before the signature of the peace treaty force the population of the occupied territory, between the ages of fourteen and sixty, to work as ordered by the German authorities. Disobedience of these orders will be followed by deportation, imprisonment from one to five years, and in certain unspecified cases, death.

Summing up, the treaty imposed on Roumania is the most shameless contradiction of all German statements. It means the disguised annexation of the



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whole country, the robbery of the public and private property, and after the peace, the most conscienceless exploitation. They make a prison of Roumania, where all the people are condemned to hard labor for the profit of the enemy.

This instance of a German peace deserves to be considered the more as the German delegates, to the astonishment of the Roumanian delegates, have stated that these conditions are very moderate compared with those intended for the treaty to be imposed on France, England and Italy after the victory of the Central Powers.

(*May 16.*) The following letter is addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the four Allied ministers:

“The Entente governments have learned that the treaty signed in Bucharest on the 7th of this month, between Roumania and the Central Powers, contains clauses contrary to the provisions of the international agreements which they have signed.

“The treaty of Bucharest mentions, in fact, that the river Danube, starting from Braila, will be placed under a new commission that will only represent states through which the river passes, or on the coasts of the Black Sea. The establishment of this new commission, the same as any alterations of the European Commission of the Danube, without the participation of the signers of the prevailing agreements, is a violation of these covenants.

“Article II of the treaty of London, on the 10th of March, 1883, determined the proceeding for the modification of the rules of the Commission.

“Article XV of the treaty of Paris of March, 1856, established that the principles of the Act of the Congress

of Vienna, designed to govern the navigation of the rivers crossing or separating several countries, would in future also apply to the river Danube and its mouths.

“The provisions of the treaty of Bucharest are contrary to the conditions which rule the river Danube, as they modify, and the modifications do not take any account of the rules specially arranged to this effect.

“In these circumstances, the Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy have the honor, by order of their governments, to bring to the knowledge of the Roumanian government the fact that the countries they represent consider as non-existing any arrangement made in regard to the Danube without their approval. This question can only be settled at the general peace, and after agreement between all countries interested.

“They also make their reservations as regards the consequences of the provisional rulings that will be applied until then.”

(*May 17.*) Another letter was sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as follows:

“We have the honor to confirm our letter of the 6th of May as regards the Russian war material, also our previous communications, of which you will find copy enclosed.

“As regards the Roumanian war material, we refer to the assurances which have been given by the present government, as well as by the previous governments, according to which none of this material will be given to the enemy.

“In presence of the provisions of this treaty to this effect, we insist that the Roumanian government take the necessary steps to insure the strict execution of these agreements.”

(*May 20.*) According to information from the occupied territory, these regions have been exploited by the Germans with more savagery than ever, since the signature of the peace treaty. They have organized systematic robbery, and anything that can be used is being taken and sold, from foods and industrial installations to clothing and fancy goods. They take the last provisions from the peasants, including the maize, which, since the German occupation, has replaced the wheat. The famine produces very serious epidemics. Where the Germans expect resistance of the enraged population, they surround the village with machine guns and compel them to deliver their foods under threats of general massacre.

In Ukrainia and Poland, the Germans even remove the rich soil, sending away many trains loaded with black earth, destined to create culture lands in the sandy districts along the borders.

(*May 21.*) According to the Roumanian delegates in Bucharest, the German circles are very pessimistic. They fear the failure of the next offensive at the Western front. They consider that even if they succeed and the German troops reach the sea, the establishment of a base against England would require too long a delay in regard to the interior situation in the Central Empires, where there is general discontent, a desire for peace, and insufficient food, which will not permit continuing the war for more than a few months.

The friction is getting worse between the Germans and Austro-Hungarians on one side, and the Turks and Bulgarians on the other. Mr. Marghiloman himself recognizes these difficulties, but states that the unity of direction in Germany will continue to prevail, and

that he has faith in the victory of the Central Powers.

Following is the context of the letter from the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to our protests regarding the signing of the peace treaty by Roumania:

“In answer to your letter sent me on the 14th of May, I have the honor to make the following statement:


“Notwithstanding the generosity of principles which the Allied Powers have often shown during the World War, this has not prevented the ruin of Roumania, left to her own resources in an unfortunate war, notwithstanding her resistance, her numerous sacrifices and the courage of her soldiers.

“At the end of her strength, threatened in her existence even, the peace imposed by the Central Powers on Roumania was the only means of salvation, and an imperative duty; the Royal government must thus consider this peace as legal in all points, and in consequence must feel bound by it.”

(*May 23.*) We have sent the following letter:

“Through our communication of March 16, we have requested His Excellency the Prime Minister to appoint a Roumanian representative for the mixed commission for the Russian material, and to let us know the date on which this commission will start functioning. Having received no reply to this communication, we have the honor to ask you to let us know whether we must consider as definitely abandoned the principle admitted by General Janconvescu for the creation of an International commission in charge of the material which the Russian army left behind.

“If this principle is maintained, we request that its



PAVILION AT THE RACE TRACK IN BUCHAREST



THE PAVILION OF THE QUEEN, IN CONSTANZA, ROUMANIA

realization be no longer deferred, as each day that goes by will render the task for the International commission more difficult.

“We add that, in regard to the new conditions in Bessarabia, we consider it necessary to take the same precautions for the Russian material in this territory as for the material in Roumania.

“It is our duty to call the attention of the Roumanian government to the responsibility that will be created by each new delay in the functioning of the commission, the principle of which has been admitted.

“In any case, we renew our reservations as regards the rights of the Allies in the said material.”

(*May 24.*) Letter from the four Allied ministers:

“We have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the letter which you have addressed to us, dated the 4th of May, to inform us of the view of the present Cabinet regarding the question of the Russian war material in Roumania and Bessarabia.

“We hasten to bring this communication to the knowledge of our governments, but it is our duty to state that from now on we consider the Roumanian government bound by agreement of the previous Cabinets to this effect.

“Regarding the Roumanian war material in Russia, we of course, from our side, will maintain our previous statements regarding the rights of Roumania in this material, as it results from paragraph three of our letter of the 16th of March to General Averescu. We have the honor to communicate to you a copy of this document, of which you seem to have no knowledge.

“Also confirming our reservations contained in our letter of the 23d of April and 6th of May, we beg to

state that any verification and appraisement effected without us, and contrary to the agreement already accepted by the Roumanian government, will not be recognized by us."

CHAPTER XXIII

ROUMANIAN ELECTIONS CONTROLLED BY GERMANS— INTRIGUE AGAINST CROWN

(*May 27, 1918*)

IT is necessary for the Entente to know the exact value of the elections imposed by the Germans, in view of the ratification of the peace treaty.

We recall that these elections have been effected under the threat of German bayonets, that the important parties took no part in them, and that the list of candidates formally agreed upon by Mr. Marghiloman has been reduced by the German authorities. The government has had considerable difficulty in getting the necessary number of candidates together, who, in nearly all cases, had no opposition. Notwithstanding the efforts of the German authorities, with the aid of the Marghiloman cabinet, to suppress any expression of national feeling, the people both in Moldavia and the occupied territory take advantage of every opportunity to show their indignation at the peace conditions, and their hope of approaching reparation due to the final triumph of the Allies.

We urge the necessity of considering what our press states regarding the events in Roumania, between a cabinet guided by the Germans and the Roumanian people, whose aspirations have become closer to those of the Entente on account of the terrible conditions of the peace, and the union with Bessarabia, which aspirations are directed towards Transylvania.

It is to be noted that the two great parties who wanted war, and who represent the two organized parties

of the country, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have remained true to the Entente under the direction of their leaders, Jean Bratiano and Take Jonsescu.

In the present circumstances, it is preferable to forget the mistakes, perhaps unavoidable, that have been made during the difficulties, and which have found their punishment in the conditions of the peace itself. The only thing that counts is that we keep in view our interests, also a full appreciation of the enormous sacrifices of Roumania, and to keep up a certain spirit that will bring the whole nation to the side of the Entente as soon as circumstances will permit. It will thus be necessary to grant to the parties in favor of the Entente great moral support in our press, and also a material support.

As regards this last point, it will be advisable to establish business relations between independent Roumanian concerns, which are nearly all run by the Liberal party, and the financial and industrial circles of the Entente. To this effect, we think that it will be necessary to use the aid and knowledge of the Roumanians who are at present in Paris and London. This aid can be manifested in the form of different missions and in the administration. This would from now on have the advantage of giving those in favor of our cause the impression that we are not abandoning them, and that we are certain of the future.

(*June 3.*) Mr. Marghiloman has recently uttered a speech on the occasion of the starting of the electoral campaign, as follows:

“The new Parliament’s first duty will be to ratify the peace, then to establish the responsibilities as regards the declaration of war and its conduct, also the real



ROUMANIAN STREET PEDDLERS

use of the money it has cost. The adventurous policies of Bratiano have led to war. He wanted this war, only awaiting a favorable opportunity to attack our former Allies. We have been defeated. We must understand the ill feeling of the victorious in order to appreciate the work of the Roumanian negotiators. Impartial history will bless those men who have had the courage to sign this peace, which is not a disadvantage in all points. Through it a whole nation has been returned to its mother country, as it is with the coöperation of the Austro-Germans that Bessarabia has been acquired.

“Some people expected that after the signing of the peace they would see all the pre-war liberties reëstablished. Let us remember the fate of Holland and Switzerland before we complain.”

Mr. Marghiloman then talked about reforms. The alteration in agriculture must harmonize with the interests of the different classes and increase production. He also implied permanent censorship of the press. These declarations of the Prime Minister are in conformity with the policies of the Central Powers. The actual conditions can only become worse until the general peace or the defeat of the Central Powers.

According to reliable information, there are two clauses in the peace treaty not yet made known. The first involves the entrance of Roumania in the Zollverein of the Central Powers, and the second requires that all legations, or at least their military attachés, receive their passports immediately after ratification of the peace by the Roumanian parliament. This would strengthen certain points in the peace conditions which would make Roumania practically a German colony.

A Roumanian diplomat, who is in sympathy with the Entente, advises us that the Germans require that the Roumanian government shall not appoint its ministers to Paris, London and Washington, before establishing their legations in the Central Powers, but on the other hand they refuse to receive Roumanian representatives in Berlin and Vienna, stating that their presence can only create difficulties, and that the presence of von Mackensen in Bucharest will do for the time being. Finally, as the Germans are always intriguing against the Crown, they insist, in disregard of the rules of the constitution, that the command of the army be taken away from the king and given to a committee of generals, with the approval of the Central Powers. The occupation of Roumania is no doubt a safeguard against Bolshevism, and the Germans also see there an opportunity to exploit this rich country. They try to create trouble in Roumania by favoring the establishment of the Austrians in the north of Bessarabia and of the Bulgarians in the south.

We understand that the blockade at Kiev by the Germans is becoming more effective each day. Documents originating in a pro-Ally group have been sold by a Russian officer to the German staff, and numerous arrests have resulted. These include the Greek and Spanish consuls, who represented the interests of France.

All the government candidates for the Senate have been elected. General Averescu has been elected as an independent candidate without any opposition from the government. Only about one-third of those inscribed have taken part in the election, and only two candidates have had an absolute majority. This gives an idea of the strength of the pro-Entente party.

Under German pressure, the Cabinet has issued a decree making agricultural work compulsory throughout Roumania for a period of five years. This applies to all persons of both sexes, from fourteen to sixty years of age, and has been imposed by the Germans to insure agricultural production, as the prices they have fixed are so low the lands would not be cultivated except under compulsion. This measure has caused great discontent which is increased by the attitude of the Cabinet against the general right of voting.

The German policy is designed to make slaves of the Roumanian people after the conclusion of peace. It includes the transfer of individuals from one part of the country to another, according to needs. This will be the worst form of slavery, depriving people of their homes and dividing families.

At the inauguration of the new parliament, none of the representatives of the Allies were present. The king had been informed of our intention to absent ourselves, and fully understanding our good reasons, he gave instructions that no invitations should be sent. Therefore, for the first time, the ceremony took place without the presence of the representatives of foreign or neutral countries. The king's address was undoubtedly prepared by Mr. Marghiloman and the German authorities, and in many respects was far from being a true expression of the real sentiment. This was illustrated by the alteration of a paragraph which originally read: "The manner in which the countries with whom we have made peace have considered this event, has prepared the way for the reestablishment of our friendship as in the past." In the king's speech, the word "relations" was substituted for "friendship."


(*June 21.*) The new parliament does not in any way represent the country. In the first place, the elections were illegal. Mr. Marghiloman admitted that the opposition could not conduct a free campaign in the occupied territory, which comprises two-thirds of the whole territory. Only 40 per cent of the legal voters cast their votes, whereas 70 per cent voted in 1914. In this parliament, the opposition party comprises only some half-dozen senators and deputies. In the majority are included four men formerly condemned to death for desertion to the enemy, and one man charged with wilful murder. The election of these five has been protested by forty-five deputies, but the Germans have ordered that they be accepted.

(*June 23.*) Owing to the dry weather both in Bessarabia and in Roumania, it is estimated that the total production of wheat, maize, sugar, lards, etc., will be less than 50 per cent of the quantity actually needed for local consumption. It is apparent that present stocks of provisions will be used up before the new crop arrives. We have telegraphed to our governments of these conditions, urging steps for relief not only for humanity's sake, but also the deep and lasting gratitude to the Entente which will be created by such action. We have advised that all supplies be under the control of a neutral country, and that care must be taken that none be appropriated for the German army.

(*July 1.*) The peace treaty has been approved by the Chamber of Deputies by 135 out of 179 votes. On this occasion, General Averescu made the statement that the ties still remain between Roumania and the Entente. There is much bad feeling between the Bessarabian and Roumanian troops, the latter being forced,



FORTRESS IN BRASSOV, TRANSYLVANIA



BRIDGE OVER DANUBE RIVER AT CERNA VODA, ROUMANIA,
DESTROYED BY THE GERMAN ARMY

in conformity with the treaty of Bucharest, to make requisitions for the Germans.

(*July 5.*) The peace treaty has been approved by the Senate, and the king has given orders to maintain strict neutrality.

(*July 8.*) The Senate and the Chambers have made their answers to the address of the king. That of the Senate mentions that the peace of Bucharest will permit reestablishment of old relations with the Central Powers, while that of the Chambers does not make any allusion to their future relations. In his reply, the king has stated that their neutrality will permit them to entertain their peace relations, and also friendly relations with all the countries.

(*July 16.*) Notwithstanding the ratification of peace, the Germans continue to make demands, especially in financial matters. They seek control of the National Bank of Roumania, with the right to appoint the personnel of the bank. They demand a credit of three milliards at a rate of exchange advantageous to them, which would reduce the price of cereals 20 per cent more. They require a monopoly for checks and drafts for the exterior, and demand that their debts for larger exports from Roumania to Central Europe shall be paid wholly in merchandise, which they will either furnish themselves or supply through an intermediary.

The statement of the principal agent of the Reichsbank for the purchase of cereals in Ukrainia is that the intent of the Central Powers is systematically to depreciate the value of the money of all countries, in order to make the mark the international standard in Central Europe and the Orient. The Germans continue to issue lei currency in Bucharest, which is to be taken up by

the Roumanian government without limit, according to the peace treaty. This will enable them to acquire the stocks of all financial and industrial associations of the country. General conditions have become very much worse since peace was ratified. The Germans do not hesitate to take the last provisions away from the peasants, and they are shipping to Germany everything they can use. All people, regardless of age or sex, who incur their displeasure, they condemn, without investigation, to five or ten years of imprisonment.

Ukrainia having been declared a war zone, the only Allied consuls are in Odessa, except that those of France and Greece have been sent to Moscow.

(July 18.) Notwithstanding the ratification of peace, a state of blockade has been renewed for the entire territory of Roumania, without time limit.

(July 22.) We have written to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, renewing our request for authority to send an agent to inspect the Legation buildings in Bucharest, as we have been informed that some of them have been burglarized.

(July 23.) We have notified our governments that articles very unfavorable to the Entente cause, inspired by the Marghiloman cabinet, have been appearing in the press. In one of these it was stated that, "It has been impossible to get the *Enemy* communication on account of atmospheric troubles." On that same day we received communications from Lyons, which appeared in the independent Jassy papers.

(July 24.) The daily ration of bread has been reduced from 500 to 250 grams. The Roumanian transportation fleet of the Danube is to be put in service between Akermann and Odessa. The Chamber of Deputies states

that a foreign company is purchasing coal mines, and fields which may contain coal, in the occupied territory, and will make similar purchases in Moldavia and Bessarabia. There is danger that Roumanian industries will be dependent on foreigners for coal, but the Minister of Commerce states that the present laws do not allow any interference with such purchases. Reserve officers and members of the universities have protested against the attacks of the Senate on the Crown.

We are advised that a telegram addressed to our governments cannot be dispatched, the Prime Minister claiming that it is against the Roumanian government. He expresses regret that the "enemy communications" article was printed, and assures us there will be no repetition. He says that his paper, the "Steagul," being issued in Bucharest, is under German censorship, and therefore prints only the news supplied by the German military authorities.

We learn that the German authorities of Kiev have prohibited the departure of Messrs. Choulguine and Galip, whom the Ukrainian government had charged with a mission to the Entente countries. Also the German authorities protest the incorporating by Ukrainia of Volynia, Podolia and Odessa. The anti-German movement in Ukrainia becomes stronger each day.

(*August 6.*) The news of the interference of the Allies in Russia has produced the most favorable effect in Roumania, where opinion is principally impressed by events which affect the local situation. In all quarters, except the Germanophile circles, which are growing smaller each day, it is stated that if this interference had been earlier, it would have saved Roumania, or in any case, that their army could have been used for the

common cause in Russia. At present the Allied efforts are being watched with interest. They hope that good fortune for the Allies in Bulgaria and in Turkey will soon permit free action for Roumania.

According to information from Ukrainia, the anti-German movement and the general strike on the railroads, which affects the transportation of foods for the Germans, are strongly encouraged by the Inter-Allied action in Russia, and by the success of the Czecho-Slovaks. We wish that the Allied efforts in Russia may be accelerated and strengthened as much as possible.

(*August 8.*) The report of the investigating commission regarding the Bratiano question has been deposited, and Mr. Bratiano has made his reply.

(*August 12.*) The Minister of Foreign Affairs made the following statements yesterday at the parliament:

“Since the day that we signed the peace, it has been our duty to be absolutely neutral towards all countries. In consequence, we do not permit any hostile acts, no attacks nor discourtesy to the Entente countries. We are, nevertheless, obliged to follow the policies that result from the peace treaty, which we have to respect and apply. This treaty has established between us and the Central Powers certain relations that we cannot prevent. We are bound to the Central Powers in regard to our economic situation, and everybody knows how the economic life influences the political life of the nation.”

In regard to this, agreements have been made in Berlin in view of the execution of this treaty. Answering a question of an independent deputy, who characterized the attitude of the government as contrary to the



TRAVELING ON THE RAILROADS IN ROUMANIA DURING THE WAR



TOWN OF CAMPULUNG IN WALACHIA

principles of neutrality, the minister added: "If you believe that conditions will change in time, different statements will perhaps be made at this Tribune by another government."

The papers of the Roumanian Legation in Petrograd, after having been deposited by Mr. Diamandy at the French Embassy, have now been handed over to the Norwegian Legation. The Marghiloman cabinet intends to ask their transfer to Jassy. As these papers contain confidential documents regarding the relations between Roumania and the Entente, it is necessary that they should not be remitted to the Marghiloman cabinet, which would give them to the Germans. We beg our governments to intercede with the Norwegian government, and request that it does not comply with the request of the Marghiloman cabinet.

(*August 13.*) The parliament has given authority to the Marghiloman cabinet to make decisions in form of decrees of law during the parliamentary vacations, and during the intervals between the dissolution and the convocation of the Chamber, until the general peace. This authority will only depend upon restrictions of second order, especially as regards the pensions and the settling of questions concerning the advance of the civil and military officers.

Count Czernin having stated that, during the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk, Roumanian politicians had brought to his knowledge the fact that Roumania was ready to make peace, the king and Mr. Bratiano have said that this statement has no foundation as regards the Roumanian government, and that it must have originated from the Germanophile party in Bucharest. The statement has been confirmed by all our information

as regards the attitude of the Bratiano government, who have resisted the pressure of the politicians in Bucharest, and have admitted the peace negotiations with the enemy only after the situation of Roumania had become totally desperate as a result of the complete surrounding of the country.

According to a radio from Lyons of the 11th of August, the English government has published our collective telegrams of the 16th of May as regards the peace imposed on Roumania. This telegram, which was dispatched after we were no longer allowed to use the wireless, must surely have called the attention of the Germans to the fact that we possess a secret means of communication via Moscow. We repeat that our code telegrams are for the strictly secret use of our governments, and that the press should only publish information emanating from a neutral source.

(*August 26.*) The success of the Entente in France and their efforts to reestablish the Oriental front produce a great impression here, and raise up again the national aspirations. The Germans, afraid of this situation, increase their brutalities.

It is necessary to reveal the manner in which they execute the peace terms they have imposed on Roumania. Notwithstanding that this peace has already been ratified by the parliament, the members of which were chosen under German control, the Germans do not hesitate to make it constantly worse. The occupation continues as before, with all its abuses and violences. The country is being emptied of its last resources, taken by the Germans, or what is the same in effect, requisitioned with bonds payable by the Roumanian government.

The people who fled to Moldavia cannot return to their homes, either because the necessary authority has not been granted by the Germans or because their homes are occupied by the Germans. German officers are being billeted in the private properties, where they have their families join them, and the unfortunate owners not only are deprived of the use of their homes and estates, but are even required to pay their unwelcome tenants for their occupancy. Thus the wife of a colonel gets an allowance of six hundred francs a month as compensation for the supervision of the house, and the children also get allowances for certain alleged employment. Some proprietors, whose property formerly brought them several hundred thousand francs a year, having put in a claim for at least a part of their income, have been answered by bills, according to which the owners owe the German occupants considerable sums of money. The peasants have been reduced to death by starvation, or when forced to labor, in cases of resistance have been executed.

The only relief from the Germans is to take advantage of their corruptibility. Several officers are mentioned who can be bribed. The Germans do not treat the Germanophile government any better than the population, several members of the cabinet even being unable to obtain authority to reoccupy their homes in Bucharest.

The execution of the clauses of the treaty, favorable in appearance to the Roumanians, is always dependent on certain conditions. For instance, the remitting of posts and telegraphs, still under German control, to the Roumanian government, involves an indemnity of two hundred millions, for the reimbursement of the

betterments they have made in the systems, and they want a much larger sum for returning the railways.

The six divisions mentioned by the treaty for the occupation consist of 160,000 men, mostly men invalided from active service, and these are maintained at the expense of Roumania. Although the Germans live on what they take from the people, the German government has claimed an indemnity of sixty millions per month or 720 millions a year. The Germans request that the members of the Bratiano cabinet be arrested.

The system adopted in Roumania by the Germans shows that they are not certain of the future. They sacrifice all future prospects for present benefits, by taking everything away from the country and terrifying the people. It is a fact that they do not leave the peasants a sufficient quantity of grain for the sowing in 1919, the future not seeming to interest them.

(*August 27.*) A Belgian, Mr. Vermeulen, and an Italian, Mr. Negro, have recently submitted to the Minister of the United States an invention which, according to them, would increase the production of bread by 50 per cent. The United States Minister has advised his government, but has failed to receive a reply.

Advantageous propositions have since been made to the inventors for the exploitation of their discovery in Roumania, but their acceptance would unavoidably give the secret of their invention to the Germans. We are not in a position to state whether their invention is as valuable as they say it is, but the good faith of the inventors cannot be doubted, and in case the invention is efficient, it is of the greatest importance that the enemy be unable to apply it. In these circumstances the Ministers of England, France and the United States



ROUMANIAN GENERAL STAFF



MONASTERY AT TISMANA, ROUMANIA
CHURCH FROM FOURTEENTH CENTURY

have made an arrangement with the inventors that they shall not exploit the invention directly or indirectly, nor give the secret to any country, without our written authority. They will leave for London, as soon as circumstances permit, to offer their invention to competent tests.

CHAPTER XXIV

CROPS MUCH LESS THAN FOOD REQUIREMENTS— ELOPEMENT OF CROWN PRINCE

(August 27, 1918)

ACCORDING to the local press, the grain harvest of this year can be estimated as follows:

Wheat, 48,000 carloads, requirements, 55,000 carloads, shortage, 7,000 carloads.

Oats, 5,100 carloads, requirements, 15,500 carloads, shortage, 10,400 carloads.

Barley, 2,500 carloads, requirements, 12,400 carloads, shortage, 9,900 carloads.

Maize, 102,000 carloads, requirements, 93,000 carloads, surplus 9,000 carloads.

(September 2.) The continual victories of the Entente on the Western front have deeply impressed Roumania. These victories strengthen the national feeling so much depressed by the local situation, but, on the other hand, they increase the harsh actions of the Germans, in their endeavor to remain masters of Roumania materially, the morale of the people escaping them. Their domination, based upon faith in their final victory, the chances of which, however, decrease every day, they think depends upon their severity, and they of course will make the people feel their pressure more and more as it becomes their only means of control.

The German authorities, who apply in the occupied territory the same system as during the war, demand in Moldavia certain steps for their advantage. They have proposed three laws:

(1) To forgive all the traitors and deserters. (2) To discuss, at a meeting composed of agents under German orders, the question of their right to arrest the members of the old government, and all other people who might be in the favor of the old government. (3) To free immediately all traitors and deserters who have already been condemned.

Of these three propositions, the first only has been foreseen by the peace treaty. The other two will enable the Germans to injure their adversaries, to keep up the work of their party and to ruin discipline in the army, as the freeing of traitors is contrary to the constitution.

The king having stated that he will use his prerogative against these propositions, Mr. Marghiloman has resigned. After advice from Mr. Bratiano, the king has reversed his decision, and Mr. Marghiloman has withdrawn his resignation. The attitude of the king is due to the fact that he is afraid the Germans will fight again, which intention they openly manifest, in order to bring about his fall and entrust the ruling of the country to men like Carp and Stere, in whom they have more confidence than in Marghiloman.

The latter has stated to the king in writing that these three propositions were imposed by the Germans. This last indication is to remain secret. The Germans have also presented two legal propositions regarding the Banque Nationale and the Crédit Foncier, through which the control of those two concerns will be entirely in their hands.

They also demand that the military forces be reduced to less than the number stipulated in the peace treaty, and that the employes of the court be sent away, as they were all favorable to the Entente. Certain military

measures seem to indicate that they intend to occupy Moldavia and to arrest the royal family. We feel that our governments should warn the enemy that pursuance of the policy of punishing fidelity to the Entente, and of seizing and attempting to dominate state and private resources and institutions, will result in similar treatment being accorded them later on. Such a message would be very cheering for the Roumanian people, and would have a salutary effect on the enemy representatives. We recommend that it be sent by radio, and that it be based on information received through a neutral country, in order not to involve us, as it would suit the German purpose to have a pretext for a break between the cabinet and ourselves. Also that the warning shall apply to actions in other countries as well as in Roumania.

As the Germans meet with defeat on the Western front, they increase their severity in Roumania. It is the apparent intention to reduce this country to a state of absolute helplessness before it becomes necessary to withdraw any considerable number of the occupation troops. Although all the prisoners taken from the Central Powers have been released and sent home, the Roumanians who were taken by the Germans are being held, and are kept at hard labor for the benefit of their captors. Contrary to the terms of the peace treaty, the Germans now demand all the war material and supplies, and they have already seized that which was held in Odessa. And they refuse to permit Roumania to keep any standing army, unless part of it shall be put under their orders to fight in Russia.

(*September 12.*) In reproducing a recent speech of Senator Lodge, the newspapers of Bucharest state that of all the countries taking part in the war, only Rou-



MINISTER VOPICKA ADDRESSING GERMAN WAR PRISONERS IN BUCHAREST



MONASTERY IN PUTNA, BUKOWINA, NOW PART OF ROUMANIA

mania has been omitted. They conclude that Roumania has sacrificed everything and that they will have nothing to expect from the Entente.

(*September 16.*) We are sending via Moscow the text of a manifesto issued by the representatives of the "Party of Labor," in the name of the labor population of the cities and country. This manifesto has been secretly signed by a great number of people, and refers to the monstrous peace imposed on Roumania, which especially concerns the laborers. We think it would be important to publish this document as widely as possible, especially in socialist circles, including those of the Central Powers. In order to protect the members of the Party of Labor it will be necessary to publish this manifesto as coming from an unknown organization, or from the Roumanian laborers.

An emissary has been sent recently by the Hungarian government to the royal family of Roumania. He has had an audience with the queen and the crown prince, and he has spoken to them regarding an agreement between Roumania and Hungary to act against the great countries in the general peace negotiations. Having agreed to see this emissary only upon the request of the Prime Minister, the queen and the crown prince listened to him and then declared that no conversation of this nature is possible so long as Roumanian territory is occupied.

It is not known in any of the governmental circles what is behind this proposition, but the Hungarian emissary stated his desire to see the queen because she is an English princess, and it is questionable whether these steps were not more or less antagonistic to England.

(*September 21.*) A letter from General Averescu

has been read at the Chamber meeting, concerning the attitude of Roumania, which is too much in favor of the Central Powers, and contrary to a strict neutrality, especially regarding an eventual military action of the Roumanian army in Ukrainia.

Mr. Cuza, an independent member of the Parliament, has developed the subject of realizing the importance of public opinion, and has also dwelt upon the fact that the government, beyond the clauses of the peace treaty, has authorized the export of 12,300 carloads of grain from Bessarabia. He has also called attention to the fact that there are rumors of the delivery of ammunition to the Central Powers.

Mr. Marghiloman has firmly denied the rumors concerning a coöperation of Roumania in Ukrainia, and has stated that he has received no demands to this effect.

As regards the attitude of the press, he has stated that he did not go beyond the principles of neutrality, and that it was natural, as Roumania had concluded peace with Austro-Hungary, that she was trying to regain the confidence lost as a consequence of the war. Regarding the grain exports from Bessarabia, he stated that he had consented to this only in order to limit the requisitions of the Germans in the occupied territory, and thus help the Roumanian people indirectly. He adds, however, that on account of inefficient guarding of the frontier, a great deal of grain is smuggled to Ukrainia. On the other hand, the Germans have only been able to get 2,000 carloads of what was sent. As regards ammunition, he stated that he has not sent any of it to the enemy, although, according to the convention of the Hague, a neutral country has the right

to furnish arms to a belligerent state. He concluded by stating that he will maintain a strict neutrality.

Several days ago, the crown prince mysteriously left Roumania, leaving a letter to be delivered to the king a few days after his departure. In this he declared his intention to enter the service on the Western front. He was accompanied by a young girl of the middle class, Mademoiselle Lambrino, whom he married in Odessa. Being recognized, he was unable to proceed further, and at the request of his parents he returned to Roumania, where he will be tried for leaving the command of his regiment without proper authority. His marriage may compel him to relinquish his rights to the throne in favor of Prince Nicholai, whom the Germans would greatly prefer.

The king, as commander in chief of the army, has condemned the crown prince to imprisonment in jail for seventy-five days for leaving his command without permission. There is much discussion as to whether or not the crown prince should forfeit his rights to the Crown. Several who have been in favor of it have altered their opinions, having realized the desire of the Germans.

Returning from Bucharest, Mr. Marghiloman, apparently through German influence, has threatened to resign if the crown prince's rights were not forfeited, and he also proposed to the king that the constitution be so altered as to permit, in case of necessity, the nomination of a foreigner in the crown prince's stead. In this connection he mentioned the Prince of Hohenzollern and the Duke of Brunswick, a son-in-law of the Emperor. The king has refused to consider this proposal.

The Société Commerciale de Navigation Russe announces that the service between Odessa and Constantinople, with the former calls at Roumanian ports in the Black Sea, will be taken up again.

A radio of the Transoceanic Agency announces that the service of freight trains between Germany and Roumania will soon be reëstablished. In consequence of this communication, a newspaper of Bucharest announces that the firm of S. & W. Hoffman will undertake the imports between Hungary and Roumania and the firm of Schenker & Co. the imports between Austria and Roumania, and that the firm Express of Berlin has established a branch office in Bucharest for the needs of the German import business.

(*September 26.*) We are endeavoring to impress upon our governments the absolute necessity, in the existing circumstances, of being able to communicate with them by means of code telegrams, and we urge action which will enable us to properly conduct our legations.

The campaign of the Bucharest newspapers against the Entente grows worse each day. A first page article has appeared headed "The Treason of the Entente." A few of the papers of Jassy have joined in this campaign. One of them states that the actual situation of the Entente is very difficult, and leads readers to expect a colossal offensive of the Germans against France. They state that if peace is concluded according to the fourteen points of President Wilson, or the seven points of the German program, Germany will not be destroyed, but on the contrary will be strengthened.

(*October 1.*) Events in Bulgaria produce in Roumania considerable effect. They strengthen the feeling



EPISCOPALIAN PALACE AND CHURCH OF THE MONASTERY AT
CURTEA DE ARGESH IN ROUMANIA



BISTRITZA VALLEY IN WALACHIA

created by the victories of the Entente on the other fronts in favor of a reintervention of the Roumanian army on our side. In all circles there are rumors of a new mobilization. But the German occupation becoming more strict, and the disorganization of the army according to the peace treaty, which has already been realized to a great extent, reduce Roumania to complete incapacity as long as she cannot get in communication with the Allied troops. It is also feared that any attempt to mobilize or any trouble resulting would be followed by the occupation of Moldavia, and that the Roumanian government would disappear, also what is left of the army, until Roumania is freed by the Allies.

According to some information from German sources, this occupation would have been accomplished a long time ago if it were not a military problem. But it is said that the German government cares less for the military advantage than for the fact that it would have to violate completely the only treaty of peace the Germans have concluded with a regular government. It is for this reason they have not wiped out the seat of hostility that Moldavia presents to them, and have not even demanded the sending away of the Allied missions, which, however, they try to crush.

However, if any steps were taken in view of a new mobilization, or if there was violent excitement, this would permit the Germans to occupy Moldavia immediately under pretext that the peace treaty has been broken by Roumania. In order to reduce to a minimum the risks of such occupation, the friends of the Entente do their best to avoid any action that might lead to it. In order to facilitate their task, and to furnish no pretext to the Germans, it is preferable for the time being

that the radios destined to Roumania do not refer to this eventual mobilization.

The day that Roumania is able to communicate with the Allied troops on their arrival at the Danube, the Roumanians will help with all their strength. But the Entente will have to renew their engagements with Roumania, and it would be of great help if the United States would join them.

The general feeling here is that Roumania has done its duty under the peace made imperative by the treason and hostility of the Russians. The engagements keep their political and moral value; their judicial value only can be contested since Roumania has officially ceased to be our ally. We request our governments to let us know as soon as possible what we will have to reply if this question is raised. In case we have to reply affirmatively, we ask that the following wire be sent to the French Legation:—"Your accounts up to the 30th of March have been approved."

We will of course remind Roumania of its own engagements, and we leave it to our military attachés to explain the importance of the aid of the Roumanian army and the disposition to be taken.

(*October 3.*) Mr. Constantinesco, former Minister of Interior in the Bratiano cabinet, together with the former prefect of police in Bucharest and others, has been arrested. He has been shut up in the central prison, notwithstanding the law providing a special system for the detention of ministers.

(*October 6.*) The Germans, who have always postponed the ratification of the peace treaty, seem to be impatient to proceed to it since the events in Bulgaria. It would of course be in their favor to give this treaty a

more definite character. On the other hand, although the Marghiloman cabinet desires to postpone this formality, perhaps to make the peace treaty less definite, we think they will not be able to delay it much longer. In fact, the exchange of ratifications would have the effect, theoretically, of bringing an end to the requisitions that reduce the country to starvation, and also an end to the unlimited issue of paper money authorized by the Germans and redeemable by the Roumanian government, the amount already issued being approximately three milliard lei.

But the most imperative reason for not refusing the exchange of ratifications, which would decide even the most faithful friends of the Entente, is the danger of incurring by this attitude the immediate occupation of Moldavia, which would of course destroy all chances of mobilization.

(*October 7.*) The peace proposition of the Germans is watched anxiously, the program of President Wilson being accepted as the basis of the negotiations, which, according to the telegrams we have received, mentions the evacuation of the German troops in Roumania.

The fact that Roumania has often been ignored has been taken advantage of by our enemies, and it will be of the greatest importance to see to it that this is done no more. This, combined with the public and private ruin and misery, would incite terrible anarchy, and the realization of national unity and economic restoration will be the only means of preventing Russian anarchy from penetrating Roumania.

On the other hand, the day that order is reestablished in Roumania, the national feeling has been so much suppressed it would not lead to complications for the

Entente. On the contrary, the realization of national unity and the economic restoration would mean for the Entente, in an enlarged and grateful Roumania, a strong political and economic basis between Bulgaria and Southern Russia.

Mr. Bratiano, who will probably again be prime minister when circumstances permit the king to make his choice, has called on us to impress upon our governments this expectation, which is fully justified. Mr. Bratiano hopes that the continuation of hostilities and the arrival of the Allied troops from the Orient will permit Roumania to take up arms again, which, it is believed, would restore all their value to the engagements entered into with her, and the peace concluded at Bucharest would be considered invalid, as it was imposed on Roumania at a time when Roumania was no longer in a position to make any useful sacrifices.

In view of the extremely difficult situation in Roumania and the continual danger of a total occupation, which would eliminate any chances of mobilization that still exist, we urge the necessity of publishing nothing regarding the reintervention of Roumania.

We understand from the German authorities in Bucharest that the peace proposition has been made in order to divide the Allies and to influence the opinion of the Entente countries. They state that the Central Powers will do all that is necessary for the reestablishment of their situation in the Balkans.

(*October 11.*) According to a radiogram from Nauen, stating the conditions imposed by Bulgaria, that country will keep that part of Dobrudja lying south of Cobadin. We have not failed to notify the Prime Minister that this is contrary to the Interallied statement communi-



ALEXANDER MARGHIOMAN

cated in a telegram from Karnarvon of the 30th of September, according to which Bulgaria was to be left in the old borders of 1915, and the conditions regarding territory were to be settled at the general peace as per statement to which Mr. Orlando has referred in his speech. However, a communication of the Bulgarian journal "Presoretz," and a telegram from Reuter, mentioning the maintaining of the Bulgarian troops in Dobrudja, yesterday provoked a great wrath against the Allies, which was expressed in most violent terms. We beg our governments to confirm officially the previous statements of the Entente.

In order to rush the exchange of ratifications, the Germans have intimated that they are willing to grant some concessions as regards Dobrudja and the Carpathian frontier. Mr. Marghiloman, who, as he states, is only trying to gain time, has replied that any offer to this effect is of no value, the acceptance by Germany of the program of President Wilson being of a nature to give back the whole Roumanian territory. He has added that Germany was in position to give an immediate advantage to Roumania in removing the troops, or at least clearing the district of the capital. The Germans have refused to do this, stating that it is absolutely necessary for them to keep under their control the exploitation of the petroleum fields because of the submarine war. They have stated that they would rather sacrifice the last man of the occupation than give this up.

In order to excite the Roumanians against the Entente, the Germans have told them that the Allied Powers are negotiating a separate peace with Austro-Hungary. In the Germanophile circles it is considered that in this case, as Roumania has been abandoned by

the Entente, the best thing to do is to come to an agreement with the Central Powers before the conclusion of the general peace.

The day after receiving this information I assured Mr. Marghiloman that Roumania would be well treated by the Entente, and that all she could receive would be at the hands of the Entente, as the Central Powers would have nothing to give.

CHAPTER XXV

GERMANS OFFER CONCESSIONS TO HASTEN RATIFICATION OF PEACE TREATY

(October 16, 1918)

THE Germans are trying to hasten exchange of the ratifications of the peace treaty. In order to obtain this, they offer Dobrudja, including the territory gained in 1914, the reestablishment of the old Carpathian frontier and acknowledgment of the union with Bessarabia.

The Marghiloman cabinet, pretending that Roumania has been abandoned by the Allies, the German information regarding the cession of part of Dobrudja to Bulgaria not having been denied, is willing to accept the German propositions. The Germanophile party state that the attitude of the Entente towards Roumania only proves that they have nothing more to expect, except from the side of the Central Powers. The king has given formal orders to Mr. Marghiloman to avoid the exchange of ratifications and to accept nothing from the Germans. He has stated that he would not sanction anything in that direction.

(October 22.) Roumanian opinion has been favorably impressed by the brief answer of Hungary to the Austrian federalization plan. But a communication of the 20th of this month, which states that the answer of President Wilson to Austria was much softer in tone and form than the note sent to Germany, produces a worse effect on account of the persistent silence of the Entente regarding their intentions towards Roumania, while they have issued statements in favor of all other nations.

Ever since I came to Jassy, Prime Minister Bratiano has repeatedly, through me, asked my government, and President Wilson personally, to confirm the promise that everything the Entente Powers have held out to Roumania will be granted to her. To all my correspondence, up to the 24th of October, 1918, the only answer has been that Roumania will lose none of her territory if she stays in the war with the Allies.

That was not satisfactory to the Roumanian government and people, as they claimed that they went to war for the purpose of freeing other Roumanians in Transylvania, Bukowina and Banat. They have made immense sacrifices, losing nearly 360,000 soldiers and about as many lives of civilians, which was more than one-tenth of the entire population of Roumania. From time to time, the Prime Minister asked my colleagues to try to obtain the promise from my government through their governments, but without success.

I personally was satisfied that the claims of Roumania were just, and I therefore telegraphed to my government several items, explaining the position of the Liberal and Take Jonsescu Conservative parties, who were our friends, and who were responsible to Roumania for the entrance into the war on the side of the Allies. I stated that if Roumania, after all her sacrifices, was to retain only her old territory, the people of Roumania would charge the Roumanian government, friends of the Allies, with treachery, because not only had they lost more than 700,000 lives in the war, but their debt was increased by many milliards of lei. I begged our government to consider this question, especially as the same was in conformity with President Wilson's fourteen points, as the majority of the population in Transylvania, Bukowina and Banat were Roumanian.



MIHAIL PHEREKYDE

The German propaganda takes advantage of the Entente silence to make the people believe that the Allies attempt to treat with Hungary to the detriment of Roumania. As we are still unable to give any satisfactory explanation, and cannot even refer to public statements of our governments, we cannot successfully fight against this campaign, which impresses even the most faithful friends of the Entente.

Mr. Bratiano himself stated that if, contrary to what he expected, the Entente do not carry out their engagements with Roumania, he and all the politicians who have been accused of having started the war at our request will be compelled to admit their error publicly, and give up their political careers. In conformity with our previous telegrams, we beg our governments to make a clear statement in order to bring an end to this campaign, which gravely injures our cause.

The fact that Roumania is actually governed by a Germanophile cabinet, imposed by the enemy, should not be reason to delay this statement. On the contrary, it is the absence of such a statement that gives the power to this cabinet. We beg to repeat that this cabinet will be replaced by Ententist members as soon as the king recovers his liberty to decide, and we call attention to the fact that there has been agitation on account of a telegram from the French government regarding Dobrudja. This telegram not only makes reference to the national aspirations of Roumania, but creates the understanding that their rights to Dobrudja, i. e., to its old territory, might be discussed at the general peace.

Several prominent Russians, among them the Minister of Russia and the Mayor of Odessa, have stated to us that the people in Ukrainia are terrorized at

the prospect of the Bolsheviki system that might follow the departure of the German troops, if they are not immediately replaced by Allied troops. Some murders have already been committed in the freed places. We think that in the interest of our future action in Russia, it will be necessary to make efforts to reply to this appeal, and reduce to the absolute minimum the delay between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies.

The help of the Roumanian troops has already been requested in case they shall be in a position to act with the Allied troops. But it is preferable, if possible, to hold the Roumanian troops for action in Austro-Hungary. Also, in regard to the Roumano-Russian hostility, the interference of the Roumanian troops might make worse the relations between the two countries, and would complicate the politics of the Entente. Furthermore, the moral effect of the presence of Allied troops would be much greater, and would permit the obtaining of good results with a relatively small number. The action of the Roumanian troops would only be in proportion with the actual troops.

Mr. Bratiano, who desires to give all the help to the Entente that he can, has stated that he would, in case of necessity, send part of the Roumanian troops to Russia under the control of the Allies. But we beg to insist upon the great advantage to Russia that would result from some of the Allied troops being sent there immediately, where they would get in touch with the voluntary army of General Alexeieff, which occupies the district of Rostow. This army has requested that ammunition be sent to Vovoromk as soon as possible. We recommend this request.

The Central Powers have requested the Roumanian government to make the following announcements:

- (1) To repudiate their claims on Transylvania.
- (2) To ask the maintaining of the German occupation troops.

The Central Powers have sent Russian and other agents to provoke trouble in order to justify this demand. The chief of these agents is Colonel Randa, ex-attaché militaire of Austria in Bucharest. He has considerable funds at his disposal, with the corrupting of the Transylvanian refugees in view and obtaining from them a statement of their friendship toward Austro-Hungary. The Maghiloman cabinet states that it is trying to gain time. If the Central Powers are successful in extorting the desired statements from the Roumanian government, these concessions should be considered as invalid.

The Germans urge the immediate exchange of ratifications. They maintain their offer of the cession of Dobrudja and the old frontier of the Carpathians, also recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia. But in case of refusal, they state that they will take the following steps:

- (1) Aggravation of the system of requisitions in the occupied territory.
- (2) Prohibition to pass from Moldavia to the occupied territory.
- (3) Occupation of the railroads in Bessarabia.
- (4) Invitation to Ukraina to claim Bessarabia by all their means.

The king has given orders to the Prime Minister to do everything possible to gain time, without giving an absolute refusal, and to base the exchange of ratifications

upon the removal of the Germans from part of the invaded territory.

The attitude of Germany regarding Bessarabia shows that they do not consider the will of the people, but only see in this an object for exchange. The king having secretly asked us for advice we have encouraged him to preserve this dilatory attitude. The situation of the troops in the Balkans, and also the views of our governments being ignored, we cannot afford to take the responsibility of encouraging resistance that might lead to the occupation of Moldavia, which would make any chance of mobilization absolutely impossible. We urge the necessity of granting no armistice except the removal of the German troops from the Roumanian territory be one of the conditions.

We are still unable to give the least indication as regards the views of our governments concerning their agreements with Roumania. We beg to repeat that in all the statements of the Entente, the national aspirations of Roumania have been omitted, that this exception cannot be understood here, and that it places us in a difficult position.

(*October 23.*) The local press has printed the following statement of the Roumanian National Committee of Transylvania, according to a telegram from Budapest:

“The executive committee of the National party have had, on October 12, a meeting at Cradia-Mare, in which it has been decided to adopt a statement by which the Roumanian nation, in the situation created by the World War, asserts the right to freely decide its destiny, with the other free nations.

“The national organization of the Roumanians in Hungary does not allow the government, nor the Magyar



ALEXANDER CONSTANTINESCU

parliament, nor any other foreign factor, to represent the interests of the nation of Roumania at the General Congress of Peace."

We refer to our telegram of August 27 as regards an invention for making bread. It has been impossible until now to send the inventors to London, and, in view of an eventual early peace, it leads us to think that it might no longer be necessary to consider this invention. The inventors are impatient. Any delay risks their patent rights, a risk they wish to avoid, unless it is proved that their invention can be useful to the Allies.

(*October 26.*) The statements of Mr. Take Jonescu regarding the approach of Roumanian interference have been reproduced, according to a Dutch newspaper, the "Telegraaf," by the press in Bucharest. The publishing of these statements is very imprudent, as anything justifying the defiance of the Germans can be their pretext for the occupation of Moldavia, which would reduce Roumania to complete incapacity and would complicate the task of the Allies.

Any reference made to the eventual interference of Roumania can only render this action more difficult, and perhaps impossible. We urge that the telegrams of the Allies should read accordingly. We beg to refer to the telegrams from Lyons on October 23 regarding the operations in Bulgaria, which mention an alliance with Roumania. It would have been better that the mission of General Berthelot had not been mentioned in the telegrams, as the matter has immediately been found out here.

There is a great desire for a clear understanding of the interference of Roumania as soon as it may be materially possible. It is feared that the Germans will

take advantage of the least pretext to occupy Moldavia, and also that the hostilities will cease before the Roumanians are able to satisfy their desire for vengeance in fighting again on the side of the Allies.

It is desirable not to excite the Roumanians, but rather to quiet them and to give them full assurance of the feelings of the Entente, as was done in the telegram from Lyons on the 22d of this month. It will also be necessary to blind the Germans as much as possible, so that Roumania can rise up at once to surprise them, instead of giving them a hint by early preparations.

It may not be forgotten that we are at present interned in an Austro-German camp, Moldavia being not only surrounded by enemy troops, but also controlled by the Germans or their agents, who are at the head of all services. The Roumanian army has been disorganized to such an extent that it would be impossible to resist even a small attack. On the other hand, nothing can be done without the help or the knowledge of the existing cabinet, and the replacement by an Ententist cabinet would certainly be considered by the Germans as a provocation, which should not happen before the right time. Until further orders, it will be necessary that any action be strictly secret.

It must be appreciated that under these conditions, the aid of Roumania cannot be but very weak. We leave it to our military attachés to indicate precisely the conditions. We must, however, repeat that the king, the politicians, and the generals indicated for command, have never considered the interference of Roumania as possible, unless the action of the Allied troops would prevent the Germans from hindering the mobilization.

Once this result is obtained, the importance of the Roumanian military force will rapidly develop. This force will gradually reach the number of 400,000 men, as the territory is freed from the occupation.

Under these circumstances, the interference of Roumania offers us advantages for our future operations. But it would be an embarrassment for the Allies, and a cause of weakness, if it is started too early or found out, i. e., before the communication with the Allied troops is absolutely certain, and would only have the result of giving the Germans a reason to occupy Moldavia. In this case the Allies would have to conquer the whole country; the enemy would be in a position to get hold of all the railroad material which is accumulated there, which would be of great necessity to the Allies in Austro-Hungary; and if the war lasts, the enemy would have the benefit of the next crop.

We wish to impress the importance of the following:

(1) To avoid anything that might enable the enemy to find out our intentions in respect to the mobilization in Moldavia.

(2) To take into account, in the elaboration of the plan of the Allies, the fact that, Moldavia being actually at the mercy of the Germans, the mobilization is to be preceded by an Inter-Allied action in order to give them the necessary freedom of operation, so as not to expose them to a useless disaster, which would be both morally and materially detrimental to our cause.

(3) To give to the Chief Commander of the Allied troops the means to insure the help of all Roumanian forces in organizing as soon as possible a powerful offensive, which should be sufficiently efficient to prevent the enemy from having time to eliminate the existing

elements for mobilization, or to send to Germany the troops in Walachia.

In requesting our governments not to fail to do everything possible to reduce the risks of the Roumanian interference, and to insure its efficiency, we must consider the hypothesis that if contrary to all calculations the Germans should decide to occupy Moldavia anyhow. In this case, we believe we act according to the view of our governments in advising the king to resist at any cost, if the military authorities think this will be possible.

(*October 27.*) We learn from a reliable source that the Austrian functioners of the Danube commission, who were living at Sulina, have been sent back to their country.

The newspapers in Bucharest are taking advantage, against the Allies, of a telegram from Paris, published by the "Gazette de Lausanne," according to which the pourparlers have started, under the control of the Entente, between Bulgaria and Roumania, looking toward settlement of the question of the Dobrudja. It will be necessary to make a clear statement in order to stop this campaign.

However, the tone of the press of Bucharest has become less dangerous since the telegram from Lyons of the 22d of this month has made a favorable impression in interpreting the statement of President Wilson in such a way as to indicate that the Italian and Roumanian populations, which had not been mentioned, will get back their country. The best means to fight this propaganda is to confirm the foregoing.

(*October 30.*) The king has notified us that the Germans demand the immediate exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Bucharest. They threaten, in case of



GENERAL AVERESCU

another postponement, to completely starve the population of the occupied territory, and to treat the Roumanians as belligerents. On the other hand, the Germans state that they are still disposed, in case of immediate ratification, to restore the Dobrudja and the old frontier of the Carpathians, but they make no allusion to the evacuation of Roumania. Notwithstanding the insistence of the Marghiloman cabinet for acceptance of these conditions, the king has opposed a curt refusal.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has revealed his views to the English Minister. Very desirous not to injure the Entente, he wishes that the exchange of ratifications may be effected with the consent of the Allies, but he insists that a refusal will result in new sufferings for the people. However, he adds that the exchange of ratifications should be effected with the understanding that Germany will admit the revision of the treaty at the conclusion of the general peace.

We do not know whether the Germans are prepared to accept this restriction, which seems practically to take away the value of the desired action, except for a moral effect. In conformity with the demand made on our colleague, the English Minister, we beg to inform our governments of this interview, using the means which has again been granted to us for this special case, to correspond in cipher by the wireless. Their reply can be sent to us in the same way. Our colleague has replied, dwelling upon the bad effect that would be produced by the exchange of ratifications in the present circumstances.

With the exception of the Marghiloman cabinet, the king and the Ententist politicians are more than ever of the opinion that it is necessary to delay as much

as possible the exchange of ratifications, except in case it be the only means of avoiding the occupation of Moldavia, and the death of all hope of a new interference on the part of Roumania.

In accord with all Ententist politicians, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has requested that we obtain assurance from our governments that the armistice be granted only on condition that Roumania first be freed of the German occupation.

To prevent, as much as possible, the Germans resorting to new violence in order to obtain immediate ratifications, it will be necessary to denounce, with the greatest publicity possible, the difference between their demands of Roumania, and their general attitude, especially regarding the acceptance of the program of President Wilson, and their statement, according to which the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest should not make any difference at the general peace.

The requisitions are being effected with more brutality than ever. Cases are mentioned in which mothers commit suicide in the presence of German officers, because they are unable to feed their children. In fact, the Germans are systematically creating anarchy in Roumania, even opening up Bolshevik schools. They try by this to make any mobilization impossible, and to provoke a request for the maintaining of the German troops in the occupied territory, so as to repress any movements they endeavor to prepare. Until now this campaign has had no effect.

We urge the necessity, in the armistice conditions, not only of mentioning the removal of all occupation troops from Roumania but also of accenting the promise that the atrocities committed shall not go unpunished.

We ask our governments to let us know if their manner of considering the ratification is in conformity with the advice expressed by us. We request them also to give us instructions regarding the different questions which we have submitted to them in our previous telegrams, to which we have never received a reply.

(*November 2.*) As the Germans are trying to place the responsibility on the Allies for the destruction and disaster of which Roumania has become the victim, we have addressed the following note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“We have been informed of the cruel conditions of which Roumania is the victim between the Central Powers and the Allied troops, resulting from the German command having placed batteries in the cities nearest to the front, which made it necessary for the Allies to do the same.

“Thus, notwithstanding the essential principles of the rights of the people, and without taking into account the state of neutrality proclaimed by the Roumanian government, the Central Powers transform the occupied districts into battlefields. In these circumstances the Central Powers are responsible for the destruction incurred by this new violation of rights.

“We have thus the right, in the name of our governments, to decline any responsibility in connection with war acts, which are not being imposed by the presence of any enemy in the Roumanian territory, and which would end immediately in case of removal of the troops.”

In order to impress the Roumanians favorably, and to counteract the German propaganda, it will be necessary to make, without further delay, the statement requested in our previous telegrams regarding the

responsibility of Germany for any ravages committed in Roumania.

(*November 4.*) The Germans are executing their threats to starve the population in the occupied territory. Thus, in robbing the country, they create a state of misery and revolt, which is very favorable to their Bolshevik propaganda, designed to make mobilization impossible and to complicate the task of our troops when they enter the Roumanian territory.

Referring to our different telegrams which we have addressed to our governments since June 23 regarding the necessity of sending food to Roumania, we urge that immediate steps be taken in furtherance of this aid, which is needed as much in the interests of the Allies as for humane considerations. Concerning the quantity and nature of foods to be sent, we have left it to our United States colleague to give the necessary details to our governments.



SMALL STEAMER "RANNEFJORD," WHICH BROUGHT MINISTER
VOPICKA FROM NORWAY TO AMERICA



JASSY, MOLDAVIA

CHAPTER XXVI

ADVICE TO BESSARABIANS SECURING JUSTICE FOR JEWS IN ROUMANIA

(November 6, 1918)

AS the king considers that in the present situation he has sufficient freedom of action to compel the Marghiloman cabinet to resign, he has submitted the matter to us. We have considered it preferable, the same as he, that a cabinet of politicians under the presidency of Mr. Bratiano be not yet constituted.

The formation of such a government would be understood by the Germans as a breaking off of relations, and might provoke action on their side that will render all chances of mobilization impossible, and which the Roumanian government would not be in a position to resist. The impression has even been produced that the Turkish armistice makes the local situation more difficult, as the German troops are said to be discharging arms at Constanza and Odessa. As we are not aware of the intentions of the staff of the armies of the Orient, we are not in a position to modify this impression.

On the other hand, that which is of greatest importance in such a difficult situation, in view of the exterior and interior conditions, is that the new government, after the resignation of Marghiloman, will immediately function energetically. The king and Mr. Bratiano, who are anxious to form a national ministry, have not been able to effect an agreement between the different Ententist parties, the rivalry between whom is stronger than ever. The task of the king is being complicated by the attitude of General Averescu.

A temporary ministry seems the only one to meet the exigencies of the situation. This ministry, composed exclusively of generals and functioners, would have their admitted program to maintain order. In fact, according to instructions from the king, and under the secret direction of Mr. Bratiano, they would immediately take all necessary measures for the preparation of mobilization, and to insure, at the right time, proper action under the presidency of Mr. Bratiano.

After the Roumanians had united with the Bessarabians, many people of Bessarabia, property owners and Jews, came to our Legation in Jassy, and asked me to visit Kishenev to see for myself that their charges against the Roumanians were true. So at the beginning of November, 1918, I, together with our military attaché, took a flying trip to that city.

Bessarabia at present has 2,700,000 inhabitants, of which 2,000,000 are Roumanians but call themselves Moldavians, and about 700,000 are Germans, Russians, Jews, Bulgarians, Bohemians, Greeks and people of other nationalities, living in different parts of the country. After Roumania was joined by Bessarabia, many officers in different departments of the Bessarabian government were replaced by the Roumanians, and that accounts for the great enmity of the Russians and Russian Jews, who formerly held many of these positions.

The pro-Russians claimed that their liberty was taken away from them, that they could not hold meetings, that every nine people who wished to come together had to have permission from the government, and that the teaching of the Russian language was stopped and replaced by the Roumanian language in all the schools.

When I arrived at Kishenev, many persons came to the hotel where I stopped, and talked about their grievances against Roumania. On the other hand, when I visited the Governor, General Vaitoianu, he told me that all these complaints were without merit or foundation, and that everybody was treated right in Bessarabia. To prove that this statement was true, he took us to the first village, probably an hour's distance from Kishenev, and there we found at the Town Hall many people awaiting us. The Governor asked them in my presence different questions, and a Bessarabian soldier, who had fought in the Roumanian army, and who was now discharged and returned to his village, answered, "The people here are for complete autonomy, and not a partial autonomy, which we are now getting from the Roumanians." This remark, of course, was not to the Governor's liking.

The same day I was invited to a luncheon given by the Governor in the State House, to which also was invited a committee of large property owners of Bessarabia. After the lunch these men complained to me that Roumania was seeking to divide the land among the peasants. They claimed that if the lands were cut up in small holdings, nothing would be exported from Bessarabia, because the farmers would plant only what they needed for themselves, not caring anything about exports. They asked for my opinion. I answered them:

"Privately, I believe that you should subdivide your land, and receive payment from the government according to the system now adopted in Roumania. You asked for protection against Bolshevism when there was danger that the Bolsheviki would take everything from

you. The Roumanians protected you, and now when the government wants to do away with the reasons for Bolshevism, and wishes to divide your land, you object. Don't you think that your life and property will be safer without Bolshevism and under the protection of the Roumanian government?"

They adjourned their meeting without making any definite decision. Of course the majority of them preferred to belong to Russia if the Bolsheviki were not in control there.

The next day we were invited by General Vaitoianu to the University, where the Bessarabians arranged a great celebration over the year's duration of autonomy in Bessarabia. About two thousand people were present. All the professors, students, and prominent men and women of the city and country were there, and speeches were made in nearly all languages. The autonomy was praised enthusiastically.

At the end of the meeting, the people began to call for me. I declined to talk, but when a committee of ladies and the bishop came to me, and asked me to say a few words, I got up and said that I wished that all the Roumanian aspirations might be realized. I spoke in English, and I do not believe that twenty-five people understood what I said, but I spoke English purposely because all the other languages of the Allies were spoken there, and I thought that my country's language should also be heard.

In the evening I accepted an invitation from the Czecho-Slovak colony to visit them. When I arrived, in company of General Vaitoianu, Governor of Bessarabia, we found in the hall a lot of people, including many young ladies, all in white, who immediately com-



THE FOUR ALLIED MINISTERS AT JASSY
SIR GEORGE BARCLAY OF ENGLAND, CHARLES J. VOPICKA OF THE UNITED STATES,
COUNT DE SAINT AULAIRE OF FRANCE, AND BARON FASCIOTTI OF ITALY

menced to sing national songs, Czecho-Slovak, American and Roumanian. Speeches were made by several, among them General Vaitoianu and myself. The Czecho-Slovaks, under the leadership of Captain Cerensky, were glad that I brought the governor with me, as that gave them an assurance that they would be well treated.

While it was not decided positively in February, 1918, as to where the Czecho-Slovak army then at Zitimir and Kiev would be sent, it was hoped that they would come to Roumania and Bessarabia, and Captain Cerensky made preparation for their accommodations. He also arranged for the hiring of other Czecho-Slovaks from Southern Russia, who should report to Major General Trojanov (Pragen), to reinforce the Roumanians on the border of Southern Ukrainia against the Germans. He was financed by the French military attaché, who did this at my suggestion. Captain Cerensky had a very good organization, but before he could use it the war ended.

Couriers were frequently sent from the Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia, who passed through Jassy on their way to Prague, where they delivered their reports to their government. Naturally, as they had to pass through the Bolshevik lines, they had to be effectively disguised. These men would call on me at the Legation in Jassy, and at first it was surprising and even somewhat alarming, when Lieutenant somebody of the Czecho-Slovak army was announced, to be confronted by a ragged, dirty, unshaved individual personifying Bolshevism to the limit. But he would make a rip somewhere in his clothing and produce a little wad of paper, which, being unrolled, would prove to be credentials issued by the proper authorities, and I soon became accustomed to these unkempt visitors.

The next day we returned to Bucharest. To my astonishment, I received newspapers of Kishenev in which it was stated that I had promised to the Roumanians that the United States would give them everything they wanted, and on the strength of this, the Senate and the House of Deputies had passed resolutions personally thanking my country and President Wilson and myself for this great favor.

I immediately went to the king and told him that this proceeding in the parliament was not proper, and that I had not expected that anything like this would be allowed by the officers of the parliament without first consulting me. I then published in the papers what I really had said, which was of course different from the report brought by the Kishenev papers.

To my great pleasure, two days after my return, I received a telegram from my government, in which the government consented to giving Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat to Roumania, as it was proved to our government that the great majority of the people living in these three counties were Roumanians. So the news from Kishenev, although false at first, was true after all.

The announcement was not made by me, but by my government in Washington. At the same time the Roumanian *chargé d'affaires* telegraphed the happy news to the Roumanian government in Jassy. The king sent a telegram of thanks to Washington, and the queen thanked me personally, and sent me her picture, on which she wrote, "Thanks to Mr. Vopicka for the work he has done for Roumania." The military band and crowds of people came to the Legation and cheered for the United States, for President Wilson and for myself. It was the happiest day of their existence.

Many streets in the principal cities in Roumania were named after President Wilson, many restaurants and hotels changed their names to Wilson, and many babies were christened Wilson.

Of course, at that time the Roumanians did not know whether the whole of Banat was given to them, or only part, and they were celebrating as if it were the whole. When, later on, it was found that that part called Torondal was given to Serbia by the Peace Commission, they were surprised and angry. They claimed that Banat had a majority of Roumanians, and that they should therefore receive Banat entirely.

While it is probable that if a vote had been taken throughout the whole of Banat, the majority would have been for Roumania, the Peace Commission decided that Banat should be divided into two parts, Torondal, situated directly opposite Belgrade, the Serbian Capitol, where the majority of the people were Serbians, and the remainder comprising another part which was overwhelmingly Roumanian. After this decision was made by the Peace Commission, the Roumanians began to object; public meetings were held everywhere, and protests sent to Paris. The people who were most opposed to the division were the Transylvanians.

Many reasons were given why Torondal should belong to Roumania. As a matter of fact, Torondal is the richest part of Banat, and the richest agricultural section in Europe, and therefore it is no wonder that such a great fight was made for it. Threats were made against the Serbians that they would be attacked by the Roumanians if they did not cease their claims to Torondal, and the controversy became one of the reasons why the Roumanian Liberal government resigned.

For a time the situation was so acute that there was danger of breaking relations between the Allies and Roumania.

The Roumanians put all the blame for the division on President Wilson, claiming that the French and English representatives had so informed them. I had daily arguments with them, claiming that the whole Peace Commission was responsible for it, because the Commission consisted of representatives of all the Allies, so that all the Allies were equally responsible and not the Americans alone.

(*November 6.*) We have remitted the following note to Mr. Marghiloman:

“According to information worthy of belief, a train loaded with ammunition destined to the occupied territory, was recently made ready to be dispatched. It is our duty to call the most serious attention of the Roumanian government to the fact that it would be a great responsibility for them, in the new situation resulting from the fighting of the Allied troops and the German troops in the occupied territory, if they should indirectly help the enemy or fail to prevent, by every means in their power, any action of the Central Powers which, by threatening the public order in Roumania, would risk bringing on counteraction by the Allies.

“We consider as dangerous the audacious propaganda undertaken by the Austro-German agents, in the occupied territory as well as in Moldavia, intended to create a state of anarchy which would complicate the task of the Allies the day the necessities of the war compel them to enter the occupied territory to follow the enemy. In case the most energetic means are not used to stop



RECEPTION BY KING FERDINAND I OF ROUMANIA, OF AMERICAN MINISTER VOPICKA, MILITARY ATTACHÉ COLONEL YATES, AND COLONEL ANDERSON OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS, ON THE STEPS OF THE ROYAL PALACE IN JASSY

this propaganda, we will decline any responsibility as regards the steps taken by the staff of the Allied troops in this matter."

The tone of this document was intended to give the Marghiloman cabinet a reason for resisting the demands and actions of the Germans, and also to make the situation of the cabinet unstable, in anticipation of the formation of an Ententist government. The Marghiloman cabinet had entirely ceased, for some time, sending to the occupied territory ammunition for the Roumanian detachments, as called for in the treaty of Bucharest.

As regards the Bolshevik propaganda, Mr. Marghiloman is suspected of resisting it indifferently. This tolerance is explained by the desire to placate General Averescu, who enjoys great popularity among the peasants and laborers. Mr. Marghiloman's acts are merely to outdo Mr. Bratiano, who would be dangerous to the Marghiloman party. General Averescu shows Ententist leanings, notwithstanding he is being backed by the press of Bucharest. This attitude of his seems to indicate that he is still in some kind of an understanding with von Mackensen.

In the new situation, now that Roumania is about to be freed by the Allied troops, the Entente cannot agree that the government should effect international acts of importance without their consent, even though it is alleged that they have obtained privileges from the Germans, these privileges being really due to the victory of the Allies. This is an unamicable proceeding, which tends to mislead the public regarding the real causes of the legitimate satisfaction that Roumania is expecting for her sacrifices in the interests of the Entente. In these circumstances, the Allies can in no way trust the existing government.

The Marghiloman cabinet has resigned in consequence, and has been immediately replaced by a ministry of generals and functioners under the presidency of General Coanda, who is also Minister of Foreign Affairs. General Grigoresco has been appointed Minister of War, and General Vaitoianu Minister of the Interior.

General Coanda has immediately gotten in touch with us. He states that the king had given him instructions that he should only act in accordance with us. As regards the sending of police troops to Bukowina, we have given our consent, as this is absolutely necessary in fighting against the Bolshevik propaganda during the Roumanian mobilization.

General Coanda states that von Mackensen has notified him that if the retreat of the German troops was in any way being hindered by the Allies or the Roumanians, he would proceed with plans of destruction, and that all necessary measures had been taken to this effect. It is our duty to repeat once more that our request in regard to preventing as much as possible the devastations of the enemy in Roumania has never been answered. General Coanda has added that without openly breaking off with the Germans, who are still masters of the present local situation, he is urging the preparations for mobilization in the hope that, with the help of the Allied troops, they might be able to prevent the retreat of the Germans.

The Prime Minister has called our attention to the food situation, and has requested us to obtain immediate aid from our governments in order to remedy the conditions of famine created by the Germans. As regards the indicated quantities needed and the means of effecting this aid, the Minister of the United States

has sent another telegram to his government, whose aid seems the most imperative. Likewise, the French Minister has brought the matter to the attention of the armies of the Orient, requesting them to send immediately whatever they can. Confirming our previous unanswered telegrams regarding the matter of responsibility of the Entente, if they do not quickly remedy the sufferings of Roumania, due to having fought on our side, the Roumanians will soon be unable to give us any help whatever.

(*November 7.*) The king has expressed his desire to justify the resignation of the Marghiloman cabinet by the actions of the Entente, and we have remitted to him a statement of our last grievance, i. e., the sending to Bukowina, without our consent, of police troops at the request of the National Committee of that province, for the purpose of keeping order against the Bolsheviki.

(*November 8.*) Von Mackensen has informed the Roumanian government that after the city of Constanza had been cleared of the German troops, it was occupied by the Bulgarian troops. We request that this news, which produces the most disastrous impression and is absolutely contrary to our official statements, especially to the statement made by the English Minister in accordance with his instructions, be immediately denied or explained.

In this case, it will be necessary to take into account the indications we have given in our previous telegrams regarding the precautions to be taken to weaken the effect made by the presence of Bulgarian troops in Dobrudja, if for military reasons their provisional help cannot be avoided. We also request that in case such decisions have to be taken, we are immediately

informed and furnished explanations, in order to avoid as much as possible a bad impression. In the same statement, von Mackensen has repeated and emphasized his former threats of destruction if the retreating German troops are molested by the Allies or the Roumanians.

Before I left for my post, in 1913, I was visited by many prominent Jews of America, and before my departure I had a conference with the Jewish leaders in New York, regarding the condition of the Jews in Roumania. They all complained that the Roumanian Jews were regarded and treated as slaves, that our country was disposed to better those conditions, and that under the leadership of America the Jewish question should be settled, so that the Jews would obtain not only their liberty but equality with the other inhabitants of Roumania.

Soon after I arrived in Bucharest and had been received as Minister of the United States to Roumania, I began an investigation to ascertain why so few Jewish subjects of that country were permitted to become citizens, and why so much ill feeling existed against them. I even spoke to King Carol and to the present King Ferdinand concerning it. King Carol said to me:

“The Jews are better educated than the Roumanians, so we must first build schools where our own people may be taught. Then in twenty years the Roumanians will be well enough educated to vote on the question of whether or not the Jews shall be admitted to citizenship.”

To this I answered: “That is too long a time. Neither you nor I will have a chance to see that reform.”

When Roumania entered the war, in August, 1916,



PRINCESS ELISABETH OF ROUMANIA WITH PROMINENT ROUMANIAN LADIES AS HOSPITAL ATTENDANTS
AT HER HOSPITAL IN JASSY, WITH MINISTER VOPICKA AND COLONEL ANDERSON OF THE AMERICAN
RED CROSS

the Jewish question became more acute than ever, for many Jews were charged with being German spies, and many were arrested and interned and their property confiscated. I took the part of the Jews, defended them before the Roumanian government, and succeeded in having many of them freed and their property returned to them.

The most important matter in connection with the Jewish situation developed in 1917, when the seat of the Roumanian government was in Jassy. When I arrived there, September 16, Mr. Moritz Wachtel, President of the Banca Moldavia, informed me that he could furnish proof that Jewish soldiers in the Roumanian service were taken from their various regiments and placed in the front lines, so that they would be the first to get killed; also that they were inhumanly treated by Roumanian officers and soldiers alike, and that they failed to receive advancement or any reward for heroic conduct. On the other hand, Prime Minister Bratiano and other Roumanian officials complained that many Jewish soldiers were deserters and German spies.

The king told me that he would favor a decree conferring citizenship on all Jews serving in the army, but at the same time he stated that many Jewish soldiers were deserters. I suggested that if they were given equal rights it might not be so. Later, I investigated these charges and countercharges and became satisfied that the Jewish soldiers were badly treated by some officers, and also that the accusation that many of them were deserters was true.

Early in November, 1918, information reached me that the Roumanians were preparing a pogrom to start on the 12th of that month. A young lawyer from

Bucharest sent me a letter in which he appealed to me to use what influence I had to stop the threatened pogrom. When I was convinced that I had sufficient evidence to justify prompt action, I prepared a letter to the Prime Minister, General Coanda, in which I called attention to the expected pogrom, and asked that he take steps to stop it at once. To assure prompt compliance, I delivered the letter personally, and I told the Minister that my country had entered the war solely for the sake of humanity, that if Roumania should start killing the Jews, she should not expect anything from the Peace Conference, and that most likely I would be obliged to quit my post, as my government would not overlook such an outrage.

General Coanda assured me he would do everything in his power to avert the massacre, that he would immediately give orders by telegraph, and that where there was no telegraphic communication he would send messengers. A few weeks later he told me that the Germans had made the preparations for the pogrom in order to discredit Roumania before the world and the Peace Conference. Pogroms were started on the 12th of November in Braila and Bucharest, but were suppressed by the military authorities.

Whenever I had a chance to speak to the king or to the Roumanian ministers concerning the Jews, I urged that citizenship and equal rights be given them, and argued that that course would be the best, not only for them, but also for Roumania. A decree finally was proclaimed, purporting to confer such rights, and I submitted it for an opinion to my counsel, who reported that it contained what some people are pleased to term a "joker," and that it was of very little, if any, value.

I therefore suggested to the Jewish Committee that the members call upon the Prime Minister, and ask for a new decree which would be so clear as not to be subject to an unfavorable construction. I also appealed to the government. In the early part of May, 1919, the new decree was issued, and this, according to the opinion of a Jewish lawyer and the Jewish Committee, was clear and satisfactory, assuring citizenship to all Jews born in Roumania and equal rights with other subjects of that country.

During the war, the Jews, like the other inhabitants of Moldavia, especially in Jassy, suffered from scarcity of food, and at this critical time the American Joint Distribution Committee of New York came to their rescue, and sent them many thousands of dollars, with which provisions were bought under my supervision. This society deserves great credit for the diminution of misery among the Jews at that time.

In the month of December I received a cable from the Department of State at Washington, instructing me to investigate a report that a new pogrom against the Jews was to be started in Bessarabia. I immediately sent two men to investigate, and they informed me that there were no indications of any trouble. After receiving this report, I laid the matter before King Ferdinand, who assured me that the Bessarabian Jews had no reason to be fearful, and that all precautionary measures necessary for their future protection would be taken. This was satisfactory to me, and, in fact, no trouble occurred.

CHAPTER XXV

KING FERDINAND CABLES PRESIDENT WILSON — CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES

AFTER November 1, 1918, I frequently talked the military situation over with Colonel Yates, our military attaché. We both agreed that Roumania should enter the war again for the benefit of the Allies. After the resignation of the Marghiloman cabinet, there was nothing to keep the Roumanians from adopting this course, and I therefore obtained an audience with the King on November 9, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, in which I stated that it was not only in the interest of the Allies, but for the great interest of Roumania as well, to enter the war again before the armistice, of which there was now so much talk.

The king thought well of it and called in Prince Stirbey, with whom he usually conferred. After an hour of consideration, it was agreed that a meeting of the Entente ministers and the Prime Minister be called for 6 o'clock the same evening. The meeting was held at 6:30, and it was decided to immediately give the Germans twenty-four hours' notice, and that after the expiration of that time Roumania would consider herself at war again with the Central Powers.

This was done with enthusiasm, which was greatly accentuated when the French Minister announced the receipt of a telegram notifying him of the arrival at the Danube River of the Allied troops under command of General Berthelot, who was known to be a staunch friend of Roumania. At the same time mobilization of



QUEEN MARIE AT THE CANTEEN OF THE
AMERICAN RED CROSS IN JASSY WITH COLONEL
ANDERSON



MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS COMMISSION, AND
DOCTORS AND NURSES FOR ROUMANIA, AT JASSY

the army was ordered, so Roumania had actually re-entered the war before the general armistice.

The new declaration of war was a great surprise to the Germans in Bucharest, who seemed to think their position there absolutely secure. They had arranged for a repetition of a performance the following day in the Roumanian National Theatre but it was never given, as the troops were in too great haste to leave the city.

The king's joy was great, and he sent the following telegram to our President:

MR. WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON.

At the same time that we received your government's wonderful message concerning Roumania and the Roumanian people, we heard of the Allied troops' arrival on the Danube. After long and unheard of sufferings and humiliations, we are at last able to act again.

The Roumanian people have taken up their arms, and with the support of their faithful Allies they are looking forward to accomplishing their national ideal.

In these moments our grateful thoughts are directed towards America, who entered this war for the cause of justice and humanity of all nations.

FERDINAND.

On the 10th of November I was awakened early in the morning by the music of a military band and the noise of a great crowd, who congregated before the Legation and cheered for the United States, President Wilson and myself. Later in the day I was invited by the French Minister to come to his Legation, and there I met the Ministers of Great Britain and Italy. On the outside the band was playing and speeches were made.

All were filled with joy that mobilization was actually ordered, and that the Roumanians were again to march

with the Allies, and we, the four Allied ministers, realized that the Roumanians had moral and political right behind their claims, for Roumania had done all in her power to aid the Allies in the great war, and had helped them to gain the victory.

The king had immediately answered the appeal of General Berthelot, without hesitation and without awaiting the further news that the Danube had been crossed by the Allied troops.

We realized that in the present miserable state of Roumania, the immediate value of the mobilization was mainly its moral effect. But we believed that as the Allies were gradually able to aid them, the Roumanian help would become of great importance.

Late in the afternoon of November 11, the wireless gave us the glad tidings of the armistice. Immediately all else was forgotten, and the people poured into the streets from the public buildings and offices, and from their homes. Parades were formed, bands played and the people sang and cheered. Owing to the abruptness of the announcement, there was but little opportunity for orderly demonstration, but there was no friction, as all were too happy to care how much they were pushed and jostled.

There was but one note of disappointment, and that was that the enemy would probably not receive adequate punishment for the suffering the Roumanians had undergone. Bratiano and Take Jonsescu voiced the popular sentiment of all Roumania when they stated that instead of an armistice, it would have been far better if the Allies had marched their armies to Berlin.

(*November 13.*) We, the four Ministers of the Allies, have sent to the Peace Commission our views as follows.

As regards the peace conditions the preliminary points to which the agreement of the Allies should be obtained are:

(1) Unity of representation of Russia at the Peace Conference, with exclusion of the Bolshevik delegates and territorial groups who have other views than the aim of the voluntary army.

(2) Annulment of political and economical treaties with Germany and her allies; reestablishment of the rights that have been attacked by these treaties; indemnity of damages caused in this way; restitution of the gold, the military and commercial fleet, the equipment, railroad material, etc., and the sending of exports of foods and material from Russia. This demand does not regard the treaties with the Entente Powers.

(3) Removal of the troops of Germany and her allies from the Russian territory according to the borders in 1914, including Finland. It is also considered wise to make a similar demand as regards Poland.

(4) The occupation of the principal railroad centers and other places of military importance in the Russian territory, now occupied by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, by Russian forces, or provisionally by the Allies until the necessary Russian detachments have been formed.

(5) The immediate exchange of prisoners.

(6) The engagement on the part of Germany and her allies not to prevent in any way the reestablishment of a strong and lasting State organization in Russia.

Mr. Poklewsky, Minister of Russia, has been introduced to us as a representative of the voluntary army formed by Alexeieff, at present under the command of General Denikine. We understand that this army is the

only national force that can be a basis for the reconstitution of Russia with the help of the Entente.

Mr. Poklewsky states that it is absolutely necessary for Allied troops to be sent to Russia, and especially to Ukrainia, as quickly as possible after the departure of the German troops, in order to check the spread of Bolshevism. The Ukrainians are in deadly fear of this element.

The Roumanian government has stopped all movements of troops at the time stipulated by Marshal Foch. This order has been maintained wherever there were enemy military forces, but the government has notified us of the necessity of interfering wherever anarchy has been created by the Germans, where the Roumanian population asks for help, especially in Bukowina and Transylvania, where excesses have been committed by the Austrian and Hungarian Bolsheviki. We have advised the Roumanian government that the order of Marshal Foch applied only to strictly military operations and not to police operations.

(*November 20.*) The Committee of Dobrudja has sent us an address requesting our intercedence with our governments to hurry the departure of the Bulgarian troops and authorities from Dobrudja, in order to make it possible for the refugee population in Moldavia and Bessarabia to return to their homes.

The delegates of the National Committee of Transylvania have come to Jassy to notify us, and also the Roumanian government, of their decision to proclaim their union with Roumania as soon as the Transylvania unities which are being formed shall be strong enough for protection against the Hungarian troops.

A new appeal to our governments by the Russian



FIRST TRIP OF MINISTER VOPICKA TO ADDRESS THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS NEAR GALATZ, ROUMANIA, WITH ROUMANIAN MINISTER A. CONSTANTINESCU, AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHÉ COLONEL YATES, COLONEL GLASCOW AND MAJOR FLEXNER, MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS, WITH GENERALS AND OFFICERS OF ROUMANIAN AND RUSSIAN ARMIES



RUSSIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AT AJUD, ROUMANIA

delegates has been received. We again urge the necessity of interference. This will prove easier and more efficient if effected as soon as possible.

We have advised our governments as follows:

(1) That the Ukrainians have organized a rebellion in the district of Kiev in which nationalists, anarchists and Bolsheviki have taken part.

(2) That this rebellion is the more dangerous, because, owing to the complete disintegration of the Austro-German troops, the invasion of the Bolshevik army in the country might spread considerably.

(3) That the Bolshevik troops threaten especially the northern border of Ukraina.

(4) That in case of the realization of this threat the rich collieries of the Don district, which are of the greatest importance to the transportation lines, also the factories and military depots, will consequently fall into the hands of the Bolsheviki, which might result in the complete control of Ukraina by the Bolsheviki.

We think it will be necessary to take the following steps:

(1) To send immediately Inter-Allied troops, even a small number will be sufficient, to occupy Kiev and Charkow.

(2) To make a clear statement conveying the firm decision of the Allies to help the orderly elements in Russia.

(3) To advise the German government that the Allies will hold the Germans responsible for any aid to the rebellious troops, either by selling or giving them arms, or for any attempt to use the arms at the depot of Kiev.

Failing immediate action to suppress the rebellion

with greater forces within a short time, this situation might require a campaign lasting several months.

(*November 21.*) The Roumanian government has delivered us the following, with a request to transmit it to our governments:

“The German troops that are still in Roumania do not respect the conditions imposed by the armistice, in fact, said troops are devastating the territory they leave, and especially they blow up the bridges, thus rendering the communications and the feeding of the population impossible. In the occupied territory they are taking away all provisions, furniture, and animals. These things which are being taken away from the poor population are being sold in Transylvania.”

In consequence, the Roumanian government requests our governments to put in a protest to this effect with the German government, and get them to consent that a commission be formed, composed of Allied and Roumanian officers, to watch the retreat of the German troops in Transylvania, in order to avoid the repetition of the above mentioned.

The following note has been received from the Roumanian government:

“The Roumanian government has been delighted to see in the assurances relative to Dobrudja the favorable intentions and feelings of the Allies towards Roumania.

“Roumania has never feared that any part of her territory might be sacrificed to the benefit of the enemy on the day of the victory of the Entente, because she remained on the side of the Allies even in the most trying moments. The immediate nullification of the treaty of Bucharest confirmed our confidence.

“We watch with gratitude the friendly efforts with which the Inter-Allied staff endeavor to hasten the liberation of the Northern province from the invaders, who have destroyed the work of half a century of civilization by fire, blood and robbery.

“It is, however, necessary to extend without delay, in conformity with the conditions of the general armistice, the measures *extended by the Allied command to the territory of the country in 1914.*

“The interests of the people demand the prompt return of civic administrations in the whole province, as prescribed by the armistice conditions for all the countries freed of the enemy.

“It is just and natural that the Roumanian army should participate in the execution of the necessary measures for this operation and help the Allied command therein, as it would be a great danger if the available troops were not sufficient.

“To this effect, the staff of the Roumanian troops has received orders to take the necessary steps in order to act with the Allied troops.”

(*November 22.*) The Hetman of Ukrainia has asked us to notify our governments that he has issued a manifesto to the people of Ukrainia, to unite all the national forces in working for the reconstruction of Russia on the basis of Federal arrangements.

(*November 24.*) We have held a meeting with the Russian delegates, who inform us that it is absolutely necessary that about 150,000 men should be sent immediately to Russia to reinforce Denikine's army.

(*November 26.*) The Roumanian government has complained to us that the manner in which the Russian prisoners from Germany are sent through their country

is very dangerous, because these prisoners are in a state of indescribable misery, all of them either suffering from contagious diseases or in such a condition that they should not be allowed to travel at all, and the government has asked us to intervene with the German authorities, in order that these transports shall be made under better circumstances.



MINISTER VOPICKA SPEAKING TO RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN
SUCCAVA, ASKING THEM TO REMAIN IN THE TRENCHES
AND KEEP ON FIGHTING



MINISTER VOPICKA ADDRESSING RUSSIAN SOLDIERS



SCENE ON THE WAY TO THE TRENCHES OCCUPIED BY
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN ROUMANIA

CHAPTER XXVIII

PROCLAMATION IN BUCHAREST OF GENERAL BERTHELOT — GREAT DANGER OF FAMINE

TO celebrate the victory of the Entente, I had arranged a dinner for Thanksgiving Day, November 28, to which I invited Her Majesty the Queen, and I had a promise from her that she would attend. However, at eleven o'clock on that day, I was notified that I must be at the depot with my personnel at 12:30, and to my great sorrow I had to leave for Bucharest and the dinner had to be given up.

On account of the broken bridges, hurriedly repaired, the trip from Jassy to Bucharest, instead of nine and one-half hours, took forty-eight hours. When the Court and the ministers arrived at Bucharest, the legations were not in condition to be occupied, and the city authorities rented temporary quarters for each minister in a public hotel.

The seals on the doors of our Legation were broken, chests and trunks had been opened, and many articles of value belonging to me and to my diplomatic friends had been stolen. The value of the stolen property was more than 100,000 gold francs.

We found the following proclamation published in Bucharest by General Berthelot:

With the permission of the king, I order all the military and civil authorities to fulfill the following measures:

The Prefects, Procurors, Gendarme Officers and Mayors will assure quietness and order, forming guard posts with the men under arms and the reserve officers. All agitators will be immediately arrested. All German, Austrian and Hungarian subjects will be put under observation.

The proclamation of the king, government and myself will be immediately affixed.

All traces of the late occupation must be removed. All German, Hungarian and Bulgarian inscriptions will be destroyed. All postal and fiscal stamps of the late German occupation will be taken from circulation.

In each locality commissions will be formed for the control and assurance of food for the population.

In the petroleum regions, commissions will be formed for the control of the production and working of petroleum. All petroleum products will be considered as requisitioned in the hands of the actual producers and holders.

The exporting of any kinds of food, clothing, petroleum, wood, etc., is prohibited.

There will be established in the shortest possible time all communications (railroads, telegraph and telephone lines). Men will be concentrated from their homes and will be organized in gangs of workers under reserve officers.

The Procurors and Judges of Instruction will prove up all destruction and violation of rights by the enemy, and will forward the records promptly.

Physicians will report through the Prefects the sanitary conditions and the need of medicines.

A service of daily couriers will be immediately established between all the Prefectures and the headquarters of the army at Giurgiu.

Until new dispensations, I fix the rate of exchange of 100 francs at 140 lei.

These dispensations remain in force until later dispensations of the Roumanian government.

They will be posted in all towns and villages.

BERTHELOT.

The people in Bucharest were dazed when they saw their king and the diplomatic corps again in their capital. For two years the Germans had occupied Bucharest, and it was only three weeks before that they had played German pieces in the Roumanian national theatres. Today their king came back with the army, and the people appreciated the great boon

of victory. They felt that they were again at home and rulers of their own country.

The entire city was decorated with the National and the Allied flags, and there was a great parade, which marched from the square in front of the building of the Minister of Foreign Affairs through the city. The procession was headed by the king and by General Berthelot and other prominent generals, Roumanian, English, Italian and French. There were a great many Roumanian soldiers, a few regiments of French, and some English and Italian troops. The United States was not represented by officers or soldiers, although I am sure that the people would have preferred to see the American soldiers first. I felt that the Americans had more friends than any other nation, as when Colonel Yates and myself passed in our automobile, we received the greatest and heartiest ovation of all.

(*December 7.*) The Russian delegates have impressed upon us the necessity of an immediate declaration to the Bolsheviki, and the French Consul in Kiev has been directed to formulate such a declaration in our name, as follows:

“So far we have not been notified as to what the Entente will do regarding the Bolsheviki in Russia.

“The Entente has proclaimed that a patriotic organization should be established in Russia, which will be aided by the Allies. The regeneration of Russia, as one of the victorious democratic powers of the Entente, will be accomplished, as it is the wish of all patriots and those who desire preservation of order there.

“More especially in Southern Russia, occupied or unoccupied, and threatened by Bolshevism, the Entente powers are willing to preserve order. This decision will

be executed without great delay. The Entente will from now on consider all leaders of parties or organizations personally responsible, whatever their politics may be, for any agitation spreading trouble and anarchy.


“The Consul of Kiev declares that in the meantime, before the Entente troops come, the Hetman and his government are expected to keep order in the cities and province. The Entente troops do not wish to come to Russia in the role of gendarmes or enemies. They will come as friends of the people, who during the last two years have been fighting in the same ranks with them. The Entente advises that they will punish riots.”

(*December 11.*) We have received a letter from the French Consul in Kishenev as follows:

“Several French and Allied concerns in Ukrainia have applied to me for protection against robbery by the Bolsheviki, especially the society called Groshanatz in Podoli. General Berthelot, as chief of the Allied forces in Southern Russia, declares that he will hold all the Bolsheviki and their accomplices responsible for any damages done to subjects of the Entente, or to the interests of the Allies, and that they will be severely punished.”

(*December 13.*) We have notified our governments that several Polish people came to us and informed us of the progress of Bolshevism in Galicia, and showed us the necessity of protection by the Allied troops. We have notified General Berthelot of this complaint.

The king has asked Mr. Bratiano to form a new cabinet, and the new ministers at present in Bucharest have taken the oath of office. Mr. Bratiano is to be the Prime Minister, and will also retain the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. To give this new govern-



VIEW OF KISHENEV IN BESSARABIA



SIBIN, OR HERMANSTADT, IN TRANSYLVANIA

ment national character, five places in the ministry, two of which are without portfolio, were offered to the party of Mr. Take Jonescu.

(*December 16.*) A delegate of the National Transylvanian Council has announced to the king the unanimous vote for the union of Transylvania with Roumania. The delegation called on us to notify us of the event, and was received with great enthusiasm, and in their honor many celebrations were arranged, in which we took part.

(*December 18.*) When we arrived at Bucharest we found that the Germans had taken all the supplies of food and clothing with them. There was nothing in the market and the people were in very deep misery. There was no wood in the city, and the government feared a great calamity.

The minister in charge of supplies visited us this morning to represent the gravity of the situation due to the extreme shortage of provisions. His Excellency stated that there were at the most 10,000 tons of wheat and 30,000 tons of maize in the country. This amount of wheat might last for twenty days, and the maize might last for two months, if there were no difficulties of transportation, which, however, are very great. This state of things was, His Excellency added, the more alarming in view of the Bolshevism by which Roumania was surrounded and menaced. There are agitators at work, whose cry is, "During the German occupation we had bread, now we have none."

The Roumanian government earnestly begs the Allied governments, in view of the extreme urgency of the matter, to take steps at once to send from their own stores, the nearer the better, possibly from Alexandria,

30,000 tons of wheat. Wheat, furnishing the staple food of the towns, where Bolshevism is more to be feared than in the country, is more essential than maize for the moment. We consider the matter so urgent that we beg that no question may be raised as to the mode of payment, such questions having caused great delay in the past. Naturally the Roumanian government will consider itself liable for the cost. I wrote a special telegram to my government asking that relief be sent as soon as possible.

(*December 20.*) The Parliament of Bessarabia, which on the 27th of March had voted the union with Roumania, but now, under reservation of liberal autonomy, votes a union without any reserve. It can be noted by the sense of the declaration that they have full faith that grand Roumania is a democratic country.

(*December 23.*) Mr. Bratiano, the Prime Minister, has asked us to send another appeal to our governments for food and relief, because he fears that Roumania, which all through the war has resisted the Bolshevik influence, might now offer a new home for it if the famine is not immediately remedied. To his request we add that the situation is very serious and calls for immediate remedy.

To show that the tears of the Prime Minister were justified, a great riot took place in Bucharest, in which a mob, consisting of anarchists, Bolsheviks and other dissatisfied elements, surrounded the royal palace and shouted, "Down with the king! Down with the royal family! Hurrah for the republic!" The guard which is usually at the palace did nothing until a shot was fired from the crowd and wounded two of the soldiers, and at this, without orders, the soldiers fired and killed

and wounded about fifty persons, and the crowd was dispersed. All the public places including theatres and moving picture shows were closed for nearly two weeks. The police arrested many people, among whom they found numerous Russian and German agitators who had tried to establish Bolshevism in Roumania. After this it seemed that the Bolshevik agitation ceased for some time.

(*December 31.*) We have telegraphed our respective governments that the food situation becomes more and more alarming, and that if the Allies do not remedy it without delay, this misery will cause worse troubles than those of last week. If they do not from now on announce that help is on the way, the people, who are dying from hunger, will charge the Allies with responsibility for great suffering, notwithstanding the satisfaction given to the national aspirations.

They repeat that the Allies do not take into consideration the fact that the worst situation among all the Allied nations exists in Roumania, as she was entirely devastated by the Germans and the Russians, and is the only country which was completely isolated for fifteen months. During the occupation, she could not be supplied, as Belgium was, by the United States.

We urge and we beg in the name of humanity, as well as for the political and economic interests of our countries, that part of the relief be sent as soon as possible. We also hope that this help will not be delayed on account of financial arrangements, as happened last year. It is only to be considered that food must be sent immediately, and payment arranged later.

The official *Moniteur*, dated the 26th, publishes the new decree of law, which confirms the union of Tran-

sylvania and Banat with the kingdom of Roumania, as voted by the National Assembly of the Roumanians of Transylvania and Banat.

(*January 2, 1919.*) A committee of Roumanian Jews came to me and asked me to obtain permission for some five thousand of them to go to Palestine, where they would be under the protection of the Allies. I obtained this permission from the Roumanian government, and then took up the affair with my colleagues, and we sent a joint telegram to our governments, asking whether the Allies are in favor of this move, and if they are, when and how these Jews could expect to be sent to Palestine.

(*January 7.*) The Prime Minister has notified us that he received a telegram from Carnarvon, according to which Belgium and Serbia will be the only two lesser powers admitted to the Peace Conference with the four great powers. He said they hope that this information is not correct, and Mr. Bratiano added that he believes Roumania is regarded as an unfortunate deserving pity, and not as an ally with full rights to justice. He said that if this be the truth, and Roumania should be left out, the government would be obliged to resign.

Mr. Bratiano states that the Roumanians continued the fight as long as possible, and that even after the complete disintegration of Russia, and notwithstanding the hostility of that country, Roumania has fulfilled her duty to the Allies as far as she could. The suspension of activity, as a consequence of the Treaty of Bucharest, which has never been confirmed by the king, terminated as soon as the army in the Orient was able to take the place left vacant by the Russian army. The Royal government has no doubt that their treaty of the 17th of August, 1916, is fully valid.



GENERAL GRIGORESCU

We have called the attention of our governments to the following facts:

(1) As a result of circumstances, the Entente has not been able to keep her promise to Roumania of the 17th of August, 1916. The offensive of Salonika, which was supposed to begin eight days before Roumania entered the war, was not started. Roumania continued to fight after the complete disintegration of Russia, whose aid had been guaranteed to her by the Entente, and although the new Russian government has declared war on her, the Allies having done nothing to remedy conditions or prevent this conflict.

(2) It is absurd to compare the situation of Roumania with that of Serbia. War had been declared on Serbia, and she was forced to defend herself, but Roumania was led into the war by the promises of the Entente. Serbia has always been in communication with the Allies, who have accepted her government and her army, but Roumania has been in between two enemies, absolutely isolated, and it was impossible for the army to retreat to Russia, as is recognized by the Allied representatives.

(3) We repeat that the Treaty of Bucharest has never had any legal value, as it was voted by an unconstitutional parliament, and has never been confirmed by the king, or ratified.

(*January 9.*) Because the Bulgarians still occupy Dobrudja, although the Roumanians were granted the whole of that country, this is an additional difficulty for the government.

(*January 13.*) We have received from an absolutely reliable source an extract of the protocol of the last meeting of the ministers in Budapest. This document

seems to be too important not to be immediately communicated to our governments. The text is as follows:

“It is necessary to organize, as soon as possible, six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, also their artillery and technical formations, and start again to fight against the Czechs and the Roumanians.

“It cannot become worse, and the continuation of the fight, a guerilla war if necessary, will convince the Entente that peace can only be made here if the integrity of Hungary is safeguarded. The soldiers will be recruited among the best men, and it will be necessary to promise to them, also to their families, the greatest advantages. We are sure that we will get more soldiers than necessary to organize the eight divisions. I beg the chief commander of the army to take the necessary measures, in order that the army may be ready within three weeks.

“The bulk of this army will be sent to Transylvania, where it will get in touch with the Hungarian population there and the socialists. The Hungarian socialists decided yesterday, the 24th of December, to send 30,000 to 40,000 laborers, who have no work here, to Ardeal and Banat, to get the population on the side of the Hungarians and the Serbians. For this purpose they have received twenty millions from the government. There they will excite the population, massacre the small detachments of the Roumanian army of occupation, and start a guerilla war.”

(*January 16.*) We have sent the following letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“According to the decree of law regarding the payment of indemnity for damages caused by the war, all applications must be filed by the 7th of February. As

it is impossible for us to notify all subjects of our countries of this decree, we must respectfully request that the time for filing be extended."

(*January 19.*) We are notified by the Roumanian government that Bulgaria is not keeping the terms of the armistice, as she is mobilizing more troops than allowed, that the Bulgarians take away all they can find in the way of supplies, and that the Roumanian government cannot enforce its rights in Dobrudja so long as the Bulgarians do not obey the terms of the armistice. We have sent a telegram to this effect to our respective governments.

(*January 20.*) We have addressed a communication to the Prime Minister as follows:

"It results from Article II of the decree of law, 3795, paragraph 1 of the circular of the Ministry of the Interior 73,605 bis, dated December 21, 1918, that all the institutions and societies, etc., which were under sequestration in 1916, and which comprise, in any proportion, enemy interests, cannot claim any indemnities for war damages.

"We beg to call the attention of the Roumanian government to the fact, that if it is its right to take these measures towards the enemy subjects, these measures should, however, not affect the interests of Allied or neutral subjects.

"As regards the foreign enterprises in Roumania, the societies of enemy and other subjects should have been considered as legitimate before the entrance in the war of Roumania. In consequence, any measures taken towards such enterprises should preserve the rights of the Allied and neutral subjects.

"We ask the government to execute the above

named orders in conformity with these principles, which cannot be discussed.

“We further ask that those who are in the above mentioned position be allowed to file their claims, and be granted the necessary time for it.”

(*February 4.*) A delegation of the Saxonian population, which forms the majority of the Germans in Transylvania and Banat, came to Bucharest to proclaim that they are for the union with Roumania. These Saxonian delegates proclaimed that they have no interest in Germany, from which they have been separated for eight centuries. According to indications published here, the adherence of the Saxonians will give the Roumanians the majority in Torondal also.

The telegrams published in the press indicate that it has been decided in the most pro-Entente circles, that the question of Banat can only be settled after a close investigation, and after the removal of the Serbians from that country. According to our instructions, we have formulated our reservations regarding the occupation of the disputed territory, in stating that this occupation cannot prejudice the destiny of this territory.

The Roumanian government has stated that, out of respect for the Entente, they did not occupy exclusively Roumanian districts in Transylvania, nor in Dobrudja which is part of the former national territory. The Minister of Foreign Affairs admits that it would have been better to have delayed the decree of law regarding the union of Transylvania until the decision of the Conference, but the present state of misery of the country is such that national satisfactions are the only ones they can grant, and this is the best means of keeping the country free from Bolshevism. We must realize



KING AND QUEEN OF ROUMANIA, WITH GENERALS AND
MINISTERS, IN TRANSYLVANIA



MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN FOOD COMMISSION IN ROUMANIA

that because of snow all transportation has been completely paralyzed, and the misery, even in the capital, is extreme and creates a real danger.

(*February 6.*) We have received a letter from the Roumanian government again complaining that the Bulgarians are taking all the supplies away from Dobrudja, and they ask us to see to it that they are sent away from that territory.

(*February 10.*) We have again received a notification from the Roumanian government that the Roumanian population in Constantinople and Turkey is suffering because Roumania has no official representative there. They ask that they be permitted to nominate a Roumanian commissioner to represent the Roumanian interests there.

(*February 11.*) The Roumanian government has notified us that a great part of the archæological treasure has been removed from the museums of Southern Dobrudja, and transferred to Bulgaria and put in the museums in Varna. They demand immediate restitution. General Berthelot notified General Chretien to inform him of this Bulgarian action, and we have asked our governments to notify the Allied representatives in Sofia to attend to this matter.

We have received complaints from the Roumanian government regarding the treatment of the Roumanians in Transylvania, by the Hungarians, stating that they continue to treat the Roumanians there very cruelly, torturing and killing people in different villages. The Roumanians claim that the action of the Hungarians should be stopped, because in the territory which is occupied by Roumanian troops all nationalities are protected.

(*February 20.*) We have sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which we protest against Article I of the decree of law regarding agricultural reforms, as follows:

“Article I of the law regarding the agricultural reforms prescribes the complete expropriation of rural property belonging to foreign subjects, whereas the national properties will only be reduced. This arrangement seems to discriminate between the Roumanian and Allied subjects, to the detriment of the last mentioned.

“We consider it our duty to call the attention of our governments to the text of this law, and await instructions. Meanwhile we beg to formulate our reservations.”

We have notified our governments that the Drogman of the Roumanian Legation in Constantinople, Mr. Capacosta, is authorized to represent the Roumanian interests before the Commissioners in Constantinople.

(*February 21.*) We have asked the Roumanian government that Allied capital should be treated the same as purely Roumanian capital. In case the Roumanian government should wish to appoint a sequester for an Allied society, we ask that before the nomination of the sequester is made, the Minister of the Allies whose subjects' interests are involved should be consulted about it.

CHAPTER XXIX

DISTRESSING SHORTAGE OF FOOD—HEALING BREACH BETWEEN ALLIES AND ROUMANIA—TRADE DEVELOPMENT

(February 21, 1919)

I HAVE sent to my government, and my colleagues to their respective governments, the following telegram regarding the food necessary for Roumania, based upon information received from Captain Green, United States representative in Roumania of the Food Commission of the Supreme Economic Council:

“The amount of food which it will be necessary to ship into Roumania up to the end of November amounts to an average of 100,000 tons per month. This figure is based on a careful study of the official reports of the Ministers of Commerce, War and Agriculture, and on such other information in regard to conditions as is available. The figures are, of course, not prepared with the scientific exactitude which would be possible in a country possessing the administrative machinery necessary for the preparation of complete statistics concerning the stocks now in hand. I am, however, convinced that unless importations approximating an average of 100,000 tons a month are made, most of the live stock of the country, and a large proportion of the population, will die of starvation before the end of the present crisis.

“According to advices received from Mr. Hoover, United States Food Administrator, the United States will be able to furnish only 25,000 tons of cereals per month, as a contribution to the requirements of Rou-

mania. I am as yet uncertain whether a certain quantity of pork products is to be included in the 25,000 tons, or whether it can be furnished in addition to the 25,000 tons. In any case, it will be necessary for the Roumanian government to apply to the British and French governments for a proportion of their food requirements.

“There is also very urgent need of spring wheat, barley, oats and maize seed; except the maize, all seed must reach this country before March 15 to be of any use. The maize could be used if it comes a fortnight later. Unless these seed requirements are satisfied the crisis will last another year.”

This appeal was made on the 5th of March:

“We earnestly hope that the three governments, America, England and France, will take into immediate consideration the food situation in Roumania, and we beg that we may be informed as soon as possible how far the requirements stated can be met by the respective governments.

If it is impossible to divert ships with seed for wheat, oats and barley in time to be of use, we trust that all efforts will be concentrated on the arrival here of maize for seed before April 1. In this case, it would be most helpful that we should be enabled to publish widely that maize will arrive in time for sowing, so that the peasants will not be tempted to conceal any stocks they may have, in order to preserve them from consumption and keep them for sowing purposes.”

(*March 7.*) We have sent to the Roumanian government a request that the execution of the law mentioned in our communication of the 22d ult. be suspended.

(*March 10.*) The announcement that the line of occupation passed by Sathmare, Orada Mare and Arad,

„Roumánské páni Charlesa Popovického, ministra
spojených států Americké republiky. Nevyšel se udeřiti Čechové,
jako zajatci z Ruských armád v době světové války zjizvě
v Demiansku. Těch tak zachová, moha letě ve zdraví, a spokojenosti.“

„Pravě, dne 15 listopadu 1918.“



CZECHO-SLOVAK WAR PRISONERS WHO CAME TO ROUMANIA FROM RUSSIA, WAITING FOR
A CHANCE TO FIGHT FOR THE ALLIES

which was given to the Roumanians, provoked a great rage in the Hungarians, who revenge themselves again by new atrocities and massacres, which occur daily. It is absolutely necessary that the Roumanian troops be sent to their new line of occupation as soon as possible, where they should be assisted by the Allied troops. Every hour of delay in said decision will lead to more atrocities. We ask our governments to take the necessary steps to hasten the establishment of the new line.

The Prime Minister advises us regarding the law about foreign capital, that it should be treated the same as purely Roumanian capital. He cannot, he states, comply with our request, as the Constitution alone can change this. We will, however, continue to ask that this modification be made.

(*March 24.*) The Roumanian government has complained to us that the international military authorities have prohibited the exportation of goods from Turkey to Roumania. If this is true, it will result in great damage to Roumania, because, at this time, the population is short of everything. We have requested that a telegram be sent immediately to these commissioners, asking if this report is correct, as we would like to satisfy the Roumanian government, which considers this action very grave.

To all demands for food, America and England answered first. Roumania had only one week's supply of corn left, and no bread, when two boats with more than 5,000 tons of flour each arrived at Constanza. Afterwards the supplies came mostly from America, and were distributed under the direction of Captain Green

in such a manner that he gained the praise of the Roumanian ministry, especially of Minister Constantinescu, who had charge of the supplies. I am sure that the Roumanians will be forever grateful to the American people for this aid in their greatest misery.

At the time when the appeal was made to America for the relief of Roumania, it was first asked that the Hoover Food Commission send as much food as possible to Roumania as quickly as it could be shipped. At the same time an appeal was made to the American Red Cross, and the response from both was prompt and generous.

Colonel Henry W. Anderson was the American Red Cross Director for all the Balkan States, and Major H. G. Wells was sent directly to Roumania to take charge of the relief work there. He established branches for the distribution, in charge of members of the American Red Cross, and by his systematized plans all sections of the country were afforded relief. The American Red Cross spent several million dollars for the relief of Roumania, and the benefit to that country was incalculable.

To the telegram of March 10 which my colleagues and I sent to our respective representatives on the Peace Commission, regarding the line of demarkation, we never received an answer, and when in April, 1919, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Karoli, could go no further because his government was bankrupt, he turned over the Hungarian government to Bela Kun, the Bolshevik leader of Hungary.

This new ruler aroused terror not only in Hungary, but also in the neighboring countries. He imprisoned his political opponents and many rich people outside

of political circles, and he had many of them executed without trial.

He ordered an attack on two villages in Transylvania close to the new border of Hungary and Roumania. In this attack one hundred and twenty-five Roumanian people were wounded and killed. At the same time his troops took with them the mother and sister of the acting Governor of Transylvania, Mr. Maniu. When this report came to Bucharest, the Roumanian people became very much excited. The newspapers blamed the government for not acting, and for not taking possession of the new border line which was given to them by the Allies.

During this excitement, which extended to the members of the Cabinet, Minister Constantinescu asked the Entente ministers and myself to dinner. In the course of the conversation there, this matter was discussed, and the minister asked our advice as to what should be done to quiet and protect the people.

We, the ministers, had not received instructions from our respective governments, and therefore told him that the Roumanians could not take possession of the new line of demarkation until they were advised to do so by the Peace Commission. I stated that if in America such attacks as those of Bela Kun should occur, the people would protest until the government would be obliged to send troops to protect those in danger, whether there was authority to do so or not.

No answer came from the Allies, and the Roumanians marched the next day and took possession of the new line of their frontier as fixed by the Allies, although not yet confirmed by them.

The same evening I sent a telegram to the American

Peace Commission in Paris, and requested them to see to it that Bela Kun received forty-eight hours' notice from the Peace Commission to quit, and if he disobeyed this order, that the Peace Commission should give joint orders to Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Roumania to attack him and make him quit, and I stated that by this action the prestige of the Allied Peace Commission would be preserved.

I am sure that if action had been taken on my telegram, which, by the way, was endorsed by the American military attaché in Bucharest, much trouble and many Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian lives could have been saved, and that the Peace Commission would have preserved its prestige.


Regarding the line of demarkation, we received from the Paris Peace Commission notification that General d'Esperey would establish and supervise the line between Hungary and Roumania. After the Roumanians took possession of the line, Bela Kun attacked them from the north and inflicted great damage, but the Roumanians not only repulsed the attack but defeated Bela Kun's army and pursued it to the Tissa River. However, on the order of the Peace Commission at Paris, they stopped there, although they wanted to follow him up and if possible disperse his entire army.

While the Roumanian army was on the Tissa River, Bela Kun did not desist but attacked them from the south and killed twenty-four hundred of them. The Roumanians then went after him, and did not stop until they came to Budapest, where they dispersed his army and took possession of the city.

In April, 1919, I received the following letter from the Serbian government:



PETROLEUM WELLS IN THE VALLEY OF CAMPINA, ROUMANIA



PETROLEUM REFINERY AT CAMPINA

MINISTER:

His Royal Highness, Prince Alexander, Regent of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, desiring to give you a special sign of his high friendliness, and to recompense the services which you have had occasion to render to my country, has designed, by Decree of December 24, 1918, bearing No. 6159, to confer upon you the Grand Cordon of the Order of the White Eagle, 1st Class.

In handing you the decoration of the said order, I consider myself happy to be able to express to you my heartiest congratulations on the high favor by which you have been honored, and take with pleasure the occasion to assure you anew of my highest consideration.

(Signed) G. N. NASTASSIYETVITCH,
Chargé d'Affaires.

On the same day, I received an official communication from the Roumanian government, enclosing the following decree:

FERDINAND I

By the grace of God and National Will,
King of Roumania
To all present now and hereafter,

Greetings

In accordance with the Report No. 5112 of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chancellor of Orders, I have decreed and decree:

Art. I. We appoint a member of the order of Steaua Roumaniei, in the grade of Mare Cruce, Mr. Charles Vopicka, Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the United States of America to our Court.

The named will wear the civil insignia.

Art. II. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chancellor of Orders, is charged with the execution of this decree.

Given at Bucharest this 30th day of March, 1919.

(Signed) FERDINAND.

The Acting President of the Councils of Ministers,
The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chancellor of Orders,

No. 1467

M. PHEREKYDE.

I expressed my thanks to both governments for the honors conferred upon me, but was obliged to state that under the laws of my country, a representative of the nation was not permitted to receive any decoration during the term of his official life. However, this objection was not regarded as insuperable by either of the monarchs and each insisted that I accept the decoration.

King Ferdinand had seen the statement in a newspaper that an act of Congress had been asked in a similar case in another country, in order to permit the acceptance of a decoration, and he thereupon sent a telegram to President Wilson as follows:

Mr. Vopicka, the United States representative in Roumania, has given so many proofs of his devotion to the Allied cause, and especially to Roumania through all these difficult times, that I am very desirous to show him my full appreciation of his excellent work by bestowing on him a Roumanian decoration. I would consider it a special favor if the United States government would allow Mr. Vopicka to accept this distinction.

(Signed) FERDINAND.

I immediately wrote to the Department of State, giving all the facts, and enclosing the decrees and the decorations, and these remained in the custody of the State Department at Washington until I resigned my post, when they were turned over to me.

About the first of June, 1919, I left for America, on leave of absence granted to me by the Department of State. The Roumanian government gave me a special car which took me up to Agram, where another special car was assigned me by the Jugo-Slavians and Czecho-Slovaks, which took me first to Vienna and from there to Prague. I was anxious to visit Belgrade at this time, but on account of the trouble between Jugo-Slavia and Italy about Fiume, the Department of State thought it was not advisable.

When I came to Paris in the month of June, I inquired of the members of the American Peace Commission, Mr. Lansing, Mr. White and General Bliss, whether my telegram regarding Bela Kun's action arrived. I was told to take the matter up with General Bliss, who said that my telegram did arrive, but that no action was taken on it because he accepted only the advice of American officers on the front in such matters. Then I told him in this case he could not wait for such advice from the Roumanian front, because there were no American officers there. But I could not argue with the General, who did not pay any attention to my communications.

After I had been in America about two weeks, I received a notice from the Department of State to come to Washington, where the Secretary of State showed me the complete correspondence between the American Peace Commission in Paris and the Department, in which it was stated that the Allies had ordered a blockade against Roumania and were about to break relations with them. I was much surprised at this news and immediately promised to return to Roumania and straighten the matter out. I was instructed to stop at Paris and talk with Secretary Polk, who at that time represented the American government in the Supreme Council of the Peace Commission.

Mr. Polk was very much dissatisfied with the inactivity of the Roumanian government. He said that this government promised everything and did nothing. I asked what was required from the Roumanian government, and assured Mr. Polk that I would be able to straighten out the trouble between the Allies and Roumania, if good will toward them could be shown to

me by the Allies themselves. He told me what was demanded by the Allies from Roumania, and stated that unless she complied with this request, the Allies would sever relations. I first spoke to the Roumanian members of the Peace Commission in Paris, and then sent telegrams to the Roumanian Prime Minister.

Within ten days the Roumanian government complied with the first request of the Commission, to supply 10,000 gendarmes in Hungary with arms and ammunition, and also complied with the other things which were required, with the exception that they refused to sign the treaty between Roumania and Austria. One of their reasons for not doing this was that they did not like the preamble of the treaty, the rights of the minority, and the description of the special Jewish rights. I first ascertained what changes in the preamble were demanded by the Roumanians, and then submitted them to Mr. Polk. He thought that these changes could be made. I said that if this was the case, I could leave for Bucharest, where I could settle the rest of the trouble. When I arrived at Bucharest, I was surprised at the conditions existing there and at the feeling against the Allies. I called a meeting of the Allied ministers, as the dean of the diplomatic service, and in this meeting we decided on action which would adjust the differences between the Allies and the Roumanians. However, the Peace Commission was impatient at the delay of the Roumanians and sent notice that unless the agreement was signed within a week, the Allies would be obliged to break relations.

With the representatives of England, France and Italy, I served this ultimatum on the Prime Minister, General A. Vaitoianu. I told him that we were all



T. G. MASARYK
PRESIDENT OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA



VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC
TO ROUMANIA

IN FRONT: MR. MASARYK AND MR. VOPICKA

IN REAR: MINISTER TAKE JONESCU, MR. DUCA, A SERBIAN
LIEUTENANT, MRS. MARINCOVITCH, SERBIAN MILITARY
ATTACHÉ, FRENCH MINISTER COUNT DE SAINT AULAIRE,
SERBIAN MINISTER MARINCOVITCH AND FRENCH GENERAL
BERTHELOT

very sorry to be obliged to serve this notice, but as long as peace in Europe was at stake, that we asked him kindly to comply with the request of the Allies. He said he would present this request to his ministry and give us the answer as soon as possible. After deliberation, the ministers decided that because of patriotic scruples, they would rather resign than sign the treaty, and when this was announced to the king, he appointed Vaida Voevod prime minister.

At eleven o'clock that night, the new Prime Minister came to our Legation and told me that if the changes he suggested in Paris were made in the treaty, he would be willing to sign it. I assured him that the Peace Commission would comply with this request, and that he should send my telegram regarding this matter over his wire, as it was necessary that the answer should reach Paris before the departure of Mr. Polk to the United States. The signing of the treaty between Austria and Roumania was the last matter to which Mr. Polk's attention was given.

After this treaty was signed and the danger of a rupture between Roumania and the Allies was removed, the Roumanian people were very well satisfied. At first it was the opinion of the members of the royal family that Roumania had made great sacrifices by signing this treaty, but after further consideration they also became fully satisfied.

At last peace had come to Roumania, and the people could return to their homes, and again take up their former occupations.

My position as minister to three countries was unique, and required the exercise of much tact and discretion.

While it is true that these countries had many interests in common, they also had their individual interests apart from each other, and there naturally was great rivalry in many things. Possibly the greatest fear of all was of any possible encroachment on their respective territories.

Therefore I was scrupulously careful, when making a speech in any one of the countries, to confine my remarks only to the affairs of that nation, and to make no reference to the affairs of the other states. Of course it was to be expected that at times the representatives of a government would, ingenuously or otherwise, ask some question regarding conditions or matters in one of the other countries which I represented, but diplomatic evasion of such inquiries was a necessary part of my official career.

CHAPTER XXX

SKETCHES OF KING FERDINAND AND QUEEN MARIE — OTHER ROUMANIAN PATRIOTS

DURING the years 1914 and 1915, I was in constant communication with the American Consul-General, Mr. J. B. Ravndal, in Constantinople, where he helped to start the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. He asked me to coöperate with him in organizing an American Chamber of Commerce for the three Balkan countries to which I was accredited.

I realized the necessity of a Chamber of Commerce for the establishment and development of trade between these countries and America. The business done in these countries with America was very small and was limited to purchases of agricultural machinery. I immediately asked our consular agent in Sofia and our consul in Serbia to coöperate with me. In Bucharest, I called a meeting of prominent American and Roumanian business men, and at this meeting the Chamber of Commerce was organized. However, just when plans were laid and a program worked out, Roumania entered the war and our activity was stopped.

When the new consul, Mr. Kemp, arrived at Bucharest after the war, I talked to him about the pre-war action on the American Chamber of Commerce, and he was enthusiastic about it at once and promised to continue the work. A meeting was called and the organization was renewed. He was elected chairman, with authority to name the board of directors.

During the term of my office as Minister to Roumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, the Department of State

was short of secretaries. I had a secretary for only two years out of the seven; in other words, I was without a secretary for five years.

When I left the United States for Jassy, via Russia, I took two young men with me as private secretaries, but one of them after he spent one month in Jassy was so sick of that city, and probably also lonesome for his sweetheart, that he left with the American Red Cross Commission for the United States; the other stayed with me up to June 8, 1918, the time when the Germans allowed the only train to leave from Roumania to France. Then I could not hold him, because he wanted to enlist as an aeronaut with the American army in France.

The persons who left in this train could take no papers with them, so I had to make him memorize everything I wanted to say to my government. He arrived at Berne, sent my message to Washington, and after that joined the American army.

After he left, I had only one clerk in the Legation. He was an Englishman, an old employe of the Standard Oil Company, and I was obliged to depend on him entirely to do my office work. He was a good stenographer, but did not speak French. I had to attend to telegrams and official correspondence personally. Of course during this period, more than six months, the Department could not send me any help, as I was isolated from the whole world, together with my colleagues, the Allied ministers, and the Roumanians themselves. At that time we were completely surrounded by the Bolsheviki and the armies of the Central Powers.

Our partial liberty was recovered when the American army, in September, 1918, showed our enemies what they could do. Then I was permitted to send tele-



QUEEN MARIE AND PRINCESS ILLIANA AMONG THE ORPHANS



PRINCESS ILLIANA OF ROUMANIA

grams in cipher, and again receive communications in the same form from the Department of State. During the period from April to October, 1918, I could send only telegrams *en clair*, and these, with two exceptions, were lost on the way.

When the Roumanian government returned from Jassy to Bucharest, of course all German war prisoners were brought there too. The German interests, after America went to war, were placed in the hands of the Swiss government, and then the Swiss Legation moved into the German Legation building at Bucharest.

The German war prisoners, especially the officers, in Roumania, could get no satisfaction from the Swiss Legation, and were calling on our Legation and asking me to intervene in their behalf, for humanity's sake, claiming that I was the only man who could obtain permission for them to be sent home. I told them that I could not interfere, out of courtesy to my colleague, but when I met the Swiss Minister, I talked to him privately about the matter, and he at once told me that he could do nothing for the war prisoners, and if I could do anything for them, he would be glad.

I took this matter up unofficially with the Prime Minister, Mr. Bratiano, and he said he was willing to send the German prisoners to Germany as soon as the Roumanian prisoners were sent back to Roumania. A Roumanian commission was sent to Berlin to take up the matter of exchanging the prisoners of war. An agreement was reached, and thereafter, whenever a trainload of Roumanian war prisoners arrived from Germany, the same train was filled with German prisoners and sent back to Germany. This exchange was satisfactory to both parties.

While the government's seat was in Jassy during Marghiloman's régime, a great deal of propaganda was given out against Bratiano's government in Walachia. Mr. Bratiano was charged, during the time that the Germans were successful on the Western front, with sacrificing Dobrudja, Roumania's economic independence, and even the whole Roumanian race.

Marghiloman insisted that General Illiesco should not be pardoned, stating that if he should be, the crime of Tukarcaia would be condoned, and furthermore, that he would be forgiven for the poverty he had thrown over the country. We cannot pardon national assassination. He said that Bratiano should be brought before the courts. Mr. Constantinescu was arrested with Mr. George Corbescu, the prefect of police, and others.

During my stay in Jassy, many representatives of different nations came to our Legation, and asked me to send petitions on their behalf to the Peace Commission and to President Wilson. Among them was a committee of Ukrainians, representing the party of General Petlura. To them I said that I could not recommend his party, because it was very uncertain whether his army consisted of Bolsheviki or anti-Bolsheviki. It was proved that the majority of his troops became Bolsheviki.

Also, representatives of the Bolsheviki of Ukraina called on me, and wanted me to send their petition to President Wilson. I told them that I did not believe I could do it on account of their doctrine, and the chairman told me that I probably was not well acquainted with their doctrine, and stated that the first Bolsheviki was Christ, because he said that nobody should own anything more than his neighbor. I told him that

that idea might have been all right in that time, but that it was impossible now.

The Cossacks, Georgians, Armenians and Albanians also sent representatives to the Legation to plead their respective causes, and to urge that their petitions be forwarded to the Peace Commission and to President Wilson.

After the Roumanian government returned to Bucharest, there was a feeling plainly shown between the people who came from Jassy and those who stayed in Bucharest during the German occupation, and even articles in the papers stated that the majority of the people who stayed in Bucharest were charged with being Germanophile and should be ignored. Of course this action was not approved by the Allied representatives in Bucharest. This feeling had abated considerably at the time I left Bucharest in 1920.

After the signing of the Armistice, many prominent Americans came to Bucharest for different reasons. Many were sent by the Peace Commission in Paris as investigators. Some were members of the American Red Cross, others were members of Hoover's Food Commission, representatives of religious missions and church investigators. A number of army officers arrived, but no emissaries of trade missions appeared.

Many came to the Legation to obtain information from me, which would aid them in the execution of their functions, and some of these men expressed their opinion that it would not be necessary to send commissions to the Balkans, if the Peace Commission in Paris would ask me to give my advice in settling the disagreements between the Balkanic nations.

Among other things which I considered very important for our country was the membership on the Danube

Commission. I asked the Department of State to insist that one member of the Commission should be an American, because if we wished to do business in Central Europe, it was essential that our country be represented on that body, but the Department of State never made a decision in the matter.

The Roumanian people will never forget those who were responsible for their victory, and who made out of Roumania, Roumania Mare, by extending the territory and increasing the population from seven million to eighteen million people. First among them is King Ferdinand I, who, at the request of the majority of the Roumanian people, consented to enter the war.

I consider King Ferdinand one of the most democratic kings in Europe. If it were not for the conventional ceremonies and formalities with which he was surrounded, I am sure he would have been willing and glad to meet all people without ceremony, even on the street or in his private home, as well as in the office of the palace.

He was a hard worker; there was not a day in the week that he was not working with the different ministers. He was well acquainted with all the branches of the government, and his advice to the ministers was invaluable. He was a constitutional king, with the exclusive right as the head of the army and the privilege to name the ministry.

When the question came up as to who should be King Carol's successor, King Carol himself suggested the name of the present King Ferdinand, formerly Prince Hohenzollern; and Queen "Carmen Sylva" suggested the Prince of Wied, later known as King of Albania.



ON THE DIPLOMATIC PLATFORM, AT THE CELEBRATION OF MAY 10 IN BUCHAREST

But King Carol gained his point, and the present King Ferdinand received the preference, to the good fortune of Roumania.

As a new Prince of Roumania, he immediately took up the study of the Roumanian language, which he spoke well, and I have heard him make speeches in that language that would do credit to any Roumanian professor.

When the war was started, he was a friend of the Allies, but would not make known his opinions, because King Carol was favoring Austro-Hungary and Germany, or neutrality. But after the death of King Carol, King Ferdinand showed his ability, and when the opportune time came, he proclaimed himself for the war on the side of the Allies, and from that time on became a very much loved king in Roumania. There was never given him the credit he deserves. I, who particularly studied him, must give him credit for his ability, capacity for hard work, democracy and fairness. He guarded the interests of Roumania successfully, and he proved himself, in the time of danger to Roumania, the man of the hour. During the war he was constantly with his army, giving advice and encouragement where it was necessary.

In his work he was well supported by his wife, Her Majesty the Queen Marie. It is my great pleasure to mention here the work of this queen, so popular and dearly loved by her people. As ruler, she showed her ability. In peace, she worked for the education of the people; she tried to better their material conditions. In their poverty, she aided them, and tried to find work which would not be difficult but still help them financially.

She was an early riser, getting up at 6 o'clock, and at

6:30 she had breakfast and then dictated her letters and material for her books. Later in the day she painted, visited different institutions and hospitals, and gave teas, to which she invited new artists, and in that way introduced them to the public. At the same time she chatted with the diplomats and with prominent subjects. And she managed to spend considerable time with her children, helping them to become well educated.

During the war, as an English-born woman, she was the greatest friend of the Entente in Roumania, and when the war was proclaimed in Roumania in favor of the Entente, everybody gave her credit for influencing this decision. She was an angel to the wounded soldiers, the orphans, the needy and the suffering people. She planned, she worked, she risked her life daily, especially during the terrible epidemics in Roumania.

She was everywhere. Her palace was changed into a workshop, in which the highest ladies in Roumania were toiling every day under her leadership. She discussed politics with the king and the ministers, and many times gave advice which brought great benefit to her country.

When she left Jassy and went to Biczaz, on the Bistritza River, the diplomats and the people of Roumania were afraid that the Germans might carry her away from there, as her protection was insufficient. But she walked about freely in her national costume, without fear, always working among the poor and sick, giving advice and aid to them. When during the war she lost her beloved son, Prince Mirca, she mourned the great misfortune but worked resolutely on. She was with the Red Cross workers on the battlefield, she consoled the wounded soldiers, and obtained for them

the best to eat and drink, of which, however, the stock was insufficient. There is no doubt in my mind that if she could have led the soldiers, the Roumanian army would have been unconquerable.

Her constructive work during the war for the aid, not only of the soldiers and orphans, but of the civil population, which suffered terribly by reason of insufficient food, was praised by everybody. Friends or enemies had only good words for her, and when she became ill, I met many people whose eyes were full of tears when they asked me news of Her Majesty's condition.

I am recording this as a sketch of the real queen, whose activity benefited her people, in whose hearts her name is written in golden letters, and who is admired by all diplomats and visitors who had opportunity to see her work for humanity.

Her Majesty's womanly traits were very marked, and often revealed even in trivial matters. Shortly after the treaty between Roumania and Austria was signed, in 1919, I sent her a box of American made flavored biscuit, and these she acknowledged by sending me a beautiful autographed photograph of herself. On the back of this she had inscribed:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

Thank you ever so much for the exquisite biscuits. Illiana and I ate them with relish, regretting that America is so far off, and that the delicious biscuits disappear too rapidly, being too good to eat moderately. Now that our poor little country has been bullied into signing, I hope we may all be friends again, and that all bitterness between us and our "friends" will die a natural death.

(Signed) MARIE.

Other persons to whom credit should be given for Roumanian success are, Mr. Jon I. C. Bratiano, Mr.

Alex Constantinescu, Mr. Take Jonsescu, Mr. Nicu Filipescu, Mr. Mihail Pherekyde, Prince Stirbey, Mr. Vintila J. C. Bratiano, Mr. Diamandy, Mr. N. Misu, Mr. Em-Porumbaru, Mr. E. Constinescu, Mr. I. Duca, Dr. Angelescu, General Grigorescu, General Averescu, General Coanda, General Vaitoianu, General Prezan, General Cristescu, besides many others.

Mr. Marghiloman is mentioned because he was the Prime Minister under the German occupation of Walachia, and in his difficult position, although considered a Germanophile, he protected the royal family.

The inhabitants of Roumania, Serbia and Bulgaria have much in common, in their environment, customs and mode of living. The great majority in each country live in small houses, but being a hardy and prolific people, and given to marrying in early life, they raise large families. And each family has at least one dog, and sometimes one for each member of the family, all trained to be faithful guardians of their owner's interests.

The kysele mleko, a sour milk, called iaurt or Bulgarian sour milk, is a popular beverage. The cigarette habit is prevalent among both sexes in each country. They all have the same national dance, the "Hora," and the wedding ceremony is much the same, though this is probably due to the fact that they all belong to the orthodox church.

They all love their homes and countries. The Roumanians have a saying, "Dombovitza apa dulca cine mi se mai duce," which, being freely translated means, "Whoever once drinks the sweet water of Dombovitza will never depart from here." Their laws are generally founded on the same principles, though of



ON THE REVIEWING STAND ON MAY 10 IN BUCHAREST
QUEEN MARIE WITH PRINCESSES ILLIANA AND ELISABETH, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, MINISTERS
AND PROMINENT MEN OF ROUMANIA

course there are a few that are peculiar to their own locality. Many years ago, the Bulgarians passed a law imposing a tax of three dollars a year on all unmarried men of thirty years and over. It became a custom on the first Monday in Lent for the girls to arm themselves with inflated pig bladders, and with these they freely beat up the luckless bachelors, who were willing to pay the tax if they could only escape the flagellation, this being a case where it was more blessed to give than to receive.

CHAPTER XXXI

IMPROBABILITY OF FUTURE EUROPEAN WARS

TODAY we view Europe after the World War. What are the conditions there now? What does the future hold? Must we expect another war in the near future? How should America act towards the stricken nations?

Frequently I have been asked these questions, and I believe the American people are entitled to all the information that can be given them regarding present conditions in Europe, and the probabilities and possibilities of the future. And this must be based on knowledge of the European people, their pre-war aspirations and their national demands and needs.

Many do not yet realize how hard a task President Wilson had after the armistice, when the settlement among the nations came up for discussion before the Peace Commission in Paris.

The Entente Powers (England, France and Italy) made contracts and gave promises to different nations before America entered the war, to induce them to take part on their side and help defeat the enemy, and many of these promises, and even contracts, were not brought to the knowledge of President Wilson. When he proclaimed his fourteen points he did not know that many of the promises made could not be fulfilled if his plan should be adopted, and this was really the cause of the trouble which faced the Peace Commission and delayed the signing of peace treaties.

For years the main obstacle to European peace was Austro-Hungary, and I believe that by the division of

that monarchy the main source of trouble for peace in Europe was removed.

Let us see which nations in Europe, if any, could desire war in the future. We will consider first those which were defeated, namely, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

I do not believe that Germany will be eager for war, for several reasons. First, since this war, the people of Germany have become more democratic and anti-militaristic. The militaristic party of Germany, which had a pre-war strength of only eleven per cent of the German population and yet forced the German people into the disastrous war, will never come into power again, if the present democratic government can be made permanent and prove that the people can exist under it as under the military rule.

Monetary reasons alone are sufficient to preclude the possibility of Germany again seeking a war.

Germany as a republic, like all firmly established republics, will not be led into war on flimsy or unimportant issues as readily as a monarchy.

A German republic, a democratic institution, will be more successful than the monarchy. If the Allies take into consideration this last named point especially, they will be careful not to press Germany too far. We Americans can aid to establish a permanent republic in Germany, not by mere advice but by material help.

The often expressed fear that Germany might combine with Russia and fight the other nations should not be considered at all. Bolshevik Russia has a separate standing, and not all Russians are Bolsheviki. We must not forget that the Russians are Slavs, and, therefore, even if the government of Russia is changed in

the future, there will be no combination of Germans and Russians against the people of the world.

There are other reasons against hostile action on the part of Germany in the near future, but the chief one is that the German people are worn and subdued by their experiences, which they do not care to live through again.

Austria, now a new country with about six and one-half million people, cannot even think of a new war. There would have to be a reason for which the whole nation would demand it, and there is none conceivable.

In this connection, I may state that the stand of the Allied Powers against the annexation of Austria to Germany was taken for the reason that Germany would be too near the Balkans, which would be inimical to European peace.

The statement that Austria cannot exist as an independent nation is wrong. The people living in Vienna must now and forever forget what Vienna was before the war, when all the other nations constituting the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were obliged to pay for the upkeep of that city, which was the residence of the monarch and the seat of government. If that is forgotten, they can develop their industries just as the people of Switzerland do, and then Austria can live on its industry as well as Switzerland can.

Hungary's position is better than the position of Austria, because she is entirely an agricultural country. With her seven million inhabitants she has a prosperous existence assured. She also must forget her pre-war standing, and adjust herself to present conditions. If she should try to engage in war, she would simply be committing national suicide.

To M^r. Topicka
with my thanks for his help
in the Roumanian
cause.



Marie

Queen of Roumania

1917

Bulgaria is the only country which has a real grievance. It is charged that she committed a crime by joining Germany and Austria in the war, but we must realize that the people of Bulgaria as a whole did not wish to join the Germans, and that their sympathy was with the Allies. Czar Ferdinand and Prime Minister Radoslavoff were responsible for her participation in the war, and they are today in exile, not permitted to return to Bulgaria.

The Allies of course demanded satisfaction, and Bulgaria was obliged to pay and suffer for the wrong step taken, but I expected that the real attitude of the Bulgarian people before the war would be taken into consideration before the judgment of the Allies was pronounced. Now, after the decision is made against Bulgaria, I believe that she is too severely punished. Not only Thrace was taken away from her, but also the entrance to the Ægean Sea.

When we consider the future peace of Europe, we must also think of Bulgaria. The countries of her former Allies in the first Balkanic war are enlarged but she is made smaller. Land is the dearest possession of the Balkan people, and territorial reduction is the bitterest form of penalty.

I am sure we all agree that she had to be punished, but not so severely as she was. She should receive her frontier on the Ægean Sea again, and in compensation be obliged to pay a little more indemnity. If a steady peace is to reign in the Balkans, Bulgaria must be taken into consideration. She is there to stay, and her neighbors, no matter how unfriendly to her, must use sound judgment.

If Bulgaria, who lost all her claims on Macedonia, is too much pressed, she may be a cause of perpetual

unrest, a prospect the Allies should kill in the bud.

Turkey, the most troublesome country in Europe, should be removed from Europe to Asia Minor. The cruelty with which she treated the Armenians should be sufficient reason for this act. For centuries she was massacring Christians; for centuries she was an unmerciful master of the Balkanic nations. She never instituted any reforms, nor ever made a suggestion for the benefit of mankind. Now is the proper time to punish her for all her sins of the past.

The jealousy always existing among European nations should be removed in this case. Constantinople should be internationalized and the Dardanelles made perpetually free to all the nations. If the Allies will not settle the Turkish question now, in the sense above interpreted, then they do not sincerely desire peace, and the talk of a long and undisturbed peace is hollow and insincere.

The Turkish reign should be removed to Asia Minor, Turkey removed from Europe, and Bulgaria's penalty made just, will secure European peace for a long time to come.

The new nations created in the war, namely Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Poland and enlarged Roumania have no reasons to commence a war. Their national dreams are realized, and they will be glad to live in peace.

After the Irish question is settled and the Russian problems cleared up, the old European nations will not begin any fresh wars, and all Europe will enjoy the peace which was purchased with such tremendous sacrifices.

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIA'S GREAT SACRIFICES AND INVALUABLE AID — HER FUTURE

RUSSIA, the most unfortunate country on earth at the present time, should be well treated by the Allies. It is due to her army and to the vast sacrifices she made at the beginning of the war that Germany could not attack the Allies with her full strength, during the years 1914 and 1915, and inflict on them a decisive defeat.

It was a sacrifice of the Russians to send two armies to East Prussia, as was done at the request of France, and this sacrifice made it easier for the Allies to defeat the Germans at the Marne, who were obliged to send several army corps from France to East Prussia at a very critical time. This Russian offensive together with the resistance of Belgium, was a great help to the Allies.

Furthermore, Russia kept Austro-Hungary constantly busy, and Generals Brussiloff and Ruzsky gained victory after victory against this ally of Germany. At the end of September, 1914, the Russian army occupied the whole of Galicia, and made the Austrian position so critical that Germany was obliged to send eighteen divisions to the Eastern front, divisions which not only could never be sent back, but even had to be reinforced.

In March, 1915, the Russian victory was so great that even Hungary was penetrated by the Russian troops, and the Austro-Hungarian army totally disorganized. To save Austria, Germany had to send anew seventeen divisions to Russia and change all her plans,

as it was plain that she had to defeat Russia first before she could take a decisive action in France.

Russia was fighting heroically up to September, 1915, when, because she had no ammunition, for she was not prepared for so long a fight, she was temporarily defeated. But by her stand, she gave England and France time to increase their armies and supply them with sufficient artillery, so that in February, 1916, when the Germans started their drive, the Allies were well prepared for the fight.

Again, a short time after this, when the Germans pressed the Allies too hard, Russia was appealed to and responded by commencing an offensive on a large front from Baranovitchy to Riga, again at a great sacrifice. This movement compelled the Germans to transfer several divisions to Russia at a time when she could not afford to move them from France.

And again, when the Italian front was endangered by half of Austria's army, Russia was appealed to with the result that General Brussiloff's offensive stopped the Austrian offensive in Italy, and the Germans were obliged to send eighteen more divisions to Russia. This move also facilitated the entrance of Roumania into the war. The Germans were finally successful in Russia, but many hundreds of thousands of her best soldiers found their graves there.

In the winter of 1916-17, Russia reorganized her army and increased her infantry, so that in the spring of 1917 she was stronger than at any time during the war.

Between 1914 and 1917 Russia was fighting Turkey in Asia Minor with great success, causing heavy losses of men and territory to Turkey, but on account of the successful revolution in March, 1917, she was prevented



WOODROW WILSON

from reaping the benefits of the victory of the Allies. Of course it must be taken into consideration that Russia's refusal to renew the commercial treaty with Germany in 1909 was one of the causes of the World War, and therefore by fighting on the side of the Allies she did only her duty.

During the war, Russia lost more than three million soldiers and as many more of her civil population, and her material sacrifices were enormous. This should not be forgotten.

During the war many changes occurred in the life of the Russian people. The Czar established prohibition and took vodka from them, and they in turn took his throne and afterwards his life, but the revolution brought freedom to the people from Czarism, and it was the general expectation that Russia would be a successful republic similar to our American republic. But it was not in the stars that poor Russia should long enjoy peace.

The government of Russia was taken over by the Soviets, who were and are trying to introduce their doctrine among the Russian people. To do that it was necessary to remove all the rich and intelligent people, either by killing them or sending them into exile, and to divide their properties among the mujiks. This granting of the land made the Bolshevik government strong. The armies of General Denikine and of General Wrangel had no chance, because, in the first place, Denikine never issued a proclamation of what his government should do for the Russian mujiks if victorious, nor proclaimed that the land which they were holding should be secured to them, and, therefore, they preferred the certainty which was assured to them by the Bolshevik

government. General Wrangel's campaign ended in complete defeat.

Russia's position in Europe is unique. She is the only country where a Bolshevik government exists. This government is trying to put in force a doctrine absolutely new, the result of which is at least very doubtful.

The enormous population comprises one hundred and fifty million Slavs, known to be peace loving people. The Bolshevik doctrine puts the country in a chaotic condition, and it is certain that only a part of the people are believers in this new theory, and probably only a very small part.

The present government is unable to satisfy the people for several reasons. Russia is exhausted from war and needs overhauling in all branches, not only of government, but of her industries and commerce

I believe it is not a good policy for American people to keep away from Russia and ignore her, because, in the simpleness of the Russian people, most of them being unlettered, they will always keep in mind the fact that our country was the one that did not help them after the war. Whether rightly or not, we can expect such a complaint.

The United States should send to Russia a mixed commission of diplomats, engineers, manufacturers and business men, who could bring back a complete report for our immediate consideration, so that we could either at once follow the example of England and other European nations who are now supplying Russia, or prepare some definite program for action as soon as possible.

America has a good opportunity to get orders from Russia for raw material and manufactured goods, a

demand which will be enormous, but if we let this opportunity pass, Germany, which is now ready for business, and England, that has more idle people than ever, will make strenuous efforts to supply Russia without us, and establish business relations there which will make American competition extremely difficult.

If the Russians are supplied with the necessities of life and the required agricultural machinery, it will be vastly easier for them to shape their government than it is at the present time.

Russia will limp for a long time, until a new democratic government is established, but I believe that she can be successful only if she is divided into federal states on the plan of our own republic.

The United States played the most important part in the war, decided the victory for the Allies and defeated German militarism, and thereby not only gave liberty and independence to many nations, but also freed the German people from military rule and made Germany a democratic nation, which, I am sure, will be more happy as a republic than before. And when the first hardships which always follow a war are overcome and forgotten, the German people will live a happier and more prosperous life than ever.

Americans can be proud of their part in the World War. Their unselfish and humane action under the leadership of President Wilson will forever be a record of which the American people can justly feel proud.

The World War is ended.

Let us hope that the blood of those who perished, and the tears of those who lived and suffered, shall not have been shed in vain, and that in time, out of all the

woe and desolation, shall be brought forth great and enduring good for all mankind.

For the smaller nations, let it be our hope that the last chapter has been written in the glorious record of the dauntless fight for freedom that they have waged for centuries, and that the priceless liberty they have won shall serve to unite them evermore, one for all, and all for one, in the cause of humanity.

And the people of these Balkan States, who in the desolate years of great tribulation became to me as brothers and sisters, may they find joy in their vocations and contentment in their homes, and in their hearts the deep peace that is born of devotion to the right, and may their children of either high or lowly estate be afforded the education that is youth's most precious heritage.

And may all the frightfulness of war be as a night of horror, banished by the dawning day that shall be the beginning of the eternal reign of truth and justice.

THE END



DECORATIONS ACCORDED MR. VOPICKA
SERBIAN ORDER
OF THE WHITE EAGLE
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ROUMANIAN ORDER
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